In Re: Cendant Corp. by unknown
2001 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-28-2001 
In Re: Cendant Corp. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Cendant Corp." (2001). 2001 Decisions. 196. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/196 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2001 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Volume 1 of 3 
 
Filed August 28, 2001 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 00-2520, 00-2683, 00-2708, 00-2709, 00-2733, 
00-2734, 00-2769, 00-3653 
 
IN RE: CENDANT CORPORATION LITIGATION 
 
JOANNE A. ABOFF FAMILY TRUST, 
U/A DATED 2/11/92, 
Appellant in No. 00-2520 
 
BETTY DUNCAN, 
Appellant in No. 00-2683 
 
TERE THROENLE, 
Appellant in No. 00-2708 
 
JANICE G. DAVIDSON; ROBERT M. DAVIDSON, in his 
capacity as trustee of Robert M. Davidson Charitable 
Remainder Unitrust, and as co-trustee of Elizabeth A. 
Davidson Irrevocable Trust, Emilie A. Davidson Irrevocable 
Trust, John R. Davidson Irrevocable Trust, Emilie A. 
Davidson Charitable Remainder Unitrust and John R. 
Davidson Charitable Remainder Unitrust, 
Appellants in No. 00-2709 
 
FAYE SCHONBRUNN, 
Appellant in No. 00-2733 
 
ANN MARK, 
Appellant in No. 00-2734 
 
NEW YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS, 
Appellant in No. 00-2769 
 
NEW YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS, 
Appellant in No. 00-3653 
 
 
 
 
  
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 98-cv-01664) 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls 
 
Argued: May 22, 2001 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and 
AMBRO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 28, 2001) 
 
       HOWARD B. SIROTA, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Sirota & Sirota 
       110 Wall Street 
       New York, NY 10005 
 
       Counsel for Appellant 
       Joanne A. Aboff Family Trust 
 
       EDWARD W. COCHRAN, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Cochran & Cochran 
       2872 Broxton Road 
       Shaker Heights, OH 44120 
 
       FRANK H. TOMLINSON, ESQUIRE 
       Pritchard, McCall & Jones 
       505 North 20th Street, Suite 800 
       Birmingham, AL 35203 
 
       PAUL S. ROTHSTEIN, ESQUIRE 
       626 Northeast First Street 
       Gainesville, FL 32601 
 
       Counsel for Appellant Betty Duncan 
 
                                2 
  
       C. BENJAMIN NUTLEY, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Kendrick & Nutley 
       468 North Camden Drive, Suite 200 
       Beverly Hills, CA 90210 
 
       RICHARD GALEX, ESQUIRE 
       Galex, Tortoreti & Tomes 
       150 Tices Lane 
       East Brunswick, NJ 08816 
 
       Counsel for Appellant Tere Throenle 
 
       GERALD W. PALMER, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       RICKY L. SHACKELFORD, ESQUIRE 
       EUGENIA L. CASTRUCCIO, 
        ESQUIRE 
       Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue 
       555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4600 
       Los Angeles, CA 90013 
 
       Counsel for Appellants 
       Robert and Janice Davidson 
 
       LAWRENCE W. SCHONBRUN, 
       ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
       Law Office of Lawrence W. 
        Schonbrun 
       86 Eucalyptus Road 
       Berkeley, CA 94705 
 
       Counsel for Appellant 
       Faye Schonbrunn 
 
                                3 
  
       JOHN HALEBIAN, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Wechsler, Harwood, Halebian & 
        Feffer 
       488 Madison Avenue, 8th Floor 
       New York, NY 10022 
 
       KENNETH A. ELAN, ESQUIRE 
       Law Offices of Kenneth A. Elan 
       217 Broadway 
       New York, NY 10007 
 
       Counsel for Appellant Ann Mark 
 
       MICHAEL D. HESS, ESQUIRE 
       LEONARD J. KOERNER, ESQUIRE 
       LORNA B. GOODMAN, ESQUIRE 
       ELIZABETH S. NATRELLA, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       LESLIE CONASON, ESQUIRE 
       Corporation Counsel of the 
        City of New York 
       New York City Law Department 
       100 Church Street 
       New York, NY 10007 
 
       Counsel for Appellants 
       New York City Pension Funds 
 
       MAX W. BERGER, ESQUIRE 
       DANIEL L. BERGER, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       JEFFREY N. LEIBELL, ESQUIRE 
       Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger, & 
        Grossman, LLP 
       1285 Avenue of the Americas, 
        33rd Floor 
       New York, NY 10019 
 
                                4 
  
       LEONARD BARRACK, ESQUIRE 
       GERALD J. RODOS, ESQUIRE 
       JEFFREY W. GOLAN, ESQUIRE 
       Barrack, Rodos, & Bacine 
       3300 Two Commerce Square 
       2001 Market Street 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
       Counsel for Appellees 
       California Public Employees' 
       Retirement System, New York State 
       Common Retirement Fund and The 
       New York City Pension Funds 
 
       ARTHUR R. MILLER, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       228 Harvard Law School 
       Langdell West 
       Areeda Hall 225 
       1565 Massachusetts Avenue 
       Cambridge, MA 02138 
 
       Counsel for Appellees Barrack, 
       Rodos, & Bacine and Bernstein, 
       Litowitz, Berger & Grossmann, LLP 
 
       ALAN N. SALPETER, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       MICHELE ODORIZZI, ESQUIRE 
       CARYN L. JACOBS, ESQUIRE 
       Mayer, Brown & Platt 
       190 South LaSalle Street 
       Chicago, IL 60603-3441 
 
       DOUGLAS S. EAKLEY, ESQUIRE 
       PETER L. SKOLNIK, ESQUIRE 
       Lowenstein, Sandler, PC 
       65 Livingston Avenue 
       Roseland, NJ 07068 
 
                                5 
  
       KATHRYN A. OBERLY, ESQUIRE 
       ROBERT G. COHEN, ESQUIRE 
       WILLIAM P. HAMMER, JR., 
        ESQUIRE 
       Ernst & Young, LLP 
       787 Seventh Avenue 
       New York, NY 10019-6018 
 
       Counsel for Appellee 
       Ernst & Young, LLP 
 
       CARL GREENBERG, ESQUIRE 
       MICHAEL M. ROSENBAUM, 
        ESQUIRE 
       Budd, Larner, Gross, Rosenbaum, 
        Greenberg & Sade 
       150 John F. Kennedy Parkway 
       CN 1000 
       Short Hills, NJ 07078-0999 
 
       SAMUEL KADET, ESQUIRE 
       Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
        Flom 
       Four Times Square 
       New York, NY 10036 
 
       Counsel for Appellee 
       Cendant Corporation 
 
       HERBERT J. STERN, ESQUIRE 
       Stern, Greenberg & Kilcullen 
       75 Livingston Avenue 
       Roseland, NH 07068 
 
       Counsel for Appellee 
       James E. Buckman 
 
                                6 
  
       DAVID M. BECKER, ESQUIRE 
       General Counsel 
       MEYER EISENBERG, ESQUIRE 
       Deputy General Counsel 
       ERIC SUMMERGRAD, ESQUIRE 
       Deputy Solicitor 
       LUIS DE LA TORRE, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Special Counsel 
       NATHAN A. FORRESTER, ESQUIRE 
       Senior Counsel 
       Securities and Exchange 
        Commission 
       450 Fifth Street, N.W. 
       Washington, DC 20549-0606 
 
       Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
       Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
       JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST, ESQUIRE 
       The William A. Franke Professor of 
        Law and Business 
       Stanford Law School 
       Crown Quadrangle 
       559 Nathan Abbott Way 
       Stanford, CA 94305-8610 
 
       MELANIE M. PIECH, ESQUIRE 
       Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & 
        Bernstein, LLP 
       275 Battery Street, 30th Floor 
       San Francisco, CA 94111 
 
       Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
       Barclays Global Investors, N.A., 
       Franklin Resources, Inc., New 
       Hampshire Retirement System and 
       Public Employees' Retirement 
       Association of Colorado 
 
                                7 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY   9 
 
II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL H ISTORY  15 
 A. Background  15 
 B. The Appointment of Lead Plaintiff and 
       Lead Counsel  17 
 C. Class Certification, the Filing of the Amended 
       Complaint, and the Reaching of a Settlement 22 
 D. The Terms of the Settlement and the 
       Plan of Allocation  24 
 E. Preliminary Settlement Approval, the Se ttlement 
       Notice, and the Fairness Hearing   27 
 F. The Appeals and the Issues Presented by 
       Each Appeal  29 
 
III. THE FAIRNESS OF THE SETTLEMENT AND THE 
       PLAN OF ALLOCATION 32 
 A. Approval of the Settlement: The Applica tion 
       of the Girsh Factors   32 
  1. The First Girsh Factor: Complex ity & Likely 
       Duration of Litigation  35 
  2. The Second Girsh Factor: The Re action 
       of the Class  37 
  3. The Third Girsh Factor: The Sta ge 
       of Proceedings  39 
  4. The Fourth Girsh Factor: The Ri sks of 
       Establishing Liability  41 
  5. The Fifth Girsh Factor: The Ris ks of 
       Establishing Damages  44 
  6. The Sixth Girsh Factor: The Ris ks of 
       Maintaining the Class Action Through Trial  45 
  7. The Seventh Girsh Factor: The A bility of the 
       Defendants 
       to Withstand a Greater Judgment  46 
  8. The Final Girsh Factors: The Ra nge of 
       Reasonableness of Settlement Fund in Light of the 
       Best Possible Recovery & in Light of 
 
                                8 
  
       Litigation Risks  49 
  9. Summing Up the Girsh Factors  52 
 B. Intra-class Conflicts  53 
  1. Throenle's Arguments  53 
   a. The Lead Plaintiff 's Allege d Conflicts 
       of Interest  53 
   b. The Corporate Governance Change s  57 
  2. Mark's Arguments  61 
 C. The Davidsons' Objections  66 
  1. Class Certification Findings  67 
  2. Notice of the Settlement   67 
  3. Intra-Class Conflicts  
               68 
  4. Alleged Flaws in the Plan of Allocation   70 
 
IV. COUNSEL SELECTION AND COUNSEL FEES  71 
 A. Introduction: Attorney-Client Tension i n the Class 
       Action Context  71 
  1. The Problem With Class Actions  71 
  2. The Evolution of Judicial Review of Cou nsel 
       Fees In Class Actions  73 
  3. The PSLRA  82 
 B. The Reform Act's Procedures; Selection of the 
       CalPERS Group As Lead Plaintiff   84 
  1. Legal Standards  84 
   a. Identifying the Presumptive Lea d Plaintiff  84 
   b. Determining Whether the Presump tion 
       Has Been Rebutted  93 
  2. Application of the Standards Here  96 
 C. The Auction  100 
  1. May NYCPF Validly Object to the Auction ?  100 
  2. Does the Reform Act Ever Permit 
       an Auction?  103 
  3. Was the Auction in this Case Permissibl e?  111 
 D. Counsel Fees  114 
 
V. CONCLUSION  12 
              4 
 
I. INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY  
 
These are consolidated appeals from the District Court's 
approval of a $3.2 billion settlement of a securities fraud 
class action brought against Cendant Corporation and its 
auditors, Ernst & Young, and the Court's award of $262 
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million in fees to counsel for the plaintiff class. Both the 
settlement and the fee award are challenged in these 
appeals. The enormous size of both the settlement and the 
fee award presages a new generation of "mega cases" that 
will test our previously developed jurisprudence. 
 
This case is governed by the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA or Reform Act). Under the 
Reform Act, one of a district court's first tasks is to select 
a lead plaintiff. Once the lead plaintiff has been appointed, 
the statute provides that the lead plaintiff "shall, subject to 
the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to 
represent the class." The District Court, after appointing a 
lead plaintiff, declined to approve its choice of counsel, 
instead choosing to select lead counsel by means of an 
auction. The most important question presented by these 
appeals is whether this decision was compatible with the 
PSLRA. Closely intertwined, and also of great importance, 
are issues involving the proper procedures for selecting a 
lead plaintiff and for awarding counsel fees in cases 
governed by the Reform Act. 
 
Before we can reach these issues, however, we must 
decide whether the District Court abused its discretion in 
approving the settlement and the plan for allocation of 
damages, to which objections were interposed. Some 
objectors argue forcefully that the settlement was 
inadequate under the nine-factor test that this Court 
developed for reviewing the fairness, reasonableness, and 
adequacy of class action settlements in Girsh v. Jepson, 
521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975). Noting that the class's case 
was exceptionally strong because Cendant (the main 
defendant) virtually conceded liability and because some of 
the plaintiffs' claims (i.e., those presented underS 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933) were strict liability claims, these 
objectors contend that, notwithstanding the threat of 
bankruptcy if the settlement was too high, a considerably 
higher figure could have been extracted under these 
favorable liability circumstances without running the risk 
that Cendant would seek bankruptcy protection. In their 
submission, the class should have received a fuller recovery 
of its alleged $8.8 billion loss. 
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These objections are weighty, but other Girsh  factors 
counsel strongly in favor of approving the Cendant 
settlement--the reaction of the class, the stage of the 
proceedings, the risk of establishing damages, the range of 
reasonableness in light of the possible recovery and the 
litigation risks, and, though to a lesser degree, the 
complexity of the litigation. Although we think that the 
question of the fairness of the settlement under the Girsh 
factors is closer than the District Court made it out to be, 
our application of those factors supports the conclusion 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
approving the Cendant settlement. 
 
The issue is even clearer with respect to the settlement 
between the class and Ernst & Young (E&Y), against which 
the case was far more difficult. As with Cendant's 
settlement, the reaction of the class, the risk of establishing 
damages, and the range of reasonableness of the recovery 
weigh in favor of approving the E&Y settlement. These 
factors are augmented by two other Girsh factors that weigh 
strongly in favor of the E&Y settlement: the complexity of 
litigation and the risk of establishing liability. Because the 
ability to withstand a greater judgment is the only Girsh 
factor that cuts against approving the E&Y settlement, we 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in approving it. 
 
One objector also argues that the District Court should 
not have approved the settlement because the entities that 
comprise the lead plaintiff were too conflicted to represent 
the class adequately. The bases for this claim are two-fold. 
First, the institutional investors that make up the lead 
plaintiff continued to hold Cendant stock during the 
litigation and settlement process, and thus, the objector 
submits, had very different motives from other investors 
who had sold their stock. Second, the lead plaintiff 
negotiated as part of the settlement certain corporate 
governance changes that will benefit only those class 
members that continue to hold Cendant stock. We are 
unpersuaded by the first argument because it is clear that 
Congress, in passing the PSLRA, for better or for worse, 
anticipated and implicitly approved the notion that entities 
that continued to hold stock in the defendant corporation 
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would serve as lead plaintiffs notwithstanding the existence 
of many class members who did not. With respect to the 
second argument, there is no evidence that the lead 
plaintiff gave up anything of value to the class members to 
induce Cendant to agree to the corporate governance 
changes. We therefore hold that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in approving the settlement. 
 
We then turn to the objections regarding the allocation of 
the settlement fund. One objector contends that the claims 
under S 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, which only a 
subset of the class possesses, are legally stronger than the 
other claims held by class members, i.e., claims under 
S 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Based on 
this disparity, the objector argues that the S 11 claimants 
should receive a larger share of the settlement proceeds. We 
conclude, however, that the S 11 claims here are not 
necessarily legally stronger than the S 10(b) claims, and 
that, at any rate, the basis for measuring the different legal 
strengths of the claims involved is too speculative to 
support the objector's contention. We thus hold that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in approving a 
settlement allocation that treated all claims more or less 
equally. 
 
Having determined that the settlement may stand, we 
must examine the District Court's award of counsel fees. 
Because the Reform Act establishes a detailed and 
integrated process for choosing a lead plaintiff, selecting 
lead counsel, and approving counsel's fee, we discuss these 
issues sequentially. In this case, the District Court selected 
as lead plaintiff a group made up of three pension funds 
(the CalPERS Group or Lead Plaintiff). Following the 
dictates of the Reform Act, the court first identified that 
Group, which is made up of three huge government pension 
funds, as being the movant with the largest financial 
interest in the relief sought by the class. The court then 
made a preliminary determination that the CalPERS Group 
satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23's typicality and 
adequacy requirements, which, under the PSLRA, made it 
the presumptive lead plaintiff. The District Court ultimately 
appointed the CalPERS Group as lead plaintiff because it 
determined that no member of the plaintiff class had 
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succeeded in rebutting the statutory presumption. We find 
no fault with the court's decisions on this score. 
 
The Lead Plaintiff then asked the District Court to 
appoint as lead counsel two firms with which it had 
previously negotiated a Retainer Agreement, Bernstein, 
Litowitz, Berger, & Grossmann of New York City, and 
Barrack, Rodos & Bacine of Philadelphia. The court 
declined initially to approve the Lead Plaintiff 's choice, 
deciding instead to select lead counsel via an auction, but 
giving the CalPERS Group's chosen counsel the option to 
match what the court determined to be the lowest qualified 
bid. Those firms exercised this option and were appointed 
as lead counsel. Following the settlement of the case, and 
consonant with the results of the auction, Lead Counsel 
petitioned for and was awarded a sum of $262 million in 
counsel fees, even though that amount was at least $76 
million higher than that provided for under the Retainer 
Agreement. 
 
We conclude that the court's decision to hold an auction 
to select lead counsel was inconsistent with the Reform Act, 
which is designed to infuse lead plaintiffs with the 
responsibility (and motivation) to drive a hard bargain with 
prospective lead counsel and to give deference to their 
stewardship. Although we believe that there are situations 
under which the PSLRA would permit a court to employ the 
auction technique, this was not one of them. Here, 
inasmuch as the Lead Plaintiff conducted its counsel 
search with faithful observance to the letter and spirit of 
the Reform Act, it was improper for the District Court to 
supplant the CalPERS Group's statutorily-conferred right to 
select and retain lead counsel by deciding to hold an 
auction. In sum, we hold that the District Court erred in 
using an auction to appoint lead counsel; rather it should 
have done so pursuant to the terms of the Retainer 
Agreement. 
 
Because the District Court's process resulted in the firms 
chosen by the Lead Plaintiff being appointed lead counsel 
anyway, this error was harmless (with regard to the 
selection of lead counsel). However, because the terms of 
the Retainer Agreement required the prior approval of the 
pension funds comprising the CalPERS Group, and that 
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prior approval was not obtained, the fee request here was 
improper. The fee award must therefore be set aside and 
this matter remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to dismiss the fee application and to decline to 
accept any further applications that are submitted without 
the prior approval of the Funds. 
 
It goes without saying that the principal focus after 
remand will be the counsel fee application which will be 
resubmitted. The parties have extensively briefed and 
argued the fee award issue, understanding that if the 
award is set aside the District Court will need guidance on 
remand. Having this need in mind--along with the fact that 
this case, in its various facets, has been before this Court 
seven times now--we will set forth the standards that the 
court should follow in evaluating a properly-submitted fee 
request in Reform Act cases so as to help bring this now 
protracted matter to a close. Although in general the court 
should use the same seven-factor test that our cases have 
developed for reviewing fee requests in other class action 
contexts, review in PSLRA cases must be modified to take 
into account the changes wrought by the Reform Act. The 
biggest change, we believe, is that courts should afford a 
presumption of reasonableness to fee requests submitted 
pursuant to an agreement between a properly-selected lead 
plaintiff and properly-selected lead counsel. 
 
This is not to say, however, that this presumption cannot 
be overcome. There is an arguable tension between the 
general schema of the PSLRA on the one hand and its 
overarching provision that requires the court to insure that 
counsel fees not exceed a reasonable amount, see  15 U.S.C. 
S 78u-4(a)(6), on the other. We hold that the presumption 
will be rebutted when a district court finds the fee to be 
(prima facie) clearly excessive. 
 
For the past decade, counsel fees in securities litigation 
have generally been fixed on a percentage basis rather than 
by the so-called lodestar method. Consistent with that 
approach, we have held that, when the percentage fee is 
challenged, the Court's obligation to award a reasonable fee 
will be best exercised by application of the factors described 
in Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 
2000). Gunter itself allows for the possibility of a lodestar 
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cross-check, see id. at 200, even though the lodestar 
approach is no longer favored. We conclude that, in 
determining whether the retainer agreement between the 
Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel is clearly excessive, the 
court should first use the Gunter factors to evaluate it, for 
the lodestar cross-check is quite time consuming. But if the 
court cannot otherwise come to a resolution, it can consider 
a lodestar cross-check. 
 
In determining whether the presumption of 
reasonableness of a properly submitted fee request has 
been rebutted here, the District Court will have to consider 
the powerful arguments of the objectors that: (1) this was 
a simple case in terms of liability; (2) the settlement was 
achieved without a great deal of work by lead counsel; and 
(3) both the fee award of $262 million under the auction 
and (potentially up to) $187 million under the Retainer 
Agreement are staggering in their size, and, on the basis of 
the evidence in the record, may represent compensation at 
an astonishing hourly rate (as well as an extraordinarily 
high lodestar "multiplier"). 
 
We conclude by explaining that, if the court's 
deliberations were to confirm that the fee agreed to by a 
lead plaintiff and lead counsel was clearly excessive, the 
court will need to set a reasonable fee according to the 
standards our previous cases have set down for class 
actions not governed by the PSLRA. 
 
II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Background 
 
Cendant Corporation, the main defendant, was formed by 
a December 17, 1997 merger of CUC International, Inc. 
(CUC) and HFS Incorporated (HFS). Pursuant to a 
Registration Statement and Joint Proxy 
Statement/Prospectus, HFS shareholders tendered their 
shares in exchange for CUC shares. HFS was then merged 
into CUC and the combined company was renamed 
Cendant. Cendant is currently one of the world's largest 
consumer and business service companies; among its more 
well-known businesses are Avis, Century 21, and the 
Ramada and Howard Johnson hotel franchise chains. 
 
                                15 
  
On March 31, 1998, Cendant filed its Form 10-K Annual 
Report with the SEC, which included the company's 1997 
financial statements. Two weeks later, after the close of 
trading on April 15, 1998, Cendant announced that it had 
discovered "accounting irregularities" in certain units of the 
former CUC. The notice stated that Cendant expected to 
restate its annual and quarterly financial statements for 
1997 and possibly for earlier periods as well; it also stated 
that Cendant had retained the law firm Willkie Farr & 
Gallagher (Willkie Farr) to conduct an investigation into its 
past financial statements and the allegations of fraud made 
by some Cendant employees. The next day, Cendant's stock 
fell 47%, from $35-5/8 to $19-1/16 per share, triggering 
several class action lawsuits on behalf of investors who 
purchased CUC or Cendant stock during 1997. 
 
On July 14, 1998, Cendant announced that it would also 
restate CUC's annual and quarterly financial statements for 
1995 and 1996. Following this announcement, Cendant's 
stock fell by another 9%, to $15-11/16 per share. On 
August 28, 1998, Cendant filed Willkie Farr's report of its 
investigation, with the SEC. The report revealed that 
Cendant would restate its 1995, 1996, and 1997 financial 
statements by approximately $500 million. On August 31, 
1998, the first trading day after Cendant's disclosure of the 
Willkie Farr report, Cendant's stock fell another 11%, to 
$11-5/8. The disclosure of the report triggered several more 
lawsuits arising from purchases of CUC securities during 
the broader period of alleged fraud. All told, Cendant 
shareholders lost more than $20 billion in market 
capitalization. 
 
Between April and August 1998, at least sixty-four 
putative securities fraud class action lawsuits were filed 
nationwide as a result of the above disclosures. Generally 
speaking, the lawsuits alleged that, from 1995 to 1998, 
CUC/Cendant had issued a series of materially false and 
misleading statements in the form of quarterly reports, 
annual reports, registration statements, prospectuses, and 
press releases, and that these statements artificially 
inflated CUC/Cendant's stock price. The lawsuits named as 
defendants Cendant, its officers and directors, and other 
parties--including E&Y, which had acted as CUC's 
 
                                16 
  
independent public accountant from 1983 until the time of 
the creation of Cendant. E&Y had also performed a post- 
merger audit of the financial statements of Cendant 
Membership Services, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Cendant, for the year ending December 31, 1997. The 
lawsuits alleged that E&Y had issued unqualified reviews 
and audit opinions certifying CUC's quarterly and annual 
reports, and that E&Y had failed to adhere to Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards and thus lacked any 
reasonable basis for its opinions and reports. 
 
Cendant eventually filed a cross-claim against E&Y, 
detailing allegations that E&Y became aware of the fraud 
long before it was made public but chose to conceal and 
facilitate it, thereby continuing to garner millions of dollars 
in fees. Alternatively, Cendant alleged that E&Y was 
negligent in failing to discover the fraud earlier. E&Y 
strenuously denied all the allegations made in the amended 
cross-claim, pointing out that Cendant had not provided 
any evidence or documentation to back up the allegations. 
 
By order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 
all cases relating to Cendant's accounting irregularities 
were transferred to the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey. On May 29, 1998, the District Court 
consolidated all of them under the caption In re Cendant 
Corporation Litigation. 
 
B. The Appointment of Lead Plaintiff and Lead 
       Counsel 
 
After consolidation, two of the District Court's first 
responsibilities were to appoint a lead plaintiff and lead 
counsel to represent the putative class. The PSLRA lays out 
detailed procedures for courts to follow in making these 
decisions, directing them to appoint "the most adequate 
plaintiff " as the lead plaintiff, and instructing them to 
"adopt a presumption" that the most adequate plaintiff is 
the movant that "has the largest financial interest in the 
relief sought by the class" and "otherwise satisfies the 
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure." 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) & (iii)(I).1 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Reform Act inserted identical amendments into the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. All citations are to the 
Exchange Act provisions. 
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presumption "may be rebutted only upon proof by a 
member of the purported plaintiff class that the 
presumptively most adequate plaintiff will not fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class or is subject to 
unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of 
adequately representing the class." Id.S 78u- 
4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). With regard to the selection of lead counsel, 
the statute provides that "[t]he most adequate plaintiff 
shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain 
counsel to represent the class." Id. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). 
 
Fifteen individuals and groups filed motions to serve as 
lead plaintiff, and the District Court held a hearing on 
August 4, 1998. It soon became clear that the CalPERS 
Group--a consortium of the three largest publicly-managed 
pension funds in the United States: the California Public 
Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), the New York 
City Pension Funds (NYCPF), and the New York State 
Common Retirement Fund (NYSCRF)--had, by far,"the 
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class." 
According to the District Court, the members of the 
CalPERS Group alleged combined losses in excess of $89 
million, while the largest amount alleged by any other 
movant was $10.6 million. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 
182 F.R.D. 144, 147 (D.N.J. 1998). This fact, in conjunction 
with the District Court's express finding that it satisfied 
Rule 23's "adequacy" and "typicality" requirements, see id. 
at 147-48, rendered the CalPERS Group the presumptive 
lead plaintiff. 
 
Two competing movants, the Joanne A. Aboff Family 
Trust (Aboff) and Douglas Wilson, offered three reasons why 
the presumption had been rebutted, but the District Court 
rejected their claims. Aboff and Wilson: (1) contended that 
they were better suited to be lead plaintiff than the 
CalPERS Group because they had negotiated a lower fee 
schedule with their lawyers; (2) argued that the CalPERS 
Group could not fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class because one of the Group's chosen counsel had 
made substantial campaign contributions to the sole 
trustee of one of the funds that make up the CalPERS 
Group, thereby creating an appearance of impropriety; and 
(3) suggested that the District Court should select lead 
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plaintiff "through a process of competitive bidding." Id. at 
148-49. The District Court concluded that the CalPERS 
Group could not fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the holders of convertible Cendant derivative 
securities known as PRIDES, see id. at 149-50, and severed 
the PRIDES claims from the main action.2  The court 
eventually appointed the CalPERS Group as lead plaintiff of 
the main Cendant action. See id. at 149.3 
 
The court then turned to selection of lead counsel. The 
CalPERS Group had filed a motion seeking to have Barrack, 
Rodos & Bacine (BRB) and Bernstein Litowitz Berger & 
Grossman LLP (BLBG) appointed lead counsel pursuant to 
a Retainer Agreement that it had negotiated with them, 
which dictated not only the formula for determining 
attorneys fees but also included a Plan for Monitoring 
Litigation, a section outlining a Theory of Recovery, and a 
part captioned Consultation Regarding Settlement 
Negotiations.4 The District Court, however, decided to select 
(Text continued on page 21) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The court based this conclusion on the fact that all members of the 
CalPERS Group had sizeable holdings in Merrill Lynch, a defendant with 
respect to the claims involving PRIDES. See id.  at 149. The court 
eventually appointed a different lead plaintiff and lead counsel in the 
PRIDES action. See id. at 149-50. 
 
3. Although the District Court and some of the parties refer to members 
of the CalPERS Group as "co-Lead Plaintiffs," we agree with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission that "[t]here is one lead plaintiff 
under the Reform Act: an individual, an institution or a properly- 
constituted group." Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as 
Amicus Curiae, at 11 n.8 (emphasis added). The statute always speaks 
of the lead plaintiff in the singular, requiring that the court appoint 
"as 
lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that 
the court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the 
interests of class members" and stating that the presumptively "most 
adequate plaintiff . . . is the person or group of persons" that satisfies 
the statute's three threshold requirements. 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) 
& 
(iii) (emphasis added). The biggest consequence of this distinction is 
that 
only one "entity" is entitled to speak for the class: the lead plaintiff. 
In 
cases where a group serves as lead plaintiff, it is for the group's 
members to decide how the group will make decisions, but it is the 
group--not its constituent members--that speaks for the class. A fortiori, 
we use the singular "Lead Plaintiff " throughout this opinion. 
4. The Retainer Agreement declares that the members of the CalPERS 
Group "have agreed to proceed together to seek a Co-Lead Plaintiff 
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position," and states that the funds, if selected as Lead Plaintiff, will 
"seek the appointment of BRB and BLBG as Co-Lead Counsel to the 
Class." The Agreement provides that Lead Counsel will "receive fees, as 
awarded by the Court, from the proceeds of any judgment or settlement," 
and that Lead Counsel "will advance all costs and out-of-pocket 
expenses." 
 
The Retainer Agreement contains four sections set off by roman 
numerals. The first deals with attorneys fees, providing: 
 
       I. Attorneys Fees. The fee will be a function of both the timing 
and 
       size of the recovery but, unless agreed to by the Funds, will, in 
       no event exceed the following: 
 
       A. Initiation of action through to commencement of discovery: 
       1. Recovery of $0 to $400 million - fee of 5%; 
       2. Additional recoveries above $400 million - fee of 3%. 
       B. Commencement of discovery through to conclusion of all fact 
       and expert discovery: 
       1. Recovery of $0 to $100 million - fee of 17.5%; 
       2. Additional recoveries of above $100 million to $300 
       million - fee of 10%; 
       3. Additional recoveries of above $300 million to $500 
       million - fee of 7.5%; 
       4. Additional recoveries of above $500 million- fee of 5%. 
       C. Proceedings after conclusion of all discovery, including 
       motions for summary judgment, if any, through and 
       including trial and post-trial proceedings: 
       1. Recovery of $0 to $150 million - fee of 20%; 
       2. Additional recoveries above $150 million to $400 million 
       - fee of 12.5%; 
       3. Additional recoveries above $400 million - fee of 7.5% 
 
       In any event, we [i.e., BRB and BLBG] will not submit any fee 
       application to the Court without the prior approval of The Funds, 
       and all fee applications would, of course, be subject to final 
approval 
       of the Court. Travel, meals and lodging expenses shall be 
reasonable 
       and subject to the approval of Co-Lead Plaintiffs prior to 
       reimbursement. 
 
Section II is captioned "Plan for Monitoring Litigation," and requires 
Lead 
Counsel to: (1) provide the CalPERS Group with "all significant 
pleadings" at least 24 hours before filing; (2) make monthly status 
reports, including statements as to time expended and expenses 
incurred; (3) promptly advise the CalPERS Group of"any significant 
developments in the case, including settlement discussions"; and (4) 
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lead counsel via auction. The court acknowledged that the 
PSLRA provides that "[t]he most adequate plaintiff shall, 
subject to the approval of the court, select and retain 
counsel to represent the class." 15 U.S.C. S 78u- 
4(a)(3)(B)(v); see Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. at 150 
(quoting this language from the Reform Act). But it 
reasoned that "the Court's approval is subject to its 
discretionary judgment that lead plaintiff 's choice of 
representative best suits the needs of the class," and 
concluded that "mechanisms" other than the lead plaintiff 's 
choice were available to assist the court in making that 
determination. Id. at 150. The court pointed to the 
"emerging trend" of using auctions "to simulate the free 
market in the selection of class counsel," and stated that it 
would hold an auction to select lead counsel and to 
determine its fee. Id. at 150-51. Recognizing that the 
Reform Act confers upon the Lead Plaintiff the 
"opportunity" to "select and retain" lead counsel, the 
District Court ruled that counsel chosen by the CalPERS 
Group would have the chance to match what the court 
determined to be the lowest qualified bid. Id.  at 151. Later, 
the District Court made clear that any winning bidder 
would have to agree to comply with all provisions of the 
Retainer Agreement that the CalPERS Group had 
negotiated with its chosen counsel (except, of course, the 
fee grid). 
 
The District Court solicited input about how the auction 
should be conducted and held a hearing on August 19, 
1998. The court eventually required that bids be submitted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
schedule periodic meetings to discuss "case developments" and "joint 
strategies in the prosecution of the case." Section III is captioned 
"Theory 
of Recovery," and declares that the goal of the case was "to maximize the 
recovery obtained from sources outside the corporation . . . without 
unduly penalizing Cendant or its long-term shareholders." Lead Counsel 
agreed "to vigorously represent your collective interests, and the 
interests 
of the Class, to maximize the recovery for the Class of Cendant securities 
purchasers in this case, while being cognizant of the interests of the 
long-term holders of Cendant securities." Section IV is captioned 
"Consultation Regarding Settlement Negotiations," and it requires Lead 
Counsel to "consult with" and obtain approval from the CalPERS Group 
before entering into a final settlement agreement. 
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pursuant to a grid it had designed,5 and received nine bids 
to serve as lead counsel in the main Cendant action.6 The 
District Court rejected the bid by counsel for appellant 
Aboff, which would have generated fees of 1-2% of the total 
settlement depending on the size of the settlement and the 
timing of the recovery, characterizing it as unrealistic and 
"quasi-philanthropic," and stating that "[u]nless the 
eventual monetary recovery in this case is in the billions, 
such an apparently `cheap' fee does not make professional 
sense."7 In contrast, the court expressly found that counsel 
proposed by the Lead Plaintiff was qualified and that its 
proposed fee scale was "realistic," but also concluded that 
another qualified bidder had submitted a lower "realistic" 
bid. Counsel chosen by the Lead Plaintiff exercised its 
power to meet this lower bid, and was thus appointed lead 
counsel. 
 
C. Class Certification, the Filing of the Amended 
       Complaint, and the Reaching of a Settlement 
 
After a case management conference, the newly- 
appointed Lead Plaintiff filed its Amended and Consolidated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The grid for the main Cendant action required that counsel submit a 
fee in terms of a percentage of the total class recovery. Movants were 
directed to propose fees depending on the phase at which the litigation 
was resolved (the horizontal axis) and the size of the eventual recovery 
(the vertical axis). The phases of litigation listed on the grid were: 
from 
pleadings through adjudication of any motion to dismiss; during 
discovery through adjudication of a summary judgment motion; after 
adjudication through a trial verdict; and post-trial. The sizes of 
recovery 
listed on the grid were: first 100 million; second 100 million; third 100 
million; next 50 million; next 50 million; next 50 million; next 50 
million; 
and over 500 million. 
 
6. The court required that the bids be submitted under seal. This Court 
recently held that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing 
such a confidentiality order. See In re Cendant Corp., No. 99-5485, at 23 
(3d Cir. Aug. 8, 2001). 
 
7. The case did, of course, settle for an amount well into the billions, 
reflecting the perspicacity of Mr. Sirota, Aboff 's counsel. We need not 
decide whether Mr. Sirota could have negotiated such a large settlement 
because we are satisfied that, from the perspective of the District Court 
at the time, its decision in selecting counsel was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
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Class Action Complaint (the Complaint or Amended 
Complaint) along with a motion for class certification on 
December 14, 1998. The Complaint defined the class 
represented as 
 
       [a]ll persons and entities who purchased or otherwise 
       acquired publicly traded securities . . . either of 
       Cendant or CUC during the period beginning May 31, 
       1995 through and including August 28, 1998 and who 
       were injured thereby, including all persons or entities 
       who exchanged shares of HFS common stock for 
       shares of CUC stock pursuant to the Registration 
       Statement . . . . Excluded from the Class are: (i) 
       defendants; (ii) members of the family of each 
       individual defendant; (iii) any entity in which any 
       defendant has a controlling interest; (iv) officers and 
       directors of Cendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates; 
       and (iv) [sic] the legal representatives, heirs, successors 
       or assigns of any such excluded party. 
 
The Amended Complaint alleged claims under bothS 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter "S 10(b) 
claims"] and S 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter 
"S 11 claims"], as well as numerous other claims that are 
not relevant for the purposes of our discussion and 
decision. The Complaint set out S 10(b) claims for all class 
members, but presented S 11 claims only for those class 
members who received Cendant stock via the HFS merger. 
CUC, however, acquired via merger fourteen other 
companies during the class period. As with the HFS 
merger, these other mergers involved the filing of 
registration statements with the SEC during the class 
period, and thus these mergers also gave rise toS 11 claims 
(as well as claims under S 12 of the Securities Act of 1933) 
for those who received CUC stock via these mergers. 
 
On January 27, 1999, the District Court granted Lead 
Plaintiff 's motion for class certification, defining the 
certified class as including "all purchasers or acquirers of 
Cendant Corporation or CUC International, Inc. publicly 
traded securities between May 31, 1995 and August 28, 
1998 who were injured thereby." Several of the defendants 
then filed motions to dismiss. In an order issued July 27, 
1999, the District Court denied all of them except E&Y's 
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motion to dismiss S 10(b) claims against it that were related 
to stock purchases made after April 15, 1998. See In re 
Cendant Corp. Litig., 60 F. Supp. 2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999). On 
August 6, 1999, the court approved the form of the notice 
of the class action to be sent to potential class members 
and ordered its dissemination. The District Court required 
Lead Plaintiff to mail notice to all record holders of Cendant 
and CUC stock and to all brokers in the transfer records, 
and to publish notice of the class action on three different 
days in The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times 
(National Edition), and the Dow Jones Business Newswire. 
In all, the Class Administrator sent 261,224 notices. 
 
Both the individually mailed and published notices 
included the definition of the Class as stated in the 
Complaint, and warned potential class members that if they 
failed to follow the specific procedures for opting out of the 
Class, they would be deemed class members and would be 
bound by any settlement or judgment. The notice stated 
that any class member who wanted to opt out had to file a 
written request for exclusion postmarked by December 27, 
1999, which served as the final opt-out date. 
 
On December 7, 1999, almost three weeks before the 
final opt-out date, Cendant announced a proposed 
settlement that would require it to pay $2.85 billion to the 
class members, and ten days later the parties announced 
that a proposed settlement had been reached between E&Y 
and the Lead Plaintiff (collectively, "the Settlement"). On 
December 27, 1999, the opt-out period closed pursuant to 
the class notice. Out of over 100,000 class members, only 
234 opted out before the deadline. See In re Cendant Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235, 257 (D.N.J. 2000). On 
March 17, 2000, Cendant and the Lead Plaintiff submitted 
settlement documents to the District Court, including a 
Plan of Allocation for the distribution of settlement proceeds 
among class members. 
 
D. The Terms of the Settlement and the Plan of 
       Allocation 
 
The defendants' obligations under the Settlement consist 
of three primary elements: 
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       1) Cash Payment: Cendant agreed to pay 
       $2,851,500,000 and E&Y agreed to pay $335,000,000 
       into the settlement pool, which brings the total 
       settlement money to approximately $3.2 billion. 
       Interest will accrue on this money until it is paid out 
       to the Class. 
 
       2) 50% of any recovery from E&Y: Cendant and the 
       individual defendants from HFS Inc. are currently 
       suing E&Y over E&Y's role in the fraud. Fifty percent of 
       any net recovery from this action will go to the Class. 
 
       3) Corporate governance changes: Cendant will 
       institute corporate governance changes, including 
       putting a majority of independent directors on its 
       Board of Directors; placing only independent directors 
       on the Board's Audit, Nominating, and Compensation 
       Committees; de-classifying the Board and providing for 
       the annual election of all directors; and precluding the 
       repricing of any employee stock option after its grant, 
       except with the approval of a majority of voting 
       shareholders. 
 
In exchange for these undertakings, the Class has agreed 
to release Cendant, E&Y, the HFS individual defendants, 
and the CUC individual defendants from all claims that "are 
based upon, are related to, arise from or are connected with 
any facts, circumstances, statements, omissions, events or 
other matters raised or referred to in the pleadings in the 
Litigation or which could have been asserted against 
Cendant, the HFS Individual Defendants and the other 
Released Parties by the Lead Plaintiffs and any Class 
Member." Stipulation of Settlement with Cendant Corp. and 
Certain Other Defs. at 12. 
 
The Settlement also contains a Plan of Allocation, which 
will be used to allocate the settlement money among the 
class members. The specifics of the Plan of Allocation are 
somewhat complex because it involves calculating the"true 
value" of Cendant/CUC stock for any given day during the 
class period. To get the "true value" of Cendant stock on 
any given day, one has to remove from the actual price the 
artificial inflation that Cendant's fraud caused in the price, 
a process made trickier by the fact that, unlike many other 
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frauds, the fraudulent statements made by Cendant were 
not in the form of a surprising announcement that caused 
the stock to rise a certain amount which would provide a 
fair indication of how much the fraud affected the price. 
Instead, Cendant's fraud consisted of releasing financial 
statements that met the market's expectations, while the 
truth was that Cendant was falling far short of these 
expectations. 
 
Cendant did, however, make several announcements 
revealing the fraud that caused the price of its stock to 
plummet, namely, the three announcements made on April 
15, July 14, and August 28, 1998. The Plan of Allocation 
works backwards from these price drops to develop an 
equation for determining the true, non-artificially-inflated 
value of Cendant stock for any day during the class period. 
This "true value" is then compared to the actual price of 
Cendant/CUC stock on that day to determine how much 
that day's purchasers of Cendant/CUC stock overspent. 
The Plan uses this amount of overpayment to determine the 
class members' damages. 
 
The Plan of Allocation also allows class members who 
had received their stock in CUC's merger with HFS to 
receive as damages the greater of (1) their damages 
calculated under S 10(b) as determined by the Plan, or (2) 
their damages as calculated under S 11, which would give 
them the difference between what they paid for the Cendant 
stock (i.e., the value of the HFS securities that they traded 
in to get the Cendant stock) and the value of the Cendant 
stock as of the day the lawsuit was brought (April 16, 1998, 
the date the first lawsuit was filed). This S 11 provision 
draws upon the text of the 1933 Act, described in the margin.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Title 15 U.S.C. S 77k (the codification of S 11 of the 1933 Act) 
actually 
provides for three ways of determining S 11 damages: (1) the difference 
between the amount paid for the stock and the stock's price the day the 
lawsuit was brought (the method used above); (2) the difference between 
the amount paid for the stock and the amount received for it when it 
was sold, if it was sold before the lawsuit was brought; and (3) the 
difference between the amount paid for the stock and the amount 
received for it when it was sold, if it was sold after the lawsuit was 
brought but before judgment, only if such damages are less than the 
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Lead Plaintiff 's damages expert used the Plan of 
Allocation's damage determination method to calculate the 
total damages suffered by the Class from the Cendant fraud 
as $8.8 billion. At oral argument on this appeal and in a 
supplemental affidavit, Lead Plaintiff represented that the 
Claims Administrator had received over 118,000 proofs of 
claim from class members, for a total of $4.9 billion claimed 
losses. The $3.185 billion cash payment in the Settlement 
thus represents approximately a 36% recovery rate on the 
Class's total losses and a 64% recovery rate on the actually 
claimed losses. Of the $4.9 billion claimed losses, 
approximately $2.1 billion are losses claimed by class 
members who acquired Cendant stock in the HFS merger 
deal. 
 
E. Preliminary Settlement Approval, the Settlement 
       Notice, the Attorneys Fees Request, and the 
       Fairness Hearing 
 
On March 29, 2000, the District Court granted 
preliminary approval to the proposed settlement and 
enjoined all actions or claims that were contemplated by it. 
In early April, pursuant to the order containing the 
settlement approval, the Class Administrator mailed 
478,000 notices of the Settlement and proof of claim form 
packages [hereinafter "the Settlement Notice"] to potential 
class members, and also published notices in The Wall 
Street Journal and The New York Times. The Settlement 
Notice summarized the course of the litigation and the 
terms of the Settlement, including Lead Plaintiff 's Plan of 
Allocation of the settlement funds. It also informed the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
damages as calculated under (1). See 15 U.S.C. S 77k(e). Only (1) is 
relevant to this case, however. Regarding option (2), if the class members 
sold their stock before April 16, 1998 (the day the lawsuit was brought) 
they would have no damages--the fraud was not revealed until after 
trading ended on April 15, 1998, so the stock price before April 16 was 
at least as artificially inflated by the fraud at the sale of the stock as 
it 
was at the purchase. Regarding option (3), because the price of Cendant 
stock continued to decline after the day the lawsuit was filed as more 
fraud was revealed, this option would result in greater damages than 
those calculated under (1) and thus cannot be used under the provisions 
of 15 U.S.C. S 77k(e). 
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class members that Lead Counsel intended to submit an 
application for attorneys fees totaling 8.275% of the total 
settlement fund and for reimbursement of expenses in the 
amount of $15,855,000. The Notice stated that the District 
Court would conduct a fairness hearing on June 28, 2000, 
and contained information about how class members could 
go about objecting to the Settlement. It provided that any 
class member could appear at the fairness hearing to object 
to the Settlement. Class members were also allowed simply 
to state an objection to the Settlement in writing, although, 
as we discuss below in Part III.A.2, there is some dispute 
over how clear the Settlement Notice was on this point. 
 
Prior to the fairness hearing, Lead Counsel petitioned the 
District Court for an award of $262,468,857 in attorneys 
fees and $14,623,806 in expenses. Lead Counsel noted that 
its fee request "adhere[d] precisely to the parameters in the 
lowest qualified bid proposal" established by the court's 
auction.9 At the hearing on the request to approve the 
Settlement and for counsel fees, six parties raised 
objections to the substantive provisions of the Settlement. 
Three were class members (Betty Duncan, Ann Mark, and 
Tere Throenle); two were not class members (Martin 
Deutch, a derivative plaintiff, and the State Board of 
Administration of Florida, which opted out of the Class); 
and one was a party whose class status is unclear (the 
Davidsons).10 Four class members filed objections to the fee 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In contrast, had the District Court not held the auction and appointed 
Lead Counsel pursuant to the Retainer Agreement that it had negotiated 
with the CalPERS Group, see supra n.4 and accompanying text, the 
maximum allowable fee--"unless agreed to by The Funds"-- would have 
been approximately $187 million. 
 
10. Janice and Robert Davidson, for themselves and as trustees of trusts 
for the benefit of their children (collectively, the Davidsons), have 
participated in this appeal as objectors to the Settlement. The procedural 
history of their claims presents a special situation. On June 20, 2000, 
in response to a motion by the Davidsons for clarification of the class 
definition specifying that they were not class members or, in the 
alternative, an extension of time for them to opt out of the Class, the 
District Court issued an order that: (1) ruled that the Davidsons were 
covered by the class definition and thus were included in the Class; (2) 
refused the Davidsons' request for an extension of time to opt out of the 
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request: NYCPF (a member of the CalPERS Group); Aboff; 
Faye Schonbrunn; and Throenle. 
 
August 15, 2000, the District Court formally approved 
the Settlement, entering two opinions and orders approving 
the Settlement and Plan of Allocation and rejecting all of 
the objectors' objections. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 
109 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2000). On August 16, 
2000, the District Court filed an opinion and order 
awarding Lead Counsel approximately $262 million in 
attorneys fees pursuant to the schedule that had been pre- 
set via the auction. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 
F. Supp. 2d 285 (D.N.J. 2000). Several of the objectors 
appealed these rulings. 
 
F. The Appeals and the Issues Presented by Each 
       Appeal 
 
This opinion addresses three appeals from the District 
Court's approval of the Settlement and the Plan of 
Allocation, and four appeals from its award of counsel fees.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Class; and (3) enjoined the Davidsons from arbitrating their claims in 
California, an action which they had initiated on December 17, 1998. 
See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 158 (D.N.J. 2000). The 
Davidsons appealed this order. On May 9, 2001, two weeks before oral 
argument in the present appeal, a panel of this Court filed an opinion 
affirming in part and reversing in part the District Court's June 20, 2000 
Order. In particular, the panel majority generally affirmed the court's 
Order but left the extent of the scope of the matters to be arbitrated to 
the arbitrator. However, the full Court has since voted to rehear the 
Davidsons' appeal en banc, thereby vacating the panel opinion, so at this 
time it is not clear whether the Davidsons will be held to be class 
members, whether they will be given an extended time to opt out of the 
Class, or whether they will be permitted to pursue their claims in 
arbitration. If any of these possibilities comes to pass, the Davidsons' 
objections in this appeal will be mooted. However, for reasons set forth 
infra at Part III.C, we will take up the Davidsons' objections in this 
opinion. 
 
11. This is the seventh appeal from this case that this Court has heard 
so far. The preceding six are: In re Cendant Corp., No. 99-5485 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 8, 2001); In re Cendant Corp. Litigation , 2001 WL 487903, No. 00- 
2185, (3d Cir. May 9, 2001) (this is the Davidsons' appeal that gave rise 
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These appeals were consolidated for argument. On appeal, 
the objectors to the Settlement and the Plan of Allocation 
are: 
 
       Tere Throenle (00-2708): Throenle challenges the 
       overall fairness to the Class of the Cendant part of the 
       Settlement, and contends that the Lead Plaintiff 
       suffered from a conflict of interest that prevented it 
       from fairly representing all class members because it 
       continued to hold Cendant stock during and after the 
       settlement negotiations.12 
 
       Betty Duncan (00-2683): Duncan challenges the 
       overall fairness to the Class of the E&Y part of the  
       Settlement.13 
 
       Ann Mark (00-2734): Mark claims that the proposed 
       allocation of the settlement money among the Class is 
       unfair because class members with S 11 claims should 
       have received more than class members with S 10(b) 
       claims.14 
 
       The Davidsons (00-2709): The Davidsons contend that 
       the District Court erred by not making explicit 
       Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 findings when certifying the Class; that 
       the notice given to the Class was insufficient; that 
       there are intra-class conflicts arising from the 
       disparate treatment of class members under the terms 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to the since-vacated opinion and is now pending an en banc hearing, see 
supra n.10); In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litigation, 243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 
2001); In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litigation, 235 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 
2000); In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litigation, 234 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 
2000); In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litigation, 233 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 
12. Throenle purchased 100 shares of Cendant stock during the class 
period and lost approximately $600. 
 
13. Duncan bought an unspecified number of CUC notes and claims a 
loss of $1,294. 
 
14. Mark exchanged 100 shares of HFS for 240 shares of CUC in the 
HFS merger and also purchased 400 Cendant shares in the open market 
during the class period. 
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       of the Settlement; and that the Plan of Allocation is 
       flawed.15 
 
Objector Deutch's contentions are addressed in a 
separate opinion by this panel. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. 
Litig. (Deutch), No. 00-2684 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2001). 
Objector State Board of Administration of Florida did not 
appeal. 
 
The objectors to the court's award of counsel fees are: 
 
       NYCPF (00-2769; 00-3653): NYCPF argues that the 
       District Court's decision to select lead counsel by 
       means of an auction was inconsistent with the PSLRA, 
       and contends that the Retainer Agreement negotiated 
       between the Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel remains 
       in effect. It also contends that the fee award approved 
       by the District Court constitutes an excessively high 
       percentage of the recovery given the circumstances. 
 
       Aboff (00-2520): Aboff argues that the fee award was 
       "grossly excessive," and also claims that the notices 
       that were sent to class members did not contain 
       sufficient information so as to allow them to evaluate 
       the reasonableness of the fee request. 
 
       Throenle (00-2708): Throenle contends that the fee 
       request was improper and excessive. 
 
       Faye Schonbrunn (00-2733): Schonbrunn argues that 
       the District Court ignored this Court's jurisprudence 
       governing fee requests, and claims that the court's 
       award was excessive.16 
 
       Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): The 
       SEC appears as amicus curiae, contending that 
       auctions are generally not consistent with the Reform 
       Act. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The Davidsons held a substantial amount of CUC stock stemming 
from the merger of their company into CUC, although it is not clear from 
the record or the briefs exactly how many shares they held or how large 
their losses were. 
 
16. For the most part, Schronbrunn's arguments are duplicative of, or 
subsumed by, those made by other objectors. Accordingly, we will not 
identify them separately. 
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       Barclays Global Investors, N.A. et al (the Barclays 
       Group): The Barclays Group appears as amicus curiae, 
       arguing that the auction in this case was improper 
       because there was no reason to believe that the Lead 
       Plaintiff lacked the capacity or willingness to negotiate 
       vigorously in the counsel selection and retention 
       process. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 
SS 77v & 78aa and 28 U.S.C. S 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
III. THE FAIRNESS OF THE SETTLEMENT 
AND THE PLAN OF ALLOCATION  
 
The objectors' arguments as to the fairness and adequacy 
of the Settlement fit into two basic categories. First, they 
argue that the District Court erred in applying the nine- 
factor test that we developed in Girsh v. Jepson , 521 F.2d 
153 (3d Cir. 1975), for determining whether a settlement is 
fair, reasonable, and adequate under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(e). Second, they contend that the District 
Court erred in approving the Settlement because there were 
serious intra-class conflicts that caused the Lead Plaintiff 
to represent the Class inadequately in negotiating the 
Settlement. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591 (1997). We review the District Court's approval of 
a class action settlement, including its determination that 
the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, for 
abuse of discretion. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up 
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liability Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 782 (3d 
Cir. 1995) [hereinafter "GM Trucks"]. 
 
A. Approval of the Settlement: The Application of 
       the Girsh factors 
 
Rule 23(e) sets out the basic charter for a court's analysis 
of the fairness of a class action settlement. It provides: "A 
class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without 
the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed 
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of 
the class in such manner as the court directs." We have 
interpreted this rule to require courts to " `independently 
and objectively analyze the evidence and circumstances 
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before it in order to determine whether the settlement is in 
the best interest of those whose claims will be 
extinguished.' " GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 785 (quoting 2 
Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions 
S 11.41). Under Rule 23(e), the District Court acts as a 
fiduciary guarding the rights of absent class members and 
must determine that the proffered settlement is"fair, 
reasonable, and adequate." Id. 
 
In approving the Settlement, the District Court applied 
the nine-factor test this Court developed in Girsh, which 
provides the analytic structure for determining whether a 
class action settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate 
under Rule 23(e). See id. The nine Girsh  factors are: 
 
       (1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the 
       litigation; 
 
       (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; 
 
       (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of 
       discovery completed; 
 
       (4) the risks of establishing liability; 
 
       (5) the risks of establishing damages; 
 
       (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through 
       the trial; 
 
       (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater 
       judgment; 
 
       (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund 
       in light of the best possible recovery; and 
 
       (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund 
       in light of all the attendant risks of litigation. 
 
See Girsh, 521 F.2d at 157. The proponents of a settlement 
bear the burden of proving that these factors weigh in favor 
of approval. See GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 785. 
 
Objectors Throenle and Duncan submit that the District 
Court abused its discretion in its application of the Girsh 
test to this settlement. In particular, Throenle argues that 
a correct application of the Girsh factors weighed against 
the settlement with Cendant, and Duncan raises a similar 
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argument as to the settlement with E&Y.17  Because there is 
substantial overlap between Throenle's and Duncan's 
arguments, we will consider these arguments together, 
noting any differences where relevant.18  In our review of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Throenle does raise some points against the settlement with E&Y as 
well, but the bulk of her argument centers on the Cendant settlement. 
 
18. Duncan raises another argument that we dispose of summarily. GM 
Trucks held that a district court reviewing a proposed class action 
settlement should make a preliminary determination, under which a 
presumption of fairness for the settlement is established if the court 
finds that: (1) the negotiations occurred at arms length; (2) there was 
sufficient discovery; (3) the proponents of the settlement are experienced 
in similar litigation; and (4) only a small fraction of the class 
objected. 
See GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 785. Duncan contends that the District Court 
should not have accorded the Settlement a threshold presumption of 
fairness because there was insufficient discovery directed to uncovering 
E&Y's involvement in the fraud, which, she submits, compels the 
conclusion that the Lead Plaintiff 's negotiations with E&Y were not at 
arms-length. More specifically, Duncan argues that there is a strong 
possibility that three Cendant former employees who have pled guilty to 
federal criminal charges arising from this fraud may eventually give 
testimony implicating E&Y more fully in this fraud. (The three former 
employees are Cosmo Corigliano, the former chief financial officer; Anne 
Pember, a former senior vice president and controller; and Casper 
Sabatino, a former vice president of accounting and financial reporting. 
Duncan refers to these three as "the three felons.") Duncan asserts that 
"this Court can reasonably conclude that the testimony of the three 
felons will ultimately establish the fraudulent intent by E&Y." Duncan's 
Opening Br. at 40. 
 
We reject this argument for two reasons. First, Duncan uses the wrong 
standard of review. She says that this Court "can reasonably conclude" 
that more discovery will lead to more information against E&Y; the 
question, however, is not what this Court can reasonably conclude, but 
whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding otherwise. See 
GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 782, 785. Second, E&Y points out in its brief that 
Sabatino told investigators that he and others at Cendant took steps to 
deceive E&Y as to the existence of the fraud. This is corroborated by the 
Willkie Farr Report on the Cendant fraud, which states that Cendant 
officials tried to conceal the fraud from E&Y. Indeed, the SEC also filed 
a complaint against Corigliano, Pember, and Sabatino on the date of 
their guilty pleas which accused them of lying to E&Y and of withholding 
material information from E&Y. These factors support the conclusion 
that E&Y was not an active participant in the fraud but was itself 
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District Court's application of the Girsh factors, we will first 
consider the strength of each side's arguments on each 
factor, and then, based on the totality of the factors, 
determine whether the District Court abused its discretion 
in finding overall that the Girsh factors weighed in favor of 
the Settlement. 
 
1. The First Girsh Factor: Complexity, Expense & 
       Likely Duration of Litigation 
 
This factor captures "the probable costs, in both time and 
money, of continued litigation." GM Trucks , 55 F.3d at 812 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 
District Court found that this case would involve complex 
and protracted discovery, extensive trial preparation, and 
difficult legal and factual issues, and that this factor 
therefore weighed in favor of approval of the Settlement. 
The court focused on a number of specific variables that 
increased the case's complexity: the number of defendants; 
the complex accounting issues involved with respect to 
damages; the need for expert review and testimony; the fact 
that Cendant and E&Y were blaming each other for the 
accounting errors; and the possibility of unknown novel 
legal issues raised by the PSLRA. The court also found that 
litigation would likely be drawn out, with an extended 
discovery period necessary and a trial date that would likely 
not occur until 2002. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 
109 F. Supp. 2d at 256-57. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
deceived by Cendant officials, rendering Duncan's contentions that the 
Corigliano, Pember, and Sabatino testimony will reveal E&Y's fraud an 
exercise in optimism. 
 
In sum, Duncan's arguments here are built on pure speculation that 
relies almost exclusively on the naked allegations made in Cendant's 
complaint against E&Y. See supra Part II.A. Moreover, Duncan's "wait 
and see" approach to the E&Y settlement (i.e., waiting for further 
discovery to develop) would likely mean a substantial delay to the Class 
in receiving settlement money even though there is no evidence that, 
given time, more information implicating E&Y would come to light. 
Therefore, we reject Duncan's arguments that there was insufficient 
discovery regarding E&Y's involvement, and we thus conclude that it was 
not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to give an initial 
presumption of fairness to the Settlement. 
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The objectors counter with a number of arguments. 
Throenle's best argument is that the liability aspect of the 
case against Cendant is simple--Cendant basically admits 
that its employees had the requisite scienter forS 10(b) 
liability, and there is strict liability for Cendant on the S 11 
claims--so that the only truly contested issue is damages. 
She adds that the District Court's denial of the defendants' 
motions to dismiss means that the plaintiffs have 
surmounted the most formidable barrier posed by the 
PSLRA, namely, the heightened pleading standards put in 
place by the Act. As to the complexity of the case against 
E&Y, Duncan argues that we will not know enough about 
this issue until the parties engage in more discovery to 
determine E&Y's involvement. She asserts that if the three 
Cendant employees who pled guilty to fraud implicate E&Y 
in their testimony, see supra n.18, the plaintiffs' case 
against E&Y will be uncomplicated. 
 
We find Throenle's objections with respect to the Cendant 
portion of the Settlement to have considerable merit. We 
agree with Throenle's contention that Cendant's basic 
liability does not present a difficult or complex issue. 
Cendant has indicated that, insofar as liability is 
concerned, it would argue at trial that it is not responsible 
for any illegal actions taken by its employees because these 
acts were not done to benefit Cendant. However, because 
(as we explain below) we are skeptical of the viability of this 
defense for Cendant, see infra Part III.A.4, the fact that 
Cendant would likely raise it increases only minimally the 
complexity and likely duration of the litigation. We are thus 
dubious that this case, insofar as it involves Cendant's 
liability, presents numerous complex legal and factual 
issues that would result in substantial costs of time and 
money. But this does not necessarily militate against an 
attractive settlement, a point we address later. 
 
The issue of damages against Cendant is different in 
character, for it involves technical accounting issues and 
hence can be quite complex. Thus, we agree that this factor 
weighs in favor of settlement insofar as the damages 
determination is concerned. We note in this regard that the 
damages determination formula developed by the Lead 
Plaintiff 's damages expert is complicated and difficult to 
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follow; if Cendant constructed its own damages 
determination formula (as we presume it would), the 
damages issue could appreciably lengthen and complicate 
this litigation. Still, we think that, compared to a case in 
which basic liability is contested, the damages issues 
involved here would increase only moderately the time and 
expense required to litigate. 
 
Regarding Duncan's arguments on the complexity of 
determining E&Y's liability, we note that E&Y has 
consistently and strenuously denied any fault for this 
fraud, and as we have explained, see supra n.18, there 
does not seem to be good reason to think that the three 
convicted Cendant employees will implicate E&Y. E&Y 
points out that the fraud was perpetrated at Cendant 
facilities by Cendant employees, and no evidence has 
surfaced in the investigations following the fraud that E&Y 
employees participated in or even knew about the fraud. 
E&Y also emphasizes the fact that the Willkie Farr report 
describes numerous instances in which Cendant employees 
admitted concealing or falsifying information to prevent 
E&Y from discovering the truth. We agree with E&Y that 
establishing liability and damages against it would involve 
fairly complex and protracted litigation. 
 
In sum, while the complexity and duration of litigation 
factor does not weigh as heavily in favor of settlement as 
the District Court concluded, we do think it does weigh 
somewhat in favor of the Cendant part of the Settlement, 
and strongly in favor of the E&Y part of the Settlement. 
 
2. The Second Girsh Factor: The Reaction of the Class 
 
The District Court found that this factor cut strongly in 
favor of the Settlement, as the number of objectors was 
quite small in light of the number of notices sent and 
claims filed. The claims administrator sent 478,000 notices 
of the Settlement to potential class members, and also 
published notices in The Wall Street Journal and The New 
York Times. Over 30,000 settlement claims were filed as of 
June 12, 2000 (more than two weeks before the fairness 
hearing), and almost 120,000 claims were filed by May 15, 
2001. Yet only four class members objected to the 
Settlement (Throenle, Duncan, the Davidsons, and Mark, 
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who objected only to the Plan of Allocation), and only two 
non-class members objected as well (Deutch and the State 
Board Administration of Florida). As the District Court 
noted, none of the objectors was an institutional investor 
(although the Davidsons had very large holdings), and only 
234 class members opted out of the Class; the court took 
the latter number "as an extremely favorable indicator of 
class reaction." 109 F. Supp. 2d at 257. 
 
Throenle argues that the low number of objectors is 
attributable to the confusing notice to the Class; she 
contends that the notice implied that objectors had to 
appear personally before the court to lodge objections. 
Throenle also asserts that she had difficulty obtaining 
relevant documents from the clerk's office before the 
objection deadline, and that "[s]uch a fundamental 
deprivation of due process very likely hindered[other] 
objectors." Throenle Br. at 47. Duncan submits that the 
number of objectors and opt-outs is "meaningless" because 
the opt-out and objection-filing deadlines occurred before 
the three arrested Cendant employees pled guilty. 
 
The District Court correctly found that this factor 
weighed strongly in favor of the Settlement. The vast 
disparity between the number of potential class members 
who received notice of the Settlement and the number of 
objectors creates a strong presumption that this factor 
weighs in favor of the Settlement, and the objectors' 
arguments otherwise are not convincing. Although it is true 
that the Settlement Notice could have been clearer on how 
to object to the Settlement, the District Court pointed out 
that the notice provided the address and phone numbers 
for Lead Plaintiff 's counsel in the event that class members 
had questions about any matter in the notice. See 109 F. 
Supp. 2d at 255. A confused class member who wanted to 
make an objection could have easily called class counsel 
and clarified the process by which to make it. Throenle's 
assertion about her difficulty in obtaining documents from 
the clerk's office is troubling, but the fact is that she did 
receive the relevant documents in time and no other class 
member has complained of this problem. Furthermore, 
Duncan's contention that more people would have objected 
had the objection deadline date occurred after the three 
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Cendant employees pled guilty to fraud is purely 
speculative; nothing in these employees' statements to 
investigators implicates E&Y, and in fact the statements 
reflect that they tried to conceal the fraud from E&Y. We 
therefore conclude that this factor cuts strongly in favor of 
the Settlement. 
 
3. The Third Girsh Factor: The Stage of Proceedings 
 
This factor "captures the degree of case development that 
class counsel have accomplished prior to settlement. 
Through this lens, courts can determine whether counsel 
had an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case 
before negotiating." GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 813. In 
considering this factor, the District Court took note of the 
formal and informal discovery in which Lead Counsel had 
engaged, and then concluded that "[t]he record reveals, and 
the Court finds, that the parties understood the merits of 
the class action and could fairly, safely and appropriately 
decide to settle the action with Cendant and E&Y. Counsel 
conducted extensive discovery, retained and used experts, 
and litigated pre-trial motions." 109 F. Supp. 2d at 259 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court 
then described in detail the "extensive discovery" 
undertaken by the Lead Counsel, which included analysis 
of Cendant's public filings, review of the Willkie Farr 
Report, review of various documents produced by Cendant 
during informal and formal discovery, and interviews with 
various Cendant and E&Y employees. See id. at 258-59. 
The court also noted that, in preparation for settlement 
negotiations, Lead Plaintiff had retained the investment 
firm Lazard Freres and damages expert Forensic 
Economics, Inc., to assist it in determining damages. See 
id. at 258. 
 
Both Throenle and Duncan argue that there was 
insufficient discovery. In particular, they point to the fact 
that no depositions were taken and that Lead Counsel 
mainly engaged in only informal discovery. Duncan in 
particular argues that the early stage of discovery means 
that the Settlement was not negotiated "under a real and 
credible threat of litigation." Duncan's Opening Br. at 52. 
 
The objectors are correct that the Settlement was reached 
early in the litigation, with discovery itself at an early stage. 
 
                                39 
  
However, the merits of the liability case against Cendant 
were fairly clear. With respect to the S 11 claims, Cendant 
has admitted that its financial statements contained 
materially false information, and Cendant has strict liability 
for its registration statements that incorporated these 
financial statements. As for the S 10(b) claims, Cendant 
employees have basically admitted committing fraud, so 
Cendant was going to be on the hook for a substantial 
amount, if not all, of the Class's S 10(b) damages at all 
events. In its argument on the fourth Girsh factor (the risk 
of establishing liability), Lead Plaintiff relies on the fact that 
Cendant has advanced the defense that it should not be 
held liable for the Class's damages that were caused by the 
illegal acts of its various officers, because these acts were 
not done for the benefit of the corporation. As we explain 
below, see infra Part III.A.4, on the record before us we do 
not think that Cendant would have much chance of 
success with this defense. While it is not clear whether 
Lead Plaintiff had an "adequate appreciation" of the merit of 
this defense, its viability turns more on legal considerations 
than on factual development, see id., so it does not 
substantially affect Throenle and Duncan's claim that more 
discovery was needed. 
 
Given the foregoing, it is unclear what depositions and 
interrogatories (with the requisite motions to compel) would 
have added to the liability considerations. It is true that the 
extent of the Class's damages was not clear-cut, but Lead 
Plaintiff retained its own damages expert to calculate the 
Class's damages and also reviewed a damages report 
prepared by the National Economic Research Association, 
Inc., which Cendant hired as its damages expert. The issue 
of damages appears to have been headed for resolution as 
a battle of the experts at trial. While Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26 expert witness discovery might have been 
helpful on the damages issue, it is not clear what it would 
have added to the settlement calculus. 
 
Therefore, although this litigation was settled at an early 
stage, because of the nature of the case Lead Plaintiff had 
an excellent idea of the merits of its case against Cendant 
insofar as liability was concerned at the time of the 
Settlement. Lead Plaintiff also underwent a sufficient 
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process for determining the Class's damages before the 
Settlement. Because of this, Lead Plaintiff was able to form 
an "adequate appreciation of the merits of the case [against 
Cendant] before negotiating." GM Trucks , 55 F.3d at 813. 
We thus conclude that this factor cuts strongly in favor of 
the settlement with Cendant. 
 
Because the case against E&Y was strongly contested 
and much more complex, it is correspondingly more 
difficult to ascertain the merits of the case against E&Y 
because of the early settlement. However, Duncan's 
conjecture about what evidence of E&Y's involvement in the 
fraud may turn up from further discovery is undermined by 
the results of the investigation of the three former Cendant 
employees charged with criminal fraud, which indicates 
that they concealed the fraud from E&Y. See supra n.18. 
Therefore, although we note the possibility that further 
discovery might have illuminated the merits of the case 
against E&Y, we temper this with the observation that it 
seems unlikely that evidence of E&Y's further involvement 
in the fraud would come to light. For these reasons, we 
conclude that the stage of proceedings factor is neutral as 
to the settlement with E&Y. 
 
4. The Fourth Girsh Factor: The Risks of Establishing 
       Liability 
 
A court considers this factor in order to "examine what 
the potential rewards (or downside) of litigation might have 
been had class counsel decided to litigate the claims rather 
than settle them." GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 814. The District 
Court concluded that the risks of establishing liability 
varied with the particular defendant. As to Cendant, the 
court concluded that liability was easily established, but 
that things got more complex for the S 10(b) claims when 
the proportionality of liability was considered:"the jury 
might have found that Cendant bore only a small 
proportion of the responsibility for the damages suffered by 
the Class." 109 F. Supp. 2d at 260 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing the PSLRA's provisions on 
proportionate liability, which provide that a defendant is 
jointly and severally liable on a S 10(b) claim only if the 
defendant knowingly committed the fraud; otherwise the 
defendant is only liable for the percentage of his 
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responsibility for the fraud, see S15 U.S.C. 78u- 4(f)19). 
Proportionality of liability is only an issue as to the S 10(b) 
claims; if Cendant were to lose on the S 11 claims at trial, 
it would be jointly and severally liable on these claims. See 
15 U.S.C. S 77k(f). 
 
As to E&Y, the court reasoned that the level of scienter 
required by S 10(b), E&Y's potential due diligence defenses 
under Section 11, and the fact that there was no evidence 
that E&Y knew about the fraud while it was being 
committed meant that Lead Plaintiff faced significant 
obstacles in establishing E&Y's liability. The court 
concluded that this factor weighed strongly in favor of 
settlement in E&Y's case, less so for Cendant, and"overall 
[this factor] weighs in favor of settlement." 109 F. Supp. 2d 
at 261. 
 
Throenle concentrates her argument on the District 
Court's conclusion that the risk of establishing liability with 
Cendant increases when the PSLRA's proportionate liability 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(f) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       (f) Proportionate liability 
 
       (2) Liability for damages 
 
        (A) Joint and several liability 
 
         Any covered person against whom a final judgment is entered 
       in a private action shall be liable for damages jointly and 
       severally only if the trier of fact specifically determines that 
       such covered person knowingly committed a violation of the 
       securities laws. 
 
        (B) Proportionate liability 
 
         (i) In general 
 
          Except as provided in subparagraph (A), a covered person 
       against whom a final judgment is entered in a private action 
       shall be liable solely for the portion of the judgment that 
       corresponds to the percentage of responsibility of that covered 
       person, as determined under paragraph (3). 
 
Paragraph 3 of S 78u-4(f) provides in pertinent part that the factfinder 
should make findings as to "the percentage of responsibility of [the 
defendant], measured as a percentage of the total fault of all persons 
who caused or contributed to the loss incurred by the plaintiff." 
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provisions are factored into the equation. She counters 
that, although the PSLRA limited defendants' joint and 
several liability in S 10(b) actions, defendants who are found 
to have knowingly committed S 10(b) violations are still 
jointly and severally liable for the fraud damages under the 
PSLRA. See 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(f)(2). She thus argues that, 
because Cendant would be charged with knowing whatever 
its employees knew and its employees knowingly committed 
the fraud, Cendant would be jointly and severally liable, not 
proportionately liable, on the S 10(b) claims. On this basis, 
Throenle submits that the proportionate liability provisions 
of the PSLRA really do not pose a risk to establishing 
Cendant's liability.20 
 
Lead Plaintiff counters Throenle's argument by pointing 
to Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 
1975), in which we set out a two-part test for determining 
when the fraud of an officer of a corporation is imputed to 
the corporation: the fraud is imputed "when the officer's 
fraudulent conduct was (1) in the course of his 
employment, and (2) for the benefit of the corporation." Id. 
at 884. Lead Plaintiff notes that Cendant argued in the 
District Court that it was not liable for the illegal acts of its 
officers because these acts were not for Cendant's benefit, 
and that Cendant used just this defense to defeat a 
summary judgment motion on S 10(b) claims by an opt-out 
plaintiff in this very case. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 225, 232-34 (D.N.J. 2000) 
[hereinafter "Yeager v. Cendant" or"Yeager"]. The court 
denied the plaintiff 's summary judgment motion in Yeager 
because of the possibility that "a reasonable trier of fact 
could conclude that the true motive of the wrongdoers was 
the preservation of their employment, salaries, emoluments, 
and reputations, as well as their liberty, at the expense of 
the corporation's well-being." Id. at 233 (internal quotation 
marks and brackets omitted). Lead Plaintiff contends that 
the possibility that Cendant could establish this defense to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Duncan's argument on this factor is that further discovery would 
turn up evidence establishing E&Y's liability. As we have noted above, 
this claim is not only speculative, but also undermined by the evidence 
in the record. Thus, we agree with the District Court's conclusion that 
the risk of establishing E&Y's liability is substantial. 
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limit its liability posed a risk of establishing liability, so that 
the District Court correctly concluded that this factor 
weighed in favor of the Settlement. 
 
We do not agree with the District Court that there was a 
significant risk of establishing joint and several liability 
against Cendant in this case. Rochez Brothers  makes clear 
that a corporate officer's fraud is imputed to the 
corporation "even if the officer's conduct was unauthorized, 
effected for his own benefit but clothed with apparent 
authority of the corporation, or contrary to instructions." 
527 F.2d at 884. The reason for this is that "a corporation 
can speak and act only through its agents and so must be 
accountable for any acts committed by one of its agents 
within his actual or apparent scope of authority and while 
transacting corporate business." Id. Based on the record 
before us, it would not seem difficult for the plaintiffs to 
establish that the high-ranking CUC officers who published 
the false financial statements in CUC's name were acting 
within the apparent scope of their authority and were 
transacting corporate business, whether or not they were 
feathering their own nest. 
 
In sum, we agree that there would be little risk in 
establishing Cendant's joint and several liability on the 
S 10(b) claims. As to the risk of establishing E&Y's liability, 
we agree with the District Court's analysis that a number 
of factors make this factor weigh strongly in favor of 
approval of the E&Y portion of the Settlement: the lack of 
any evidence that E&Y knew about the fraud; E&Y's due 
diligence defenses on the S 11 claims; the complexity of the 
case against E&Y; and the prospect of fierce litigation. 
Overall, then, the risks of establishing liability factor cuts 
substantially in favor of approval of the E&Y portion of the 
Settlement, but cuts against approval of the Cendant 
portion of the Settlement. 
 
5. The Fifth Girsh Factor: The Risks of Establishing 
       Damages 
 
Like the fourth factor, "this inquiry attempts to measure 
the expected value of litigating the action rather than 
settling it at the current time." GM Trucks , 55 F.3d at 816. 
Lead Plaintiff presented evidence to the District Court that 
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the total amount of damages to class members ranges 
between $8.5 and $8.8 billion. Lead Plaintiff cautioned, 
however, that establishing damages at trial would lead to a 
"battle of experts," with each side presenting its figures to 
the jury and with no guarantee whom the jury would 
believe. The District Court accepted this argument, as well 
as E&Y's statement that it was prepared to prove at trial 
that the decline in Cendant's stock following the 
announcements of the fraud was largely due to factors and 
conduct in which E&Y was not involved. The court thus 
found that this factor weighed in favor of settlement. 
 
Throenle and Duncan do not offer persuasive arguments 
regarding this factor, and we find the District Court's 
reasoning on this factor sound. As we set forth in the 
margin, the damages determination proffered by Lead 
Plaintiff 's expert is complex and hard to follow, freighted 
with involved calculations and conceptually difficult issues.21 
Were a jury confronted with competing expert opinions of 
corresponding complexity, there is no compelling reason to 
think that it would accept Lead Plaintiff 's determination 
rather than Cendant's, which would posit a much lower 
figure for the Class's damages. This risk in establishing 
damages means that this factor weighs in favor of approval 
of the Settlement. 
 
6. The Sixth Girsh Factor: The Risks of Maintaining 
       the Class Action Through Trial 
 
The District Court found that this factor slightly weighed 
in favor of settlement because, "[u]nder Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(a), a district court `may decertify or modify a 
class at any time during the litigation if it proves to be 
unmanageable,' " and proceeding to trial would always 
entail the risk, even if slight, of decertification. In re 
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 262 (quoting 
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. For example, as we stated in the Facts & Procedural History section, 
the damages determination involves calculating the"true value" of 
Cendant/CUC stock for any given day during the class period, i.e., the 
value that the stock would have had if the fraud had not been 
committed, which requires a complex and conceptually difficult damages 
determination. 
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F.3d 283, 321 (3d Cir. 1998)). The objectors argue that this 
factor is really neutral. In our view the risk of 
decertification appears to be extremely slight; hence we 
agree with the objectors. 
 
7. The Seventh Girsh Factor: The Ability of the 
       Defendants to Withstand a Greater Judgment 
 
There is a dispute among the parties as to what this 
factor means, i.e., whether it concerns the ability of the 
defendants to withstand a judgment for the $8.8 billion 
maximum damages sought by the Class, as Lead Plaintiff 
and E&Y argue, or whether it focuses on the ability of the 
defendants to withstand a settlement or a judgment for any 
amount higher than the $3.2 billion for which they are 
settling, as the objectors contend. The District Court took 
note of this dispute, but appears not to have taken a 
position on it, as it found that there was insufficient 
financial data to determine what the defendants could 
afford to pay. 
 
Lead Plaintiff and E&Y reason that the use of the term 
"judgment" rather than "settlement" in the formulation of 
this Girsh factor supports their contention that it concerns 
only the possible judgment at trial for the full amount of 
damages sought rather than other possible larger 
settlements. This reasoning is not terribly persuasive, 
because Girsh uses the phrase "the ability of the 
defendants to withstand a greater judgment," 521 F.2d at 
157 (emphasis supplied), and the comparative term 
"greater" implies a comparison with the current settlement. 
If this factor was intended to reference the ability of the 
defendants to withstand a judgment for what the plaintiffs 
claim as their damages, then it would presumably be stated 
in those terms (e.g., "the ability of the defendants to 
withstand a judgment for what the plaintiffs claim") rather 
than as "the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater 
judgment." Furthermore, because both a settlement and a 
judgment take money out of Cendant's pocket, 
distinguishing the two in the context of this factor makes 
little sense from a practical point of view. 
 
We think a better interpretation of this factor is that it is 
concerned with whether the defendants could withstand a 
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judgment for an amount significantly greater than the 
Settlement. Our case law supports this view. See In re 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 321-22 (finding no error in the 
district court's analysis of this factor that considered 
whether the defendant could withstand a judgment for an 
amount greater than the proposed settlement); GM Trucks, 
55 F.3d at 818 (same). Thus, our consideration here is 
whether Cendant could withstand a judgment for an 
amount significantly greater than $2.85 billion, and 
whether E&Y could withstand a judgment for an amount 
significantly greater than $335 million. The District Court 
concluded that, although the defendants failed to produce 
financial information that showed that they could not pay 
a judgment greater than what the Settlement provided, this 
was not enough to reject the Settlement because the other 
factors cut clearly in favor of settlement. However, the 
District Court went on to find that 
 
       at least as far as Cendant is concerned, objective 
       benchmarks support Lead Counsel and Cendant's 
       stance that sustaining a larger judgment, and possibly 
       even a larger settlement, might prove fatal. Particularly, 
       the significant percentage of Cendant's market 
       capitalization that will be paid to the class-- 
       approximately 25-30%. Even more striking is that Lead 
       Plaintiffs' total damages calculation [i.e. the $8.8 
       billion] represents approximately 80-95% of [Cendant's] 
       market capitalization (depending on market close)--a 
       figure difficult for this Court to imagine Cendant 
       paying without seeking shelter in our bankruptcy laws. 
 
109 F. Supp. 2d at 263. 
 
Thus, while the District Court did not find that Cendant 
could not pay more than the $2.85 billion it contributed to 
the Settlement, it did find that if this case went to trial and 
Cendant was held liable for an amount close to $8.8 billion, 
it would probably declare bankruptcy. Regarding E&Y's 
ability to withstand a greater judgment, the court did not 
have any of E&Y's financial information before it, so it 
could not ascertain whether E&Y could pay more than its 
$335 million share of the Settlement. The court then 
determined that, because of the lack of financial 
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information, this factor weighed neither for nor against the 
Settlement. 
 
Throenle and Duncan argue that the District Court erred 
when it found that this factor was neutral, because both 
Cendant and E&Y are able to pay greater amounts than 
they would under the Settlement. Throenle contends that 
Cendant's announcement after the Settlement was reached 
that it was resuming its share repurchasing activity shows 
that Cendant has the ability to pay significantly more than 
$2.85 billion. Duncan points to E&Y's post-settlement sale 
of its consulting business to Cap Gemini for $11 billion as 
evidence of the need to get more information as to E&Y's 
ability to pay more. 
 
We agree with the objectors' contentions that the 
defendants could afford to pay more than they did under 
the Settlement. This does not end our analysis of this 
factor, however. The District Court was surely right that 
somewhere between Cendant's settlement payout ($2.85 
billion) and the potential judgment ($8.8 billion), Cendant 
would likely be tipped into declaring bankruptcy. It is not 
clear on the record where this point would occur--it is 
probably not clear even to Cendant's directors at this point 
--but it is very likely that bankruptcy would have been a 
risk if Cendant were faced with a substantially higher 
judgment. There is inevitably a measure of speculation 
involved in this determination, especially given the lack of 
record development on this issue, so even though we think 
that it is likely that both Cendant and E&Y could have paid 
substantially more than they did under the Settlement, we 
must remain cognizant that the possibility of bankruptcy is 
quite real when the settlement or judgment numbers 
sufficiently increase. At the same time, the proponents of a 
settlement bear the burden of proving that the Girsh factors 
weigh in favor of approval. See GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 785. 
 
Given these observations, we disagree with the District 
Court that the ability to withstand a greater judgment 
factor is neutral with regard to the Settlement. Rather, we 
think that this factor cuts against approval of the 
Settlement, albeit only moderately, because of the built-in 
limitations of this kind of analysis and the lurking 
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possibility of bankruptcy for Cendant (and perhaps E&Y as 
well) if faced with a judgment near $8.8 billion. 
 
8. The Final Girsh Factors: The Range of 
       Reasonableness of the Settlement Fund in Light of 
       the Best Possible Recovery & in Light of Litigation 
       Risks 
 
The District Court began its analysis of these factors by 
noting that the maximum amount of total damages against 
all defendants is approximately $8.5 billion (later amended 
to $8.8 billion), so that the total settlement amount of 
nearly $3.2 billion from all defendants represents a 36-37% 
recovery rate by the plaintiff Class. "This far exceeds 
recovery rates of any case cited by the parties." In re 
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 263 (citing 
cases and a volume describing a range of recoveries from 
1.6% to 14% for securities class action settlements 22). 
Because Cendant paid the bulk of the $3.2 billion 
settlement, the court considered the proportionate fairness 
of the E&Y settlement separately. E&Y was only potentially 
liable for $6.2 billion in damages (i.e., the damages 
sustained by pre-April 15, 1998 purchasers), and, if E&Y 
and Cendant bear equal responsibility for these damages,23 
then E&Y's settlement payment of $335 million represented 
9.25% of the damages for which it was responsible. The 
court found that this was in line with the range of 
recoveries referenced above, and that it was well above the 
norm for recoveries against accounting firms in securities 
litigation. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. The District Court cited the following: Denise Martin et al., National 
Economic Research Association, Inc., Recent Trends IV: What Explains 
Filings and Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions  10-11 (1996) 
(securities settlements range from 9%-14% of claimed damages); In re 
Prudential Sec., Inc. L.P. Litig., MDL No. 1005, 1995 WL 798907 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 20, 1995) (approving settlement of between 1.6% and 5% of claimed 
damages); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(settlement of between 6% and 10% of damages); In re Michael Milken & 
Assocs. Sec. Litig., 150 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (7.5%). 
 
23. This is of course a highly questionable proposition insofar as the 
S 10(b) claims were concerned, as it appears from the record that 
Cendant would likely bear a much higher proportionate responsibility 
than E&Y for the fraud. 
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The objectors' arguments about these factors challenge 
the District Court's calculations, contending that the 
Class's damages were $13 to 20 billion rather than $8.8 
billion, so that the recovery rate for the Settlement would 
be much lower than the District Court concluded. These 
arguments are flawed, however, because they calculate the 
Class's damages by using the drop in Cendant's market 
capitalization after the fraud was revealed. A stock's drop in 
market capitalization is not a proper measure of damages 
in securities cases under the statutory scheme laid out in 
S 10(b) or S 11. See 15 U.S.C.S 77k(e) (S 11 damages) & 
S 78u-4(e) (S 10(b) damages). Thus, the objectors' arguments 
are unavailing.24 
 
Furthermore, we find the District Court's conclusion that 
these factors weigh in favor of the Settlement to be 
persuasive. The fact that the recovery rate for the Class 
here apparently exceeds the recovery rates in other 
securities class action settlements tends to support the 
reasonableness of the Settlement even though the Class 
faced low litigation risks in its claims against Cendant 
(because of the relative ease of establishing Cendant's 
liability). The lower recovery rate of E&Y's portion of the 
Settlement is justified by the greater litigation risks the 
Class faced in establishing E&Y's liability. For these 
reasons, we conclude that these factors weigh in favor of 
approval of the Settlement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. The reason why a drop in market capitalization is an inaccurate 
determiner of damages can be clarified by the following example. 
Suppose that Samantha Shareholder bought one share of Cendant stock 
at $20. The stock then rose to $25, but when the fraud was announced 
it dropped to $15, whereupon Shareholder sold. Shareholder's damages 
are $5 because that is the difference between what she paid for the stock 
and what she sold it for after the fraud was revealed ($20 - $15); these 
are her "out-of-pocket" damages. See Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 
926 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The proper measure of damages to 
reflect the loss proximately caused by the defendants' deceit is the out- 
of-pocket rule. That rule is the traditional measure of damages in a Rule 
10b-5 action.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If we 
used the drop in market capitalization to determine Shareholder's 
damages, however, we would conclude that she had damages of $10 ($25 
- $15), which is greater than her out-of-pocket loss and is thus not a 
proper measure of her damages. 
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9. Summing Up the Girsh Factors 
 
Insofar as the Cendant portion of the Settlement is 
concerned, we conclude that the second (reaction of the 
class), third (stage of the proceedings), fifth (risk of 
establishing damages), eighth and ninth (range of 
reasonableness in light of the best possible recovery and of 
litigation risks) Girsh factors all weigh strongly in favor of 
approval of the settlement with Cendant. The first factor 
(complexity of litigation) weighs moderately in favor of 
approval, while the seventh factor (ability to withstand a 
greater judgment) weighs moderately against approval and 
the fourth factor (risk of establishing liability) weighs more 
heavily against approval of the settlement with Cendant. 
Finally, the sixth factor (risk of maintaining the class 
action) is effectively neutral. 
 
As to the E&Y portion of the Settlement, we conclude 
that the first (complexity of litigation), second (reaction of 
the class), fourth (risk of establishing liability), fifth (risk of 
establishing damages), eighth and ninth (range of 
reasonableness in light of the best possible recovery and of 
litigation risks) Girsh factors all weigh strongly in favor of 
approval of the Settlement. The third factor (stage of the 
proceedings) and the sixth factor (risk of maintaining the 
class action) are neutral, while the seventh factor (ability to 
withstand a greater judgment) weighs moderately against 
the E&Y portion of the Settlement. 
 
Given this analysis, we conclude that the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Girsh factors 
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overall weighed in favor of approving the Settlement and 
that therefore the Settlement was fair, reasonable, and 
adequate. As should be clear from our analysis, we think 
that this question with respect to the Cendant portion of 
the Settlement is closer than the District Court made it out 
to be. In particular, the lack of any serious risk of 
establishing Cendant's liability and its probable ability to 
pay substantially more in settlement raise concerns in our 
minds concerning the fairness and adequacy of this 
Settlement. However, a quick reference to the preceding 
discussion of the Girsh factors makes clear that the balance 
clearly weighed in favor of approval of the Cendant 
settlement. As to E&Y, there can be no question as to the 
propriety of the approval. Furthermore, under our standard 
of review applicable here we accord deference to the District 
Court's exercise of discretion, and can set aside its decision 
only if there was an abuse of that discretion, which is 
absent here. For these reasons, we hold that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
Settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate based on its 
application of the Girsh factors. 
 
B. Intra-class Conflicts 
 
Throenle and Mark have presented objections to the 
Settlement that fall under the general rubric of intra-class 
conflicts. Throenle presents two related arguments for 
setting aside the District Court's order approving the 
Settlement, while Mark attacks the Plan of Allocation. 
 
1. Throenle's Arguments 
 
a. The Lead Plaintiff 's Alleged Conflicts of Interest 
 
Throenle first argues that the members of the CalPERS 
Group (who comprise Lead Plaintiff) were too conflicted to 
serve adequately in that capacity because they continued to 
hold huge amounts of Cendant stock during the Settlement 
negotiations, rendering them more concerned with 
protecting their interests in Cendant's future prospects 
than with achieving maximum recovery for the Class from 
Cendant. Throenle's argument is based on the general 
assertion that a lead plaintiff who retains a substantial 
investment in a defendant corporation cannot adequately 
represent a class in a lawsuit against that corporation 
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because this lead plaintiff will naturally be conflicted 
between trying to get maximum recovery for the class and 
trying to protect its ongoing investment in the corporation, 
e.g., by settling cheap or by securing corporate governance 
changes in lieu of cash, both of which are alleged here. 
Because of this, she argues that we should set aside the 
Settlement. 
 
Throenle's thesis is attractive. The problem with it is that 
Congress seems to have rejected it when it enacted the lead 
plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA. The Reform Act 
establishes a presumption that the class member"most 
capable of adequately representing the interests of class 
members" is the shareholder with the largest financial 
stake in the recovery sought by the class. 15 U.S.C.S 78u- 
4(a)(3)(B)(i) & (iii)(I). The plaintiff with the largest stake in a 
given securities class action will almost invariably be a 
large institutional investor, and the PSLRA's legislative 
history expressly states that Congress anticipated and 
intended that such investors would serve as lead plaintiffs. 
See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 ("The Committee intends to increase 
the likelihood that institutional investors will serve as lead 
plaintiffs by requiring the court to presume that the 
member of the purported class with the largest financial 
stake in the relief is the `most adequate plaintiff.' "). We 
presume that Congress was aware that an institutional 
investor with enormous stakes in a company is highly 
unlikely to divest all of its holdings in that company, even 
after a securities class action is filed in which it is a class 
member. 
 
By establishing a preference in favor of having such 
investors serve as lead plaintiffs, Congress must have 
thought that the situation present here does not inherently 
create an unacceptable conflict of interest. See id. ("The 
Committee believes that an institutional investor acting as 
lead plaintiff can, consistent with its fiduciary obligations, 
balance the interests of the class with the long-term 
interests of the company and its public investors."). For this 
reason, the simple fact that the institutional investors who 
comprise Lead Plaintiff retained Cendant stock while the 
Settlement was negotiated is not nearly enough, standing 
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alone, to support Throenle's claim that Lead Plaintiff was so 
conflicted that the Settlement should be overturned. 25 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Although we have held that the fact that the members of the 
CalPERS Group continued to hold Cendant stock does not warrant 
overturning the Settlement, we call attention to an issue of potential 
intra-class conflicts with which district courts will need to grapple in 
future cases at the class certification stage. See In re Party City 
Securities 
Litigation, 189 F.R.D. 91, 108-10 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting the possibility of 
a significant conflict in many securities class actions between the 
interests of individuals and institutions that purchased and then sold 
stock in the defendant firm--"Sell Plaintiffs"--and those who bought and 
continue to hold such stock--"Hold Plaintiffs"). 
 
In economic terms, the potential conflict may be demonstrated as 
follows. The motivation of a rational Sell Plaintiff is simple: he wants 
to 
secure the largest possible recovery. The rational Hold Plaintiff, 
however, 
is in a more complicated situation; her goal is to reach a settlement that 
will maximize the combined value of her share of the settlement and the 
stock that she continues to hold in the defendant firm. Consequently, 
though a rational Sell Plaintiff would be perfectly willing to push the 
defendant firm one dollar short of declaring bankruptcy, a rational Hold 
Plaintiff rarely would be so willing because the increased value of her 
share of the settlement fund would almost certainly be offset by a 
corresponding decrease in the value of her stock. Thus, there will often 
be a significant conflict between the interests of Sell Plaintiffs and 
Hold 
Plaintiffs, particularly in cases where the class's expected damages are 
very large. We acknowledge that settlements among market participants 
are not always a function of rational behavior, as economists assume. 
Indeed, most settlements are probably based on intuition--although 
market factors doubtless inform the exercise of the parties' judgment. 
 
What is important to realize, however, is that this issue is one of class 
configuration. It is not merely a problem with the identity of the lead 
plaintiff, because it is equally problematic to have a Sell Plaintiff 
represent a class that includes Hold Plaintiffs as it is to have a Hold 
Plaintiff represent a class that includes Sell Plaintiffs. Properly 
understood, the issue is whether the conflict between the interests of 
Sell Plaintiffs and Hold Plaintiffs in a particular case is sufficiently 
severe 
so as to prevent a putative class from satisfying Rule 23's requirements 
for class certification, regardless whether the problem is seen as one of 
commonality, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (providing that a class action 
may be maintained only if "there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class"), typicality, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) (permitting class 
certification only if "the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class"), adequacy of 
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Throenle appears implicitly to acknowledge this point, 
because she also argues that there is specific evidence that 
Lead Plaintiff did not adequately represent the Class's 
interests in this case, and that this evidence rebuts the 
PSLRA's presumption that the CalPERS Group was the 
most adequate plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II) 
(providing that the presumption that the largest 
shareholder is the most adequate plaintiff "may be rebutted 
only upon proof by a member of the purported plaintiff 
class that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff. . . 
will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class"). Throenle points to two factors as evidence that Lead 
Plaintiff did not adequately protect the Class's interests. 
The first is that while some people originally placed the 
Class's total damages at $13-20 billion, Cendant only paid 
$2.85 billion, which is too low a percentage of the Class's 
total damages. Her second piece of evidence is that Liberty 
Media Co. agreed to invest $400 million in Cendant soon 
after the announcement of the Settlement; because Lead 
Plaintiff must have known about this impending deal"[t]his 
obviously gave the Lead Plaintiffs--to the extent they 
retained substantial Cendant holdings--a tremendous 
incentive to settle cheap." Throenle's Opening Br. at 31. 
 
Throenle does not clearly explain how she concluded that 
the Class's damages were $13-20 billion; apparently it is 
derived from Cendant's loss of market capitalization caused 
by the announcement of the fraud. As we noted above in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
representation, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (stating that a class may be 
certified only if "the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class"), or predominance, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3) (allowing for class certification if "the court finds that the 
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members"). 
Because here no party on appeal objects to class certification based on 
conflicts between Sell Plaintiffs and Hold Plaintiffs, we need not decide 
whether this matter should have been certified as two separate classes 
or as a single class with sub-classes. We do, however, call these issues 
to the attention of district courts for future cases, and note that the 
use 
of separate classes or sub-classes is not inconsistent with the Reform 
Act because that statute deals with the identification of a lead 
plaintiff, 
and not with the proper means for defining a class in the first place. 
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our Girsh factor analysis, however, loss in market 
capitalization is not a proper measure of damages inS 10(b) 
or S 11 cases. See 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(e) (S 10(b) damages) & 
S 77k(e) (S 11 damages); supra Part III.A.8. Thus, Throenle's 
argument based on this $13-20 billion figure has no 
legitimate basis and we reject it for that reason. 
 
Similarly, Throenle's accusations about the Cendant- 
Liberty Media deal are based upon speculation; she offers 
no evidence that Lead Plaintiff knew about this impending 
deal or that it affected the settlement calculations, except 
for the fact that the deal was announced soon after the 
Settlement was announced (nine days later). Furthermore, 
even if this speculation were correct, Throenle's argument 
on its own is not persuasive. It is unclear how this 
impending deal, if Lead Plaintiff knew of it, "obviously gave 
Lead Plaintiff . . . a tremendous incentive to settle cheap," 
as Throenle contends. Why would an upcoming infusion of 
cash investment in Cendant impel Lead Plaintiff to settle 
this litigation cheaply? Lead Plaintiff would have such an 
incentive only if: (1) Liberty Media made the deal contingent 
upon Cendant achieving a favorable settlement of this case; 
(2) Lead Plaintiff became aware that Liberty Media had 
taken this position; and (3) Lead Plaintiff determined that 
the Liberty Media deal was worth more to it (as a current 
shareholder of Cendant) than a larger settlement was worth 
to it (as a class member). As with her other charges, 
Throenle offers no evidence that any of these suppositions 
are true. For these reasons, we reject Throenle's assertion 
that Lead Plaintiff was in conflict with the interests of the 
class members so that the Settlement should be 
overturned. 
 
b. The Corporate Governance Changes 
 
Throenle also argues that the corporate governance 
changes that Lead Plaintiff obtained from Cendant as part 
of the Settlement benefitted only institutional investors who 
continued to hold large blocks of Cendant stock, and not 
the Class as a whole, so that the District Court abused its 
discretion in approving a settlement that provided an 
individual benefit to certain class members at the expense 
of more recovery for the Class overall. 
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The corporate governance changes that Lead Plaintiff 
negotiated include Cendant's agreement to: (1) ensure that 
a majority of its Board of Directors would be independent 
directors; (2) place only independent directors on the 
Board's Audit, Nominating, and Compensation Committees; 
(3) de-classify the Board and provide for the annual election 
of all directors; and (4) preclude the repricing of any 
employee stock option after its grant, except with the 
approval of a majority of voting shareholders. Although 
these corporate governance changes were not negotiated 
until after the monetary portion of the Settlement was 
agreed upon, Lead Plaintiff did make it known to Cendant 
at the beginning of the negotiation process that it was going 
to ask for corporate governance changes. Obviously, these 
changes benefit only current and future Cendant 
shareholders, as they are meant to reduce the chance of 
future fraud by limiting the control of Cendant's internal 
officers and directors. The Lead Plaintiff, however, was 
appointed to represent the interests of the Class, which is 
defined as all persons who purchased Cendant stock 
between May 31, 1995 and August 28, 1998, many of 
whom have long since sold their shares. 
 
On the basis of these facts, which are essentially 
undisputed, Throenle argues that the inclusion of the 
corporate governance changes in the Settlement warrants 
overturning the Settlement. She acknowledges that she has 
no evidence that Lead Plaintiff gave up something in the 
negotiations (presumably up-front dollars) in order to get 
the corporate governance changes. Throenle's argument is 
thus based upon the common sense premise that "you 
don't get something for nothing." Throenle contends that 
the only thing of value that Lead Plaintiff had to offer 
Cendant for the governance changes was its acceptance of 
less money for the Class. Therefore, Throenle maintains, 
Lead Plaintiff sold out the interests of the class members 
(by accepting less money than it could have gotten) in order 
to get something of value for itself and for other current 
and future Cendant shareholders. Under this view, Lead 
Plaintiff breached its duty to the Class in negotiating these 
corporate governance changes, and the District Court 
abused its discretion in approving the Settlement given this 
conflict. 
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Throenle's argument here has an intuitive pull, but 
ultimately it is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the 
received wisdom of the street does not necessarily have 
force in this Court as a matter of law. The truth of the 
maxim "you don't get something for nothing" is not 
something that we can judicially notice. We need evidence, 
and there is no affirmative evidence backing up Throenle's 
claims, although there is some evidence against them. Lead 
Plaintiff strenuously denies that it took any less monetary 
recovery to get the corporate governance changes. 
Apparently, the corporate governance changes were not 
negotiated until after the monetary recovery was 
determined, and Lead Counsel who negotiated the 
Settlement made declarations to the District Court stating 
that Cendant was explicitly told that the money it paid into 
the Settlement would not be decreased in any way as an 
exchange for implementing the corporate governance 
changes. 
 
Cendant's general counsel confirmed this declaration, 
and stated that Cendant did not request or receive any 
concessions, economic or otherwise, in exchange for 
adopting the corporate governance changes. Thus, Lead 
Plaintiff submits that we should leave intact the District 
Court's factual finding that "Throenle's objection regarding 
the corporate governance changes has no substance. There 
has not been the slightest indication that the cash portion 
of the settlement was related to, dependent upon, or 
intertwined with the governance proposals." 109 F. Supp. 
2d at 252. 
 
Second, Cendant had another possible motivation for 
agreeing to the corporate governance changes: corporations 
that have admitted to fraudulent activity can have a hard 
time attracting and keeping investors unless they make 
some affirmative efforts to ensure that such fraud will not 
occur again. It is entirely plausible that Cendant agreed to 
the corporate governance changes as a way to show 
investors that it was addressing the situation that allowed 
the fraud to occur in the first place, thus trying to make 
itself more attractive. This possibility counters Throenle's 
"you don't get something for nothing" argument, because, 
under this scenario, Cendant gave up the corporate 
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changes in order to encourage continued investment, 
particularly from institutional investors. 
In sum, the lawyers involved in negotiating the 
Settlement have provided affidavits and declarations to the 
effect that there was no settlement-money-for- 
corporate-governance-changes exchange, and Throenle 
offers no evidence otherwise. We are satisfied that the 
District Court's factual finding that there was no evidence 
of such an exchange is not clearly erroneous, and we reject 
Throenle's arguments based on the supposed existence of 
such an exchange. For all the foregoing reasons, we 
conclude that Throenle's conflict of interest arguments are 
not a sufficient basis for concluding that the District Court 
abused its discretion in approving the Settlement. 26 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Throenle makes two other arguments which can be dealt with 
summarily. First, she argues that the Settlement Notice was inadequate 
because it omitted information that the PSLRA requires in such notices, 
in 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(7)(B)(ii). That statute provides, in relevant 
part: 
"Disagreement on amount of damages: If the parties do not agree on the 
average amount of damages per share that would be recoverable if the 
plaintiff prevailed on each claim alleged under this chapter, a statement 
from each settling party concerning the issue or issues on which the 
parties disagree" must be included in the notice of a settlement. Throenle 
appears to interpret this as a requirement that, if the parties do not 
agree on damages, the notice of a settlement must include a statement 
from each settling party concerning every issue on which the parties 
disagree. The District Court rejected this argument, holding that 
(7)(B)(ii) 
clearly only requires a statement on the damages  issues on which the 
parties disagree. The District Court was correct. Quite obviously, the 
phrase "the issue or issues on which the parties disagree" in (7)(B)(ii) 
refers only to damages issues, not to every disputed issue involved in the 
class action. The court found that the Settlement Notice contained a 
statement of the damages issues on which the parties disagree and that 
this statement was sufficient; this finding was supported. Throenle also 
argues that several of the statements contained in the Settlement Notice 
were misleading or incomplete; these arguments are patently without 
merit and we reject them without further discussion. 
 
Second, Throenle argues that the District Court erred in approving the 
part of the Settlement in which "Lead Plaintiffs have traded their solid 
case against E&Y" for a 50% interest in any recovery that Cendant gets 
in its cross-claim against E&Y, because: (1) "Lead Plaintiffs cannot cede 
their responsibility for prosecuting a class action against one defendant 
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2. Mark's Arguments 
 
Mark attacks the Settlement's Plan of Allocation, arguing 
that class members who had S 11 claims under the 
Amended Complaint (i.e., class members who received 
Cendant stock via the HFS merger) should be allocated 
higher settlement payments than class members with only 
S 10(b) claims, because S 11 claims and damages are far 
easier to prove than S 10(b) claims and damages. She then 
asserts that Lead Plaintiff did not press for a greater 
recovery for S 11 claimants because it used the greater 
strength of the S 11 claims to recover more for the Class's 
S 10(b) claims.27 Mark therefore argues that the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in a case to another defendant in the case," as this violates the "spirit" 
of Rule 23; and (2) "Cendant's case against E&Y is much weaker than 
the case brought against E&Y by the class." Throenle's Opening Br. at 
57-58. Throenle's argument here involves a mischaracterization of the 
terms of the Settlement. Under the Settlement, E&Y paid the Class $335 
million in return for the Class releasing its claims against E&Y; this is 
the extent of what the Class is getting from E&Y. Independent of any of 
the Class's claims, Cendant has asserted certain cross-claims against 
E&Y. In addition to its $2.85 billion payment, Cendant agreed to give 
50% of any recovery of these claims against E&Y to the Class. Cendant 
is prosecuting not the Class's claims against E&Y but its own cross- 
claims, so Cendant is not in any way taking over the role of Lead 
Plaintiff. Consequently, the relative strength of Cendant's claims against 
E&Y as compared to the Class's claims against E&Y is immaterial to the 
fairness of this settlement provision; the Class did not give up any part 
of its claims against E&Y for this 50% of Cendant's recovery, but only 
gave up some portion of its claims against Cendant in return for this 
50% from Cendant (and given that Cendant paid the Class $2.85 billion, 
it is not clear that the Class gave up very much for this 50% recovery). 
Therefore, we reject Throenle's argument that the District Court abused 
its discretion in approving this portion of the Settlement. 
 
27. As we noted above, the Plan of Allocation allowed class members with 
S 11 claims to calculate their damages either under a statutory S 11 
calculation or under the plan's S 10(b) calculation, whichever was higher. 
This is because any S 11 claim can also be treated as a S 10(b) claim, so 
anyone with a S 11 claim also has a S 10(b) claim (of course, the converse 
is not true). However, certain class members had both a S 11 claim and 
an independent S 10(b) claim; that is, they received shares in the HFS 
merger (the S 11 claim), and they also bought shares on the open market 
(the S 10(b) claim). The Lead Plaintiff had both S 11 claims and 
independent S 10(b) claims, as did Mark. 
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Court abused its discretion in approving the Plan of 
Allocation, and she asks us to vacate that part of the 
Settlement. She also asks us to appoint her lead plaintiff, 
and her counsel as lead counsel, for a subclass composed 
of the class members with S 11 claims. 
 
Mark cites three basic legal differences betweenS 10(b) 
and S 11 claims that affect their relative legal difficulty. 
First, S 11 claims are strict liability claims (all one needs to 
establish on the part of the defendant is an untrue 
statement of material fact in a registration statement) while 
S 10(b) claims require proof of scienter on the part of the 
defendant. Second, this difference in the required mental 
state means that S 11 claims are less fact intensive than 
S 10(b) claims, with the result that a S 11 claim is much 
more likely to survive a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. Third, there is no proportionate liability under 
S 11 claims, while there is under S 10(b) if the defendant 
acted only with recklessness, not knowledge. According to 
Mark, these three differences make the plaintiff 's task of 
proving her case easier with a S 11 claim than with a 
S 10(b) claim, thus making the former a more valuable type 
of claim. 
 
Mark contends that the conflict between the class 
members with S 11 claims and those without such claims 
was exacerbated here because Lead Plaintiff used the 
stronger S 11 claims as leverage to get more recovery for the 
S 10(b) claims. More specifically, Mark points to the fact 
that, early in the litigation, Lead Plaintiff agreed to defer a 
motion for partial summary judgment on its S 11 claims in 
return for Cendant's agreement to permit informal 
discovery on the S 10(b) claims. Thus, Mark argues that, in 
return for benefit for the S 10(b) claims (discovery), Lead 
Plaintiff sacrificed leverage for the S 11 claims--the 
summary judgment motion--which she submits could have 
resulted in an early determination of liability against 
Cendant. 
 
Finally, Mark points to two other Cendant cases as 
evidence that S 11 claims against Cendant are easier to 
prevail on and thus should result in a higher recovery 
percentage than the 36% this Settlement provides: the 
PRIDES settlement, In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 51 F. 
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Supp. 2d 537 (D.N.J. 1999), and the Yeager litigation, 
Yeager v. Cendant, 109 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D.N.J. 2000). 
Mark contends that these cases show that "an unconflicted 
Plaintiff with a particularly strong S 11 Claim" against 
Cendant can recover close to 100% of her damages, much 
higher than the 36% return this Settlement garnered. 
Under the terms of the PRIDES settlement, members of the 
class received almost 100% of their damages claims. In 
Yeager, the district court granted partial summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability on 
his S 11 claims, while denying summary judgment on 
S 10(b) liability because there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to Cendant's scienter. 
 
Mark's arguments are not without force. However, there 
are several considerations that convince us that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in approving the Plan of 
Allocation. First, the difference in the liability standards 
between S 11 and S 10(b) claims ultimately does not make 
a substantial difference in this case, as it is basically 
undisputed that Cendant's employees committed fraud, so 
the necessary scienter for the S 10(b) claims has been 
admitted. It is true that there is a possible issue of 
proportionate liability that arises with the S 10(b) claims, 
because Cendant has stated that it would raise the defense 
that the scienter of its employees cannot be attributed to 
Cendant itself. However, as we noted previously, see supra 
Part III.A.4, based on the record before us we think that 
Cendant would have a very difficult time making out this 
defense. 
 
Second, the real difficulty in the trial of this case would 
have been establishing damages, a process which both 
S 10(b) and S 11 claimants would have to undergo equally 
and which almost certainly would devolve into a"battle of 
the experts." Although S 11 claimants could at the outset 
calculate their damages rather simply (by subtracting the 
price of the stock at the time the lawsuit was brought from 
the amount that they paid for the stock, see 15 U.S.C. 
S 77k(e)), the defendant can counter this calculation by 
showing that any or all of this difference in stock price was 
caused by something other than the fraud, see id . Thus, on 
a S 11 claim there would still be a "battle of the damage 
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experts;" the only difference between a S 11 and a S 10(b) 
damage determination in this case is that, on aS 11 claim, 
the defendant would bear the burden of disproving the 
plaintiff 's straightforward subtraction calculation. In fact, 
in Yeager, the district court denied Yeager summary 
judgment on his S 11 claim in part because the court found 
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
amount of Yeager's S 11 damages. See Yeager, 109 F. Supp. 
2d at 229. Furthermore, the informal discovery that Lead 
Plaintiff obtained in return for deferring the summary 
judgment motion produced information relevant to 
determining the Class's damages, which was beneficial to 
both the S 11 and S 10(b) claims. 
 
Finally, it is also important to note that the S 10(b) 
damages available to the class members in this case are 
generally greater than the S 11 damages available, so that 
in this respect the S 10(b) claims are potentially stronger 
than the S 11 claims.28 At all events and for all these 
reasons, we are chary of holding that the respective legal 
strengths of the S 10(b) and S 11 claims involved here 
should have been factored into the fairness of the 
settlement determination. This would be a speculative 
enterprise at best, and the differences in strength of these 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. The reason for this is that S 11 damages and S 10(b) damages are 
calculated under the Plan of Allocation using different days as the 
"selling date," i.e., the date on which the class member is deemed to 
have sold her Cendant stock for damage determination purposes. As we 
described, supra n.8, S 11 damages are determined by using as a selling 
date the date lawsuits were first filed (April 16, 1998). Section 10(b) 
damages, however, are determined using the earlier of (1) the date the 
class member actually sold her stock or (2) the last day of the class 
period, i.e., August 28, 1998. Thus, because a class member would have 
no damages if she sold before April 16, 1998 (the fraud was not revealed 
until after trading on April 15, 1998, so sales before then got the full 
benefit of the fraudulently inflated price of Cendant's stock), damages on 
the S 10(b) claims are determined using a date between April 16, 1998 
and August 28, 1998. Because Cendant stock declined steadily between 
April 16 and August 28, 1998, the calculations ofS 10(b) damages under 
the Plan of Allocation (which may use a post-April 16 date as the selling 
date) are generally more than S 11 damage calculations under the plan 
(using April 16 as the selling date). 
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claims are not so great as to make the outcome of this 
process clear. 
 
Furthermore, the PRIDES settlement and the Yeager 
litigation are distinguishable. The PRIDES settlement 
involved a paper payout rather than a cash payout (i.e., the 
plaintiffs got new Cendant stock for their old stock), see 
Cendant PRIDES, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 540, while the case at 
bar involves a cash payout.29 Second, PRIDES was a "claims 
made" settlement, with unclaimed settlement funds 
reverting back to Cendant, see id. at 541; here all the 
settlement cash (and interest) will go to the Class. This 
point is important because it means that unmade claims in 
this Settlement will increase the percentage return for each 
class member, while unmade claims in the PRIDES  
settlement did not increase each class member's return but 
instead decreased the amount that Cendant had to pay out. 
Put another way, giving 36% recovery to 100% of the class 
in a standard settlement like the case at bar is equivalent 
(in terms of money paid out by the defendant) to giving 
100% recovery in a claims made settlement if only 36% of 
the class actually makes claims (assuming that each claim 
is for the same amount). 
 
Thus, the "claims made" nature of the PRIDES settlement 
meant that Cendant could agree to a settlement in that 
case that gave a much higher percentage recovery to all 
potential class members, because it knew that it only had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. Mark argues that, although the PRIDES settlement involved a "paper 
for paper" exchange, a PRIDES plaintiff who sold her new Cendant stock 
within the first ten days that she was able to received almost 100% of 
her damages claimed, so that the PRIDES settlement effectively involved 
a nearly 100% cash payout. However, at the time when the PRIDES 
settlement was reached, there was no guarantee that the class members 
would garner such a steadily high return over the first few days during 
which they would be able to sell their stock. There was about a nine- 
month delay between the settlement approval and the date when the 
class members could sell their new shares in the market, and much 
could have happened to Cendant and its stock during that interim that 
could have affected the amount of return that the PRIDES plaintiffs 
received. Thus, the PRIDES "paper for paper" exchange involved a 
sizeable risk, at the time the settlement was entered into, of a payout 
substantially less than 100% of the class's damages. 
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to pay out to those class members who actually made 
claims, which was certain to be a subset of the entire class. 
Not only does this mean that PRIDES is not"really" a 
settlement for 100% recovery (because less than 100% of 
the potential claimants will make a claim, thus lowering the 
amount Cendant must pay out), it also means that the 
settlement in this case is not "really" a settlement for 36% 
recovery (because less than 100% of the potential claimants 
will make a claim, thus raising the amount each claimant 
will receive). More specifically, at the time of oral argument 
in this case, $4.962 billion in claims had been submitted to 
the Claims Administrator, which translates into a 67% 
recovery for each class member--almost double the original 
36% recovery figure.30 
 
As for Yeager, that case was not a class action (the 
plaintiff had opted out of this Class) and was for far less in 
damages, so any comparisons between Yeager and this 
case are flawed at best. Furthermore, as we note above, the 
district court partially denied Yeager summary judgment on 
his S 11 claims because there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the amount of damages. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject Mark's arguments 
and conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by approving a settlement that treatedS 10(b) 
and S 11 claims more or less equally. 
 
C. The Davidsons' Objections 
 
For the reasons set forth supra at note 10, it is not clear 
at this juncture whether the Davidsons are members of the 
Class. If this Court, in its en banc sitting in November, 
2001, decides that the Davidsons are included in the Class, 
we would be required to pass on the issues they raise in 
this appeal. Given the proliferation of appeals in this case 
(this being the seventh appeal in the Cendant  proceedings 
see supra n.11), and the importance of bringing this matter 
to a close as soon as the issues presently unsettled are 
resolved, we think it prudent to address those issues now. 
Because these objections do not warrant extensive 
treatment, we will dispose of them in relatively short order. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. The deadline to submit claims to the Claims Administrator was 
October 31, 2000. 
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1. Class Certification Findings 
 
The Davidsons first argue that the District Court erred by 
failing to make explicit findings that all of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23's requirements were met when certifying 
the Class. They argue further that the court erred by not 
making those findings again at the settlement stage. In the 
Davidsons' submission, if the court had made the Rule 23 
findings, it never would have certified the Class as it now 
stands; rather it would have at least certified a subclass for 
merger claimants like them. In particular, the Davidsons 
argue that, if it had done its job properly, the court would 
have (or should have) found that Rule 23(a)'s requirements 
of typicality and adequate representation were not met by 
the Class as it was defined and by the Lead Plaintiffs' 
representation. In their Reply Brief, the Davidsons add the 
argument that Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement was 
not met as well. 
 
However, the Davidsons neglected to raise these 
arguments in a timely fashion, failing to raise them until 
the settlement approval stage. We thus conclude that they 
waived these arguments by not raising them earlier. See 
Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(holding that objectors to a class action settlement who 
argued, at the settlement approval stage, that the Rule 23 
requirements were not met for them in their subclass were 
untimely with their objection, and thus the objection was 
waived). 
 
2. Notice of the Settlement 
 
The Davidsons contend that the Settlement Notice given 
to the class members was insufficient, in that it did not give 
them sufficient information to make an informed decision 
whether to opt out before the opt-out deadline. They argue 
that the relevant terms of the Settlement Agreement--the 
Plan of Allocation and the scope of the claims against 
Cendant that were released--were not disclosed before the 
opt-out period ended. This defect, they assert, made the 
notice that was sent to the Class insufficient. The 
Davidsons submit that the court either should have sent 
out another notice with this particular information about 
the terms of the Settlement before the opt-out deadline, or 
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should have extended the opt-out deadline (or provided for 
a new opt-out period) beyond the time that the terms of the 
Settlement were released. The Davidsons argue that the 
reaching of a settlement in effect made this class action a 
settlement class action, so that the notice requirements for 
a settlement class action set forth in GM Trucks , 55 F.3d 
768, 792 (3d Cir. 1995), apply here. We disagree. 
 
This was not a settlement class action but a previously 
certified class action that settled. The Davidsons have 
provided no authority for their contention that if settlement 
is reached before the opt-out period has run the specific 
terms of the settlement must be sent to the class before the 
end of the opt-out period, or that reaching a settlement 
requires a new opt-out period. We do not think the 
requirements of Rule 23 mandate these measures, and 
thus reject the Davidsons' arguments. 
 
3. Intra-Class Conflicts 
 
The Davidsons press an interesting argument based on 
the conflicts that allegedly arose within the Class when the 
Settlement precluded the S 11 claims and 1933 Act S 12 
claims31 [hereinafter "S 12 claims"] of class members who 
acquired CUC shares via non-HFS mergers with CUC, even 
though the Settlement did not provide any recovery for 
these S 11 and S 12 claims. The Davidsons contend that the 
District Court abused its discretion and that the Lead 
Plaintiff breached its duty to the Class when they accepted 
and approved a settlement with such terms. Relatedly, the 
Davidsons contend that an intra-class conflict arose 
because the Settlement gave HFS merger claimants a 
choice between calculating their recoveries as S 10(b) or 
S 11 damages, while non-HFS merger claimants were given 
no such choice. 
 
As we understand it, the premises of the Davidsons' 
argument are that: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides for civil liability 
for 
anyone who offers or sells a security "by means of a prospectus or oral 
communication, which includes an untrue statement of material fact or 
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, 
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading . . . ." 15 U.S.C. S 77l. 
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       (1) The Amended Complaint did not include any S 11 
       and S 12 claims against Cendant for class members 
       who received Cendant stock from any merger other 
       than the HFS merger; 
 
       (2) The Davidsons and other merger partners of 
       Cendant/CUC during the class period have potential 
       S 11 and S 12 claims against Cendant; 
 
       (3) These potential S 11 and S 12 claims against 
       Cendant could produce greater damages than a 
       corresponding S 10(b) claim against Cendant; 
 
       (4) The Settlement does not allow the Davidsons or 
       other non-HFS merger class members to recover on 
       their S 11 or S 12 claims; under the Plan of Allocation, 
       they are limited to recovering under S 10(b) for their 
       losses; and 
 
       (5) The Settlement precludes non-HFS merger class 
       members like the Davidsons from bringing their S 11 
       and S 12 claims against Cendant in the future. 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Davidsons reason that 
the Settlement was unfair because: (i) it prevented non-HFS 
merger class members from recovering on their S 11 and 
S 12 claims while precluding these class members from 
bringing those claims in the future, and (ii) it treated the 
HFS merger claimants specially, by allowing them to 
recover the higher of their damages calculated underS 10(b) 
and under S 11, while denying the non-HFS merger class 
members the same opportunity. 
 
Again, we disagree. If the Davidsons are arguing that 
their S 11 and S 12 claims should have been included in the 
Amended Complaint in the first place, they waived this 
claim by not bringing it earlier. See Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 
F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2000). Furthermore, regarding the 
claim that an intra-class conflict arose from the special 
treatment given the HFS claimants, we reject a 
fundamental premise of the Davidsons' above argument, 
namely (3): that the Davidsons' S 11 claims could produce 
greater damages than their corresponding S 10(b) claims. 
The Davidsons' S 11 claims would have to be determined 
under the relevant section of the 1933 Securities Act by 
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using the date of the filing of this lawsuit. See supra n.8. 
However, using that date, the Davidsons' potentialS 11 
damages as we calculate them are less than the S 10(b) 
damages that they are allotted under the Plan of Allocation. 
Thus, the Davidsons are not prejudiced by being limited to 
only S 10(b) damages under the terms of the Settlement-- 
those damages are greater than any S 11 damages they 
would have received under the Plan of Allocation--so there 
is no unfairness or intra-class conflict here. 
 
4. Alleged Flaws in the Plan of Allocation  
 
The Davidsons submit that the District Court abused its 
discretion in approving the Settlement's Plan of Allocation 
because the Plan "was based upon clearly erroneous 
premises." They contend that the Plan does not correctly 
determine out-of-pocket damages for the S 10(b) claims 
because it does not correctly define the "true value" of 
Cendant stock when it was purchased by the class 
members, as it uses figures that "pool" Cendant's finances 
with companies that Cendant merged with. Concomitantly, 
the Davidsons argue that the Lead Plaintiff did not 
establish a proper evidentiary basis for the Plan's method of 
determining damages. 
 
It is clear from the record that the District Court was 
faced with competing expert opinions on the proper way to 
determine and allocate damages. The record shows that the 
court carefully considered the expert advice, and then 
chose to accept the plan submitted by the Lead Plaintiff 's 
damages expert over the plan submitted by the Davidsons' 
expert. This kind of decision is intensely fact-based, falling 
within the purview of the District Court's discretion. The 
District Court properly based its decision on evidence 
offered by the Lead Plaintiff, which provided more than a 
sufficient evidentiary basis for its decision. See, e.g., 
Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance 
Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 
37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 883 (1990) (presenting the damages 
study on which the Plan of Allocation was based); In re 
California Micro Devices Securities Litig., 965 F. Supp. 1327 
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (using the same method of allocating 
maximum artificial inflation over the class period, 
developed by David L. Ross of Lexicon, Inc., as was used 
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here). We therefore find no abuse of the court's discretion 
in its decision to accept the Plan of Allocation. 
 
Accordingly, the Davidsons' objections are rejected. 
 
IV. COUNSEL SELECTION AND COUNSEL FEES 
 
We turn to the issues involving the selection of lead 
counsel and the determination of its fee. The Reform Act 
establishes detailed and interrelated procedures for 
choosing a lead plaintiff and selecting lead counsel. We first 
address the District Court's appointment of the CalPERS 
Group as lead plaintiff, and then its choice to use an 
auction to select lead counsel. With respect to legal 
questions--including whether the District Court applied the 
correct standards in selecting the lead plaintiff and when, 
if ever, a court may hold an auction to select lead counsel 
in cases governed by the PSLRA--we review de novo. See 
Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238, 244 (3d Cir. 2000). 
If the court committed no legal errors, we review its award 
of attorneys fees for abuse of discretion. See id. 
 
A. Introduction: Attorney-Client Tension in the Class 
       Action Context 
 
Lawyers operate under ethical rules that require them to 
serve only their clients' interests. When a representation 
involves a single client, the ability to select, retain, and 
monitor counsel gives clients reason to be confident that 
their lawyers will live up to this obligation. The power to 
select counsel lets clients choose lawyers with whom they 
are comfortable and in whose ability and integrity they have 
confidence. The power to negotiate the terms under which 
counsel is retained confers upon clients the ability to craft 
fee agreements that promise to hold down lawyers' fees and 
that work to align their lawyers' economic interests with 
their own. And the power to monitor lawyers' performance 
and to communicate concerns allows clients to police their 
lawyers' conduct and thus prevent shirking. This regime 
has served the American legal system well for a very long 
time. 
 
1. The Problem With Class Actions 
 
Most of the safeguards we have described vanish in the 
class action context, where "the client" is a sizeable, often 
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far-flung, group. Logistical and coordination problems 
invariably preclude class members from meeting and 
agreeing on anything, and, at all events, most class 
members generally lack the economic incentive or 
sophistication to take an active role. There is simply no way 
for "the class" to select, retain, or monitor counsel. 
 
Although class counsel has an ethical duty of undivided 
loyalty to the interests of the class, reason for concern 
remains. This is in large measure because a rational, self- 
interested client seeks to maximize net recovery; he or she 
wants the representation to terminate when his or her 
gross recovery minus his or her counsel's fee is largest. In 
contrast, at least in theory and often in practice, a rational, 
self-interested lawyer looks to maximize his or her net fee, 
and thus wants the representation to end at the moment 
where the difference between his or her fees and costs-- 
which include not only the money that the lawyer spends in 
advancing his or her client's cause but also the 
opportunities for other work that the lawyer gives up by 
pursuing it--is greatest. These two points rarely converge. 
As a result, there is often a conflict between the economic 
interests of clients and their lawyers, and this fact creates 
reason to fear that class counsel will be highly imperfect 
agents for the class. 
 
Because of this conflict (and because "the class" cannot 
counteract its effects via counsel selection, retention, and 
monitoring), an agent must be located to oversee the 
relationship between the class and its lawyers. 
Traditionally, that agent has been the court. Although some 
courts have played an active role with regard to selecting 
lead counsel in securities cases, most have traditionally 
appointed the person who filed the first suit as lead 
plaintiff, and generally selected that person's lawyer to 
serve as lead counsel (assuming, of course, that the lawyer 
possessed sufficient competence and experience). See, e.g., 
H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-369, at 33 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 732. In addition, time and institutional 
constraints have generally prevented courts from actively 
monitoring the performance of lead counsel during the 
pendency of litigation. 
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Under such a regime, it was essential for courts to 
scrutinize fee requests to protect the interests of absent 
class members. Lead plaintiffs were often unsophisticated 
investors who held small claims, and, according to some 
reports, they were sometimes paid "bounties" by lead 
counsel in exchange for their "services." See id. In such 
situations, it was unlikely that the lead plaintiff had 
undertaken a meaningful counsel selection process; indeed 
it was suspected that lead counsel generally selected the 
lead plaintiff rather than vice versa. See id.  at 32-33, 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731-32; S. Rep. No. 
104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 
685. Moreover, there was generally little reason to believe 
that the lead plaintiff had the incentive or inclination to 
engage in aggressive or effective bargaining over lead 
counsel's fee, or that a typical lead plaintiff could be 
counted on to engage in meaningful monitoring of lead 
counsel's performance. 
 
2. The Evolution of Judicial Review of Counsel Fees In 
       Class Actions 
 
Courts have developed several means of reviewing the 
reasonableness of fee requests. At the dawn of the class 
action era, the most frequently used device was the lodestar 
method, which was developed by this Court in Lindy 
Brothers Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator 
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). 
Under that approach, the court assesses the number of 
hours that lead counsel reasonably worked, decides the 
reasonable hourly rate for the lawyers' services, and 
determines counsel's fee by multiplying the number of 
hours reasonably worked by the reasonable hourly rate. 
The Supreme Court has developed an elaborate 
jurisprudence covering the proper application of the 
lodestar method, which remains the governing approach for 
cases governed by fee-shifting statutes. See, e.g., Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 
886 (1984); Webb v. Board of Educ. of Dyer County, 471 
U.S. 234 (1985); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 
(1986); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Counsel 
for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 
489 U.S. 87 (1989); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992). 
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Over time, criticism mounted against using the lodestar 
method, especially in "common fund" cases such as this 
one. The "common-fund doctrine . . . allows a person who 
maintains a lawsuit that results in the creation, 
preservation, or increase of a fund in which others have a 
common interest[ ] to be reimbursed from that fund for 
litigation expenses incurred." Report of the Third Circuit 
Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 
241 (1985) [hereinafter "1985 Task Force Report"]. In 
common fund cases the fees paid to class counsel come 
directly out of the recovery of the class, as opposed to 
statutory fee-shifting cases where the plaintiffs' recovery 
and counsel's fees are distinct. In those situations, every 
additional dollar given to class counsel means one less 
dollar for the class, regardless how a total settlement 
package is formally structured. Cf. GM Trucks , 55 F.3d at 
821 ("[P]rivate agreements to structure artificially separated 
fee and settlement arrangements cannot transform what is 
in economic reality a common fund situation into a 
statutory fee shifting case.") 
 
As the 1985 Task Force Report recognized, using the 
lodestar method in the common fund context creates 
numerous problems. First, because the lodestar 
compensates lawyers based on hours worked rather than 
results achieved, there is a risk that it will cause lawyers to 
work excessive hours, inflate their hourly rate, or decline 
beneficial settlement offers that are made early in litigation. 
See 1985 Task Force Report, 108 F.R.D. at 247-48. Second, 
requiring courts to decide how many hours a lawyer 
"reasonably" worked in pursuing a given matter requires an 
enormous investment of judicial time. See id.  at 246. Third, 
though creating the illusion of mathematical precision, the 
lodestar method can be quite subjective and can produce 
wildly varying awards in otherwise similar cases. See id. at 
246-47. 
 
In light of these criticisms, the 1985 Task Force Report 
recommended a different device for setting attorneys fees in 
common fund class actions: the percentage-of-recovery 
method. See id. at 255. This Court has generally accepted 
that recommendation. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 333-34 (3d Cir. 
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1998). Under the percentage-of-recovery approach, a court 
charged with determining whether a particular fee is 
"reasonable" first calculates the percentage of the total 
recovery that the proposal would allocate to attorneys fees 
by dividing the amount of the requested fee by the total 
amount paid out by the defendant; it then inquires whether 
that percentage is appropriate based on the circumstances 
of the case. In making that decision, this Court has 
directed district courts to consider numerous factors, as 
well as recommending that they employ a lodestar"cross- 
check." See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 
F.3d 722, 733-35 (3d Cir. 2001).32 
 
The 1985 Task Force Report also identified another 
problem with the traditional approach: the fact that fees 
and their method of calculation were generally not set until 
the conclusion of litigation. This reality was troubling for a 
several reasons. First, it required the court to assess the 
reasonableness and efficacy of counsel's efforts in 
hindsight, with all of the risks of distortion and bias 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. For a sampling of the literature assessing the desirability and 
efficacy 
of using the percentage-of-recovery method in common fund cases, see, 
for example, Reagan W. Silber & Frank E. Goodrich, Common Funds and 
Common Problems: Fee Objections and Class Counsel's Response, 17 
Rev. Litig. 525 (1998) (arguing in favor of the use of the percentage-of- 
recovery method in common fund cases, and contending that the 
percentage allocated to counsel fees should not decrease simply because 
the size of the fund increases); William J. Lynk, The Courts and the 
Plaintiffs' Bar: Awarding the Attorney's Fees in Class Action Litigation, 
23 
J. Legal Stud. 185 (1994) (employing economic analysis to consider the 
similarities and differences between the lodestar and percentage-of- 
recovery methods, and surveying case law in an effort to determine 
which method better explains the actual size of class counsel fee 
awards); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' 
Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic 
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 48-61 
(1991) (analyzing and critiquing both methods, arguing that the 
percentage-of-recovery method, though preferable to the lodestar, is 
deeply flawed as well); Monique LaPointe, Note, Attorney's Fees in 
Common Fund Actions, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 843 (1991) (assessing both 
methods and arguing that the most important thing for courts to do is 
to pick one or the other in order to facilitate case management and 
promote predictability). 
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associated with this kind of decision-making. Second, it 
meant that attorneys had to litigate an entire case before 
finding out what hours or actions the court would consider 
"reasonable." Third, waiting until the end to set fee terms 
eliminated any potential for those terms to align the 
incentives of the class and its lawyers during the pendency 
of the litigation. The Task Force Report recommended that 
courts "attempt to establish a percentage fee arrangement 
agreeable to the Bench and to plaintiff 's counsel . . . at the 
earliest practicable moment." 108 F.R.D. at 255. 33 
 
The 1985 Task Force Report recognized that it would be 
problematic to have the presiding judge set a fee award at 
the outset of a case. See id. at 256. One cannot develop a 
fee scale without making an assessment of the likelihood of 
success and the size of the recovery. But requiring the 
court to make (and act upon) an assessment of the strength 
of a plaintiff class's case early in litigation was thought to 
be in tension with the need for judges to be objective. 
Although the Task Force Report proposed a process for up- 
front fee negotiation through a court-appointed, non- 
judicial representative, it does not appear to have been 
taken up by any court.34 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. The Task Force members disagreed among themselves as to how 
early was appropriate. Some pushed for as early a time as possible, 
suggesting after the pleadings have been filed but before discovery was 
significantly underway. Other (judicial) members of the Task Force 
preferred a later point to allow them to have a"feel" for how the case had 
developed. See id. at 255 n.62. The members of the Task Force also 
disagreed as to whether a "time limit should be imposed on the court's 
ability to shift from one fee regime to another." Id. at 257. Some of the 
judicial members of the Task Force thought that no such limit should 
apply so as to preserve the court's ability to protect the best interests 
of 
the class. See id. Other members of the Task Force believed that giving 
the court that degree of discretion would "destroy[ ] the predictability" 
that advance negotiation is intended to achieve. Id. 
 
34. The Task Force Report recommended that "the court appoint a non- 
judicial representative--who typically will be an attorney--for the then 
putative fund beneficiaries, who will negotiate the agreement in the 
usual marketplace manner and submit the proposal for the court's 
approval." Id. The Report contemplated that the court's review of the 
agreement negotiated between court-appointed intermediary and counsel 
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The Task Force Report's recommendations contained no 
suggestions for changes in the areas of counsel selection 
and counsel monitoring. The first major attempt to address 
counsel selection as well as fees came in Judge Vaughn R. 
Walker's application of the auction technique in In re Oracle 
Securities Litigation, 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990), which 
has since been used in a number of cases that are listed in 
the margin.35 The basic concept is simple: the judge solicits 
bids from law firms to serve as lead counsel and selects the 
lowest bidder that the court determines will adequately 
represent the class. In theory, an auction will mimic a 
market transaction and result in reasonable quality, low- 
cost representation for the class.36 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
would be "completely independent and thorough," and that the court 
would have the power to "accept, reject, or revise the arrangement, either 
providing exact terms or merely establishing ranges and retaining the 
ultimate authority to revise the agreement if later circumstances 
warrant." Id. at 257. 
 
35. We have located eleven cases besides this one and Oracle where a 
district court selected class counsel by means of an auction. Two were 
antitrust cases. See In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. 
Supp. 
1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (Shadur, J.); In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 
197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Kaplan, J.). One was a securities class 
action not governed by the PSLRA. See In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 156 
F.R.D. 223 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (Walker, J.). And eight were securities class 
actions governed by the Reform Act. See Raftery v. Mercury Fin. Co., No. 
97 C 624, 1997 WL 529553 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (Lefkow, J.); Sherleigh Assoc. 
LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 
(Lenard, J.); Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(Walker, J.); In re Lucent Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137 (D.N.J. 
2000) (Lechner, J.); In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 
2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (Shadur, J.); In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 141 F. 
Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (Shadur, J.); In re Quintus Sec. Litig., No. 
C-00-4263 (N.D. Cal., April 12, 2001) (Walker, J.);  see also In re 
Network 
Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (Alsup, 
J.) 
(directing the lead plaintiff to undertake an auction process). 
 
36. On January 30, 2001, the opinion author, acting as Chief Circuit 
Judge and Presiding Officer of the Third Circuit Judicial Council, 
announced the formation of a Task Force on the Selection of Class 
Counsel whose primary duty is to assess the propriety and efficacy of the 
 
                                77 
  
The auction method offers several potential advantages. 
First, unlike all of the methods previously discussed, it 
deals with counsel selection in addition to counsel 
retention. When an auction is used, counsel are no longer 
"selected" by the race-to-the-courthouse method, and this 
means that courts can exercise greater control over counsel 
quality. Second, auctions may lead to lower-priced 
representation. Under the traditional method, lead counsel 
(who has already been appointed) tries to get as much as it 
can from the court in terms of fees. Under the auction 
method, in contrast, prospective lead counsel compete to 
submit the lowest reasonable bid.37 Third, assuming a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
use of the auction method in its various applications, and to 
formulate recommendations for the bench, bar, and public. The 
Press Release containing this announcement is available at: 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/taskforce.pdf. Other press 
releases relating to the 2001 Task Force, a list of questions that it is 
addressing, witness statements, and transcripts of the proceedings so far 
are all available at: http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/ 
public.htm. The 2001 Task Force's preliminary report will be made 
public in October 2001, and its final report is scheduled for release 
sometime during the Spring of 2002. 
 
Judge Ambro, named in January as a member of the 2001 Task Force, 
later became a member of this panel through the Court's random 
assignment process. Judge Becker informed counsel for all parties of this 
fact during a conference call that was held prior to oral argument, and 
no party objected to Judge Ambro's continued involvement in this 
matter. During this call, Judge Becker also "explained that everything 
that is before the Task Force -- written presentations, case law, and 
transcripts of oral presentations, et alia, ha[d] been placed on the Third 
Circuit website (www.ca3.uscourts.gov), available through a link entitled 
`Class Counsel Information.' " In re Cendant Corp. Litig., No. 00-2520 (3d 
Cir., May 15, 2001) (unpublished order). Lastly, Judge Becker stressed 
that "the function of the Task Force is limited to making general 
recommendations to the bench and bar at large (throughout the nation)" 
and that its recommendations would have "no precedential effect in any 
circuit." Id. 
 
37. See, e.g., Proceedings of the 2001 Third Circuit Task Force on the 
Selection of Class Counsel [hereinafter "2001 Task Force Proceedings"], 
Statement of the Committee on Federal Courts of the Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York, at 4-5, available at 
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sufficiently large number of bidders, an auction will likely 
better approximate a market transaction than having a 
judge set attorneys fees after the fact. Fourth, auctions may 
provide a way for new firms to enter the market for 
plaintiff-side securities class action lawyers, thus rendering 
the overall market more competitive.38  Fifth, the auction 
method may require a smaller investment of judicial time 
than the time-consuming lodestar method, and could 
minimize the dangers of hindsight biases associated with 
the traditional, after-the-fact approach to determining fees. 
This Court has recognized the potential benefits of the 
auction method, commending it to district courts in this 
circuit for their consideration as one potential approach to 
the problems in this area. See Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy 
Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 201 n.6 (3d Cir. 2000). 39 
 
Auctions may not be a panacea, however. One persistent 
criticism is that courts generally identify the"lowest" bid 
submitted by an "adequate" bidder and appoint that bidder 
as lead counsel, without performing the cost/quality 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/Witness%20Statements/ 
struve.pdf [hereinafter "NYC Bar Association"]; 2001 Task Force 
Proceedings, Statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., at 2, available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/Witness%20Statements/ 
johncoffee.pdf [hereinafter "Coffee"]; 2001 Task Force Proceedings, 
Statement of Richard B. Drubel, at 4-5, available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/Witness%20Statements/ 
Richard_Drubel.pdf [hereinafter "Drubel"]; see also discussion, infra at 
n.44 (describing Judge Milton I. Shadur's belief that his use of the 
auction technique has saved class members in cases before him millions 
of dollars in counsel fees). 
 
38. See, e.g., Coffee at 2. 
 
39. In Gunter this Court noted the auction technique "appears to have 
worked well," and identified the decision now here on review, among 
others, as cases where it had been used. See id.  at 201 n.6. Gunter was 
an antitrust case, hence questions involving the compatibility of the 
auction procedure with the Reform Act were not before the Court. 
Moreover, this type of citation to a district court opinion, offered to 
open 
eyes to a range of possibilities, was not even dicta, and, at all events, 
does not preclude a subsequent panel from reviewing the merits of a 
district court's decision. 
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weighing in the way that a real client would.40 Another fear 
is that because auctions do not reward the attorneys who 
discover legal violations, they may reduce lawyers' 
incentives to seek out and disclose illegality (because 
unless they are selected as lead counsel, they may not be 
compensated for the time they spent doing so).41 Moreover, 
bids in large, potentially high-recovery, cases are likely to 
be quite complex and it may be difficult for courts to assess 
their relative costs to the class. This risk is especially 
strong in cases where the bids consist of a complicated set 
of alternate fees that vary depending on the size of the 
recovery and the stage of the proceedings at which the 
recovery is obtained. In such situations, a court cannot 
assess which bid is the cheapest without first assessing the 
likely amount of recovery.42 Additionally, if there are too few 
bidders, the degree to which an auction will actually 
simulate the market is questionable.43  Finally, there is a 
risk that auctions could result in a "winner's curse," 
systematically selecting bidders who overestimate the odds 
or amount of a likely recovery. Such a "winning" bidder 
might then find itself litigating an unprofitable case, which 
may then give it an incentive to settle early and cheaply.44 
No consensus has yet emerged about the relative efficacy of 
the auction technique, although Judge Walker and Judge 
Milton I. Shadur of the United States District Court for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
40. See, e.g., 2001 Task Force Proceedings, Statement of Lucian 
Ayre Bebchuk, at 6-8, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/ 
classcounsel/Witness%20Statements/Bebchuk.Statement.pdf 
[hereinafter "Bebchuk"]; Task Force Proceedings, Statement of Jill E. 
Fisch, at 3-4, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/ 
Witness%20Statements/fisch.pdf. [hereinafter"Fisch"]. 
 
41. See, e.g., Fisch at 7; NYC Bar Association at 3; Coffee at 3. But see 
In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 789 n.13 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (ordering a lead plaintiff to ensure that the lawyers who 
prepared the consolidated class action complaint--but were not selected 
as lead counsel via a court-ordered auction--were compensated for their 
time). 
 
42. See, e.g., Fisch at 2; NYC Bar Association at 5. 
 
43. See, e.g., Coffee at 3; Fisch at 6-7. 
 
44. See, e.g., Coffee at 3. 
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Northern District of Illinois have made a powerful case for 
it, both in terms of policy and tangible (fee-saving) results.45 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
45. Along with Judge Walker (who, as we noted in the text, originated the 
use of the auction method in federal court), Judge Shadur has been a 
leading proponent of the auction method. Judge Shadur held one of the 
first lead counsel auctions in In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust 
Litigation, 
918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996), and has since used the technique in 
two other cases as well. See In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 
F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000); In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 141 F. Supp. 
2d 951 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 12, 2001). In these opinions, Judge Shadur 
cogently explains why courts have a basic obligation to protect the 
pecuniary interests of absent class members, persuasively outlines why 
courts cannot fulfill this duty by relying on decisions made by lead 
plaintiffs, and powerfully argues in favor of the auction method as the 
only way to minimize the agency costs that plague relationships between 
absent class members and class counsel. Judge Shadur believes that his 
use of the auction technique has saved class members in cases before 
him millions of dollars in counsel fees. See, e.g., Bank One, 96 F. Supp. 
2d at 785 n.5 (claiming that the Lysine auction saved the class between 
$5 and 10 million in attorneys fees). In his recent opinion in In re 
Comdisco Sec. Litig., No. 01 C2110, 01 C 874, 2001 WL 722097 (N.D. Ill. 
June 27, 2001), Judge Shadur noted that the two prior cases in which 
he has used the auction technique resulted in attorneys fees of 
approximately 6% of the class's total recovery, and he contrasted this 
with a recent case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in which 
counsel was awarded 25% of the total recovery. See id. at *5. Based on 
this, Judge Shadur calculated that his use of the auction method saved 
plaintiff class members $10 million or more in counsel fees in each of 
the cases where he has employed it. See id. Although Judge Shadur's 
analysis seems quite persuasive, some have argued that his auctions 
have resulted in lower overall recoveries as well as lower counsel fees 
and have thus cost rather than saved class members money, see, e.g., 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities: Class Actions , Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 
1998, 
at B6 (criticizing the Lysine auction on this basis). 
 
We need not engage in a dialogue with Judge Walker and Judge 
Shadur over the merits and demerits of the auction method in class 
actions generally at this time, however, because before us is a question 
of statutory interpretation (of the Reform Act) rather than one of 
judicial 
policy. As we explain infra at Part IV.C, we think that lead counsel 
auctions are generally (and that the auction in this case was) 
inconsistent with the statutory scheme embodied in the Reform Act. It 
will be left to later opinions of this Court, to the 2001 Task Force, and 
perhaps to the Congress, to wrestle with the forceful policy arguments in 
favor of the auction method that Judge Walker and Judge Shadur have 
advanced. 
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Despite significant differences, it is critical to realize that 
the traditional approach, the procedure suggested by the 
1985 Task Force Report, and the auction method all share 
two critical traits. First, none of them addresses the 
inability of the class, a typical lead plaintiff, or the court to 
monitor lead counsel in an adequate manner. Second, and 
perhaps more significantly, all three methods rely on the 
court (or an agent hand-picked by the court) to serve as the 
class's agent vis-a-vis its counsel. This is less true under 
the auction method, but even then the court must decide 
which bidders are "qualified," assess which bids are 
"adequate," and determine which of the adequate bids 
submitted by qualified bidders is the "lowest." Another 
option would be to assign responsibility to a different type 
of agent. In 1995, two scholars recommended that 
Congress do just that. 
 
3. The PSLRA 
 
In Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional 
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class 
Actions, Professors Elliott J. Weiss and John S. Beckerman 
argued that institutional investors are well suited to select, 
retain, and monitor lead counsel in securities class actions. 
See 104 Yale L.J. 2053 (1995). Their article explained how 
then-current practices deterred institutional investors from 
taking a more active role, and recommended legislation to 
encourage them to serve as lead plaintiffs. 
 
The Weiss and Beckerman proposal had three parts. 
First, to ensure that institutional investors found out about 
pending class actions, they argued that courts should 
require that meaningful notices be sent out soon after the 
filing of a complaint. See id. at 2108. Second, "because the 
named plaintiff or group of plaintiffs with the largest 
financial stake in the outcome of an action has the greatest 
economic incentive to monitor class counsel's performance 
effectively," Weiss and Beckerman suggested that courts 
"adopt a presumption that that plaintiff or group will `most 
adequately' represent class members' interests." Id. at 
2105. They recommended that "[c]ourts . . . provide other 
putative plaintiffs with an opportunity to rebut this 
presumption, but should allow them to do so only by 
demonstrating that the presumptively `most adequate' 
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plaintiff has a significant disqualifying conflict of interest or 
is subject to unique defenses that would render it incapable 
of adequately representing the class." Id.  at 2105-06. Weiss 
and Beckerman further suggested that only putative class 
members should be permitted to file adequacy and 
typicality objections against the presumptive lead plaintiff, 
and recommended that even those parties be entitled to 
discovery "only where they can demonstrate some 
reasonable basis for believing that a presumptively 
adequate plaintiff would not be capable of representing the 
class adequately." Id. at 2109. 
 
Third, once such a lead plaintiff was selected, Weiss and 
Beckerman submitted that courts should "[a]ppoint as lead 
counsel the attorney for the `most adequate plaintiff ' " and 
should defer to that plaintiff 's discretion in setting 
attorneys fees, noting that institutional investors are 
"experienced and sophisticated consumers of legal 
services." Id. at 2105-06. Weiss and Beckerman speculated 
that if institutional investors frequently served as lead 
plaintiffs, plaintiff-side securities law firms would grow 
increasingly concerned about their long-term reputations 
with such investors and thus might have less incentive to 
shirk in particular cases. See id. at 2106-07. The authors 
acknowledged that fee structures negotiated by institutional 
lead plaintiffs might "differ substantially from the fee 
structure that courts currently employ," but suggested that 
courts "might well feel confident in assuming that a fee 
arrangement an institutional investor had negotiated with 
its lawyers before initiating a class action maximized those 
lawyers' incentives to represent diligently the class's 
interests, reflected the deal a fully informed client would 
negotiate, and thus presumptively was reasonable." Id. at 
2105. 
 
Soon after Weiss and Beckerman's article was published, 
Congress enacted the PSLRA. The statute establishes a 
detailed and integrated procedure for selecting a lead 
plaintiff and for choosing and retaining lead counsel in 
securities class actions that is unquestionably based on 
Weiss and Beckerman's proposal. Compare 15 U.S.C. 
S 78u-4(a)(3), with Weiss & Beckerman, 104 Yale L.J. at 
2105-09. See generally S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 11 n.32 
 
                                83 
  
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 n.32 
(stating that Weiss and Beckerman's article "provided the 
basis for the `most adequate Plaintiff ' provision"). 
 
B. The Reform Act's Procedures; Selection of the 
       CalPERS Group As Lead Plaintiff 
 
The Reform Act establishes a two-step process for 
appointing a lead plaintiff: the court first identifies the 
presumptive lead plaintiff, and then determines whether 
any member of the putative class has rebutted the 
presumption. See 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) & (II). We 
begin by describing the manner in which courts charged 
with appointing a lead plaintiff should proceed under the 
PSLRA. We then measure the actions taken by the District 
Court against these standards. 
 
1. Legal Standards 
 
a. Identifying the Presumptive Lead Plaintiff  
 
In appointing a lead plaintiff, the court's first duty is to 
identify the movant that is presumptively entitled to that 
status. The process begins with the identification of the 
movant with "the largest financial interest in the relief 
sought by the class." 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb). In 
many cases (such as this one, see supra Part II.B), this 
determination will be relatively easy, but in others it may 
prove difficult. The Reform Act provides no formula for 
courts to follow in making this assessment, but we agree 
with the many district courts that have held that courts 
should consider, among other things: (1) the number of 
shares that the movant purchased during the putative class 
period; (2) the total net funds expended by the plaintiffs 
during the class period; and (3) the approximate losses 
suffered by the plaintiffs. See Lax v. First Merch. Acceptance 
Corp., No. 97 C 2715, 1997 WL 461036, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 
11, 1997); see also In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig. , 188 F.R.D. 
206, 217 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing Lax for this proposition); In 
re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 286, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 
1998) (same). 
 
Any time the question appears genuinely contestable, we 
think that a district court would be well within its 
discretion in requiring that competing movants submit 
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documentation as to their holdings in the defendant 
company or companies and in seeking further information 
if it deems the original submissions to be an inadequate 
basis for an informed decision. Once the court has 
identified the movant with "the largest financial interest in 
the relief sought by the class," it should then turn to the 
question whether that movant "otherwise satisfies the 
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure," and is thus the presumptively most adequate 
plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(cc). This latter 
requirement casts into stark relief a serious ambiguity 
contained in the Reform Act's mechanism for selecting a 
lead plaintiff. 
 
The section of the PSLRA that governs the appointment 
of the lead plaintiff is captioned "Rebuttable Presumption." 
The first subsection, captioned "[i]n general," provides that 
"the court shall adopt a presumption that the most 
adequate plaintiff . . . is the person or group of persons 
that": (1) filed the complaint or made a motion to serve as 
the lead plaintiff; (2) "in the determination of the court, has 
the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the 
class;" and (3) "otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. S 78u- 
4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). The next subsection, captioned"[r]ebuttal 
evidence," declares that the presumption established by the 
previous subsection "may be rebutted only upon proof by a 
member of the purported plaintiff class that the 
presumptively most adequate plaintiff -- (aa) will not fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class; or (bb) is 
subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff 
incapable of adequately representing the class." Id. S 78u- 
4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). 
 
The draftmanship of this section is inartful and hence 
problematic. The first subsection states that a movant is 
not entitled to the lead plaintiff presumption unless it 
"otherwise satisfies" Rule 23. The two provisions of that 
Rule that are relevant to this issue are 23(a)(3) and 23(a)(4). 
The former requires that a party seeking to represent a 
class have "claims or defenses [that] are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class" [hereinafter"the typicality 
requirement"]. The latter mandates that a representative 
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party be able to "fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class" [hereinafter "the adequacy requirement"]. Read 
in isolation, the provision of the Reform Act that deals with 
triggering the presumption (i.e., 15 U.S.C. S 78u- 
4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(cc)) seems quite clear that a court must 
ensure that a movant satisfies both the typicality and 
adequacy requirements of Rule 23 before conferring upon 
that movant the status of presumptive lead plaintiff. 
 
This conclusion, however, is in some tension with the 
second subsection (i.e., 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)), 
which seems to establish that the only way to rebut the 
presumption is to show that the presumptive lead plaintiff 
does not satisfy the typicality and/or adequacy 
requirements. The statute thus simultaneously appears to 
make "typicality" and "adequacy" both part of the threshold 
identification of the presumptive lead plaintiff and the sole 
means of rebutting the lead plaintiff presumption. Put 
another way, if the requirements of the first subsection are 
met, the statute can be read to say that the requirements 
of the second subsection are moot. To say the least, it is 
difficult to believe that Congress intended such an 
incongruity. 
 
The overall structure and legislative history of the statute 
suggest that in appointing a lead plaintiff a district court 
should engage in the following analysis. The initial inquiry 
(i.e., the determination of whether the movant with the 
largest interest in the case "otherwise satisfies" Rule 23) 
should be confined to determining whether the movant has 
made a prima facie showing of typicality and adequacy. The 
initial clause of the statute, which governs triggering the 
presumption, refers to determinations made by "the court," 
15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), but the second, which deals 
with rebutting it, speaks of "proof by a member of the 
purported plaintiff class," id. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). This 
phrasing suggests that the threshold determination of 
whether the movant with the largest financial losses 
satisfies the typicality and adequacy requirements should 
be a product of the court's independent judgment, and that 
arguments by members of the purported plaintiff class as to 
why it does not should be considered only in the context of 
assessing whether the presumption has been rebutted. 
 
                                86 
  
Moreover, both the statutory structure and the legislative 
history suggest that the court's initial inquiry as to whether 
the movant with the largest losses satisfies the typicality 
and adequacy requirements need not be extensive. The first 
subsection (the one that deals with triggering the lead 
plaintiff presumption) requires that a movant "otherwise 
satisf[y]" Rule 23, but the second (which covers rebutting it) 
requires "proof " that the presumptively most adequate 
plaintiff does not. The provision as a whole would make 
little sense if we interpreted the first subsection as 
requiring that a movant "prove" that it satisfied Rule 23 in 
order to get the benefit of the lead plaintiff presumption, 
because that would create a situation in which the only 
way to rebut the presumption would be to "disprove" 
something that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff 
had already "proved." But if, in contrast, the first 
subsection requires only a prima facie showing that the 
movant with the largest losses satisfies Rule 23, the two 
subsections are reasonably harmonious. 
 
Lastly, this reading is consistent with the legislative 
history. In explaining why institutional investors would 
make desirable lead plaintiffs, the Conference Committee 
Report opines that "[i]nstitutional investors and other class 
members with large amounts at stake will represent the 
interests of the plaintiff class more effectively than class 
members with small amounts at stake. The claims of both 
types of class members generally will be typical." H.R. Conf. 
Rep. 104-327, at 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 737. The terms of this language reflect the view that 
institutional investors and others with large losses will, 
more often than not, satisfy the typicality and adequacy 
requirements. Thus, although the language of the first 
subsection does not permit courts simply to "presume" that 
the movant with "the largest financial interest in the relief 
sought by the class" satisfies the typicality and adequacy 
requirements, both the structure of the section as a whole 
and the legislative history support the view that the court's 
initial inquiry should be confined to determining whether 
such movants have stated a prima facie case of typicality 
and adequacy. See, e.g., Gluck v. Cellstar Corp. , 976 F. 
Supp. 542, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (stating that in 
determining whether a movant is entitled to presumptive 
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lead status, "[a] comprehensive reading of the statute 
reveals that [the movant] need only make a preliminary 
showing that it satisfies [the typicality and adequacy] 
requirements"); In re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 
286, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (same); In re Advanced Tissue Sci. 
Sec. Litig., 184 F.R.D. 346, 349 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (same); In 
re Milestone Sci. Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 404, 414 (D.N.J. 
1998) (same). 
 
In conducting the initial inquiry as to whether the 
movant with the largest losses satisfies the typicality and 
adequacy requirements, the court may and should consider 
the pleadings that have been filed, the movant's 
application, and any other information that the court 
requires to be submitted. In keeping with the statutory text, 
however, the court generally will not consider at this stage 
any arguments by other members of the putative class; 
rather, such allegations should be dealt with in terms of 
assessing whether the lead plaintiff presumption has been 
rebutted rather than in terms of deciding whether it has 
been triggered. 
 
When making these determinations, courts should apply 
traditional Rule 23 principles. Thus, in inquiring whether 
the movant has preliminarily satisfied the typicality 
requirement, they should consider whether the 
circumstances of the movant with the largest losses"are 
markedly different or the legal theory upon which the 
claims [of that movant] are based differ[ ] from that upon 
which the claims of other class members will perforce be 
based." Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
Georgine v. Windsor, 83 F.3d 610, 631 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(same). 
 
In assessing whether the movant satisfies Rule 23's 
adequacy requirement, courts should consider whether it 
"has the ability and incentive to represent the claims of the 
class vigorously, [whether it] has obtained adequate 
counsel, and [whether] there is [a] conflict between [the 
movant's] claims and those asserted on behalf of the class." 
Hassine, 846 F.2d at 179; see also Georgine, 83 F.3d at 
630 (stating that the adequacy of representation inquiry 
involves consideration of both whether "the interests of the 
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named plaintiffs [are] sufficiently aligned with those of the 
absentees" and whether "class counsel [is] qualified and 
[will] serve the interests of the entire  class"); GM Trucks, 55 
F.3d at 800 (same). 
 
In making the initial adequacy assessment in this 
context, courts should also consider two additional factors. 
Because one of a lead plaintiff 's most important functions 
is to "select and retain" lead counsel, see 15 U.S.C. S 78u- 
4(a)(3)(B)(v), one of the best ways for a court to ensure that 
it will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
class is to inquire whether the movant has demonstrated a 
willingness and ability to select competent class counsel 
and to negotiate a reasonable retainer agreement with that 
counsel, see, e.g., In re Quintus Sec. Litig. , No. C-00-4263, 
slip op. at 9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2001).46  Thus, a court might 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
46. In Quintus, Judge Walker found that a movant for the lead plaintiff 
position did not otherwise satisfy Rule 23 because he had not 
"demonstrated that he is able effectively to select and retain lead 
counsel." Id. at 30. In a sworn declaration, the movant stated that he 
had made his choice of counsel "based on his broker's advice and after 
conversations with lawyers at the firm," that he had "discussed and 
considered a variety of fee structures with his counsel and ha[d] 
developed an understanding of how fees are customarily charged in 
litigation of this type," and that he had "negotiated an agreement with 
counsel . . . that [he] believe[d] [would] maximize recovery for the 
class." 
Id. Judge Walker found this insufficient to support a conclusion that the 
movant satisfied Rule 23's adequacy requirement, noting that the 
declaration gave "no specifics" about the process by which the movant 
had selected and negotiated with his chosen counsel. Judge Walker was 
most concerned about a statement that one of the movant's chosen 
lawyers had made at the hearing held to consider the appointment of 
lead plaintiff. The lawyer had informed the court"that the fee negotiated 
by [the movant] paid expenses out of the class's recovery, rather than 
out of counsel's portion of the recovery," but then explained that 
"counsel, of their own accord, had decided to sweeten the terms of the 
agreement and allow expenses to be deducted from counsel's share of 
the recovery; pending approval by [the movant] who did not know about 
this concession." Id. at 31. Though finding "counsel's benevolence 
towards the class . . . commendable," Judge Walker could not "conclude 
that [the movant] negotiated anything close to a competitive fee in light 
of counsel's willingness to modify the fee, without being asked, to 
require 
counsel to pay all litigation expenses." Id.  "Benevolence of counsel," 
Judge Walker wrote, "is no substitute for hard bargaining." Id. 
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conclude that the movant with the largest losses could not 
surmount the threshold adequacy inquiry if it lacked legal 
experience or sophistication, intended to select as lead 
counsel a firm that was plainly incapable of undertaking 
the representation, or had negotiated a clearly 
unreasonable fee agreement with its chosen counsel, see, 
e.g., Raftery v. Mercury Fin. Co., No. 97 C 624, 1997 WL 
529553, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 1997) (refusing to recognize 
a movant as the presumptive lead plaintiff because the 
court was of the view that the retainer agreement between 
it and its chosen counsel, which "capped" counsel's fees at 
33 1/3% of the class's total recovery, was "not the result of 
hard bargaining").47 We stress, however, that the question 
at this stage is not whether the court would"approve" that 
movant's choice of counsel or the terms of its retainer 
agreement or whether another movant may have chosen 
better lawyers or negotiated a better fee agreement; rather, 
the question is whether the choices made by the movant 
with the largest losses are so deficient as to demonstrate 
that it will not fairly and adequately represent the interests 
of the class, thus disqualifying it from serving as lead 
plaintiff at all. 
 
The second additional factor that the court should 
consider in making the threshold adequacy determination 
will arise only when the movant with the largest interest in 
the relief sought by the class is a group rather than an 
individual person or entity. The PSLRA explicitly permits a 
"group of persons" to serve as lead plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I); see also id.S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) 
(providing that the court "shall appoint as lead plaintiff the 
member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the 
court determines to be the most capable of adequately 
representing the interests of class members") (emphasis 
added). But the goal of the Reform Act's lead plaintiff 
provision is to locate a person or entity whose 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
47. After its disqualification of the movant with the largest financial 
interest on the grounds outlined above, the court decided to select the 
lead plaintiff and lead counsel by means of an auction. See id. at *3. We 
do not ally ourselves with this latter decision, which, for reasons stated 
infra at Part IV.C.2, we think would be inappropriate in the typical 
Reform Act case. 
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sophistication and interest in the litigation are sufficient to 
permit that person or entity to function as an active agent 
for the class, see, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 32 
(1995) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731; S. Rep. No. 
104-98, at 10 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 
689; Weiss & Beckerman, 104 Yale L.J. at 2105--06, and 
a group is not entitled to presumptive lead plaintiff status 
unless it "otherwise satisfies" Rule 23, which in turn 
requires that it be able to "fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class." If the court determines that the way 
in which a group seeking to become lead plaintiff was 
formed or the manner in which it is constituted would 
preclude it from fulfilling the tasks assigned to a lead 
plaintiff, the court should disqualify that movant on the 
grounds that it will not fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class. 
 
We note at this juncture that we disagree with those 
courts that have held that the statute invariably precludes 
a group of "unrelated individuals" from serving as a lead 
plaintiff. See, e.g., Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 
2d 845, 853 (S.D. Ind. 1999); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 
67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 811-16 (N.D. Ohio 1999); In re 
Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 157-58 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The statute contains no requirement 
mandating that the members of a proper group be"related" 
in some manner; it requires only that any such group 
"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." We 
do not intimate that the extent of the prior relationships 
and/or connection between the members of a movant group 
should not properly enter into the calculus of whether that 
group would "fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class," but it is this test, not one of relatedness, with 
which courts should be concerned. 
 
If, for example, a court were to determine that the 
movant "group" with the largest losses had been created by 
the efforts of lawyers hoping to ensure their eventual 
appointment as lead counsel, it could well conclude, based 
on this history, that the members of that "group" could not 
be counted on to monitor counsel in a sufficient manner. 
See, e.g., In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 00 CV 9474 
JSR, 2001 WL 476504, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2001) 
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(refusing to appoint as lead plaintiff a group that, in the 
court's view, was "simply an artifice cobbled together by 
cooperating counsel for the obvious purpose of creating a 
large enough grouping of investors to qualify as`lead 
plaintiff,' which can then select the equally artificial 
grouping of counsel as `lead counsel' "). 
 
Courts must also inquire whether a movant group is too 
large to represent the class in an adequate manner. At 
some point, a group becomes too large for its members to 
operate effectively as a single unit. See, e.g., Chill v. Green 
Tree Fin. Corp., 181 F.R.D. 398, 408-09 (D. Minn. 1998) 
("[T]he larger [the size of a proposed lead plaintiff group], 
the greater the dilution of the control that [the members of 
that group] can maintain over the conduct of the putative 
class action.") (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). When that happens, the PSLRA's goal of having 
an engaged lead plaintiff actively supervise the conduct of 
the litigation and the actions of class counsel will be 
impossible to achieve, and the court should conclude that 
such a movant does not satisfy the adequacy requirement. 
See, e.g., In re Advanced Tissue Sci. Sec. Litig. , 184 F.R.D. 
346, 352 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (refusing to appoint a group 
consisting of "over 250 unrelated investors" because of the 
court's determination that doing so would be "inconsistent 
with the goal of restoring control over lawsuits to plaintiffs 
instead of counsel"); Chill, 181 F.R.D. at 408 (declining to 
confer presumptive lead plaintiff status upon a"group" with 
almost 300 members because doing so "would threaten the 
interests of the class, would subvert the intent of Congress, 
and would be too unwieldy to allow for the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of this action"). 
 
Like many of the district courts that have considered this 
question, we do not establish a hard-and-fast rule; instead, 
we note only that a kind of "rule of reason prevails." See, 
e.g., Advanced Tissue, 184 F.R.D. at 352; Chill, 181 F.R.D. 
at 409. We do, however, agree with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission that courts should generally 
presume that groups with more than five members are too 
large to work effectively. See Brief for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 17 n.13. 
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We do not intimate that other reasons could not justify a 
court's decision that the Rule 23's adequacy of 
representation requirement is not satisfied. If (for any 
reason) the court determines that the movant with the 
largest losses cannot make a threshold showing of typicality 
or adequacy, then the court should explain its reasoning on 
the record (so that appellate courts will have an adequate 
basis for review) and disqualify that movant from serving as 
lead plaintiff. The court should then identify the movant 
with the next largest loss, consider whether that movant 
satisfies Rule 23's requirements, and repeat this process 
until a presumptive lead plaintiff is identified. See, e.g., 
Raftery, 1997 WL 529553, at *2-4, 7 (identifying a 
presumptive lead plaintiff after disqualifying two movants 
with larger losses, one on grounds of atypicality and one on 
grounds of inadequacy). 
 
b. Determining Whether the Presumption Has Been 
       Rebutted 
 
Once a presumptive lead plaintiff is located, the court 
should then turn to the question whether the presumption 
has been rebutted. The Reform Act is quite specific on this 
point, providing that the presumption "may be rebutted 
only upon proof by a member of the purported plaintiff class 
that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff -- (aa) will 
not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; 
or (bb) is subject to unique defenses that render such 
plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class." 15 
U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II) (emphasis added). This 
language makes two things clear. First, only class members 
may seek to rebut the presumption, and the court should 
not permit or consider any arguments by defendants or 
non-class members. See, e.g., Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 
F. Supp. 542, 550 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("The statute is clear 
that only potential plaintiffs may be heard regarding the 
appointment of a Lead Plaintiff."). Second, once the 
presumption is triggered, the question is not  whether 
another movant might do a better job of protecting the 
interests of the class than the presumptive lead plaintiff; 
instead, the question is whether anyone can prove that the 
presumptive lead plaintiff will not do a "fair[ ] and 
adequate[ ]" job. We do not suggest that this is a low 
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standard, but merely stress that the inquiry is not a relative 
one. 
 
If no class member succeeds in rebutting the 
presumption, then the district court should appoint the 
presumptive lead plaintiff as the lead plaintiff. If the 
presumption has been rebutted, the court must begin the 
process anew (i.e., identifying which of the remaining 
movants has the highest financial interest in the class's 
recovery, assessing whether that movant satisfies the 
threshold typicality and adequacy requirements, and 
determining whether the presumption has been rebutted) 
until a lead plaintiff is selected. 
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2. Application of the Standards Here 
 
Under these standards, we believe that the District Court 
correctly identified the CalPERS Group as the 
presumptively most adequate plaintiff. The Group filed a 
motion to serve as lead plaintiff, and no party has 
questioned that of all the movants it has the largest 
financial interest in the relief sought by the Class. The 
District Court expressly found that the CalPERS Group 
satisfied Rule 23(a)'s typicality requirement. See In re 
Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 149-50 (D.N.J. 1998). 
Although we have expressed concerns about certain 
potential conflicts of interest that might have undermined 
the CalPERS Group's position, we have concluded that they 
do not carry the day. See supra Part III.B.1(a). 
 
The District Court also found no obvious reason to doubt 
that a group composed of the three largest pension funds in 
the United States could adequately protect the class's 
interests. The CalPERS Group's members are legally 
sophisticated entities, their chosen counsel are well- 
qualified, and the Retainer Agreement that they negotiated 
was not plainly unreasonable. Moreover, although it is a 
group, there is no indication that the CalPERS Group was 
artificially created by its lawyers, and the fact that it 
contains three members offers no obvious reason to doubt 
that its members could operate effectively as a single unit. 
We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court's determination that the CalPERS Group was the 
presumptive lead plaintiff. 
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We also conclude that the District Court was correct in 
holding that the CalPERS Group's presumptive lead 
plaintiff status had not been rebutted. Appellant Aboff and 
Douglas Wilson (who is not before us on appeal) offered 
three reasons why the statutory presumption in favor of the 
CalPERS Group had been rebutted. First, Aboff and Wilson 
represented that "they had negotiated a reduced fee 
schedule with their attorneys." Id. at 148. As we stressed 
above, the question at this stage is not whether Aboff and 
Wilson would have done a better job of securing high- 
quality, low-cost counsel than the CalPERS Group; the 
question is whether the former have put forward"proof " 
that the latter would "not fairly and adequately represent 
the class." Had Aboff and Wilson shown that: (1) their fee 
agreement was substantially lower than that negotiated by 
the CalPERS Group; (2) their chosen counsel were as 
qualified or more qualified than those chosen by the 
presumptive lead plaintiff; and (3) the CalPERS Group had 
no adequate explanation for why it made the choice that it 
did, then the presumption may have been rebutted. But 
this would only happen if the facts suggested that the 
CalPERS Group had performed inadequately in an objective 
sense. But Aboff and Wilson did not make this showing 
simply by alleging that they negotiated a lower fee; hence 
we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in rejecting this argument. 
 
Aboff and Wilson's second contention was that the 
presumption had been rebutted because "considerations 
other than the interests of the class might have influenced 
the CalPERS group when it retained its attorneys." Id. at 
148. Specifically, they alleged that "counsel for the CalPERS 
group had made substantial contributions to the campaign 
of the New York State Comptroller, who, as sole trustee of 
the [NYS]CRF [a member of the CalPERS Group], has 
substantial influence over the decisions of the fund," and 
they argued that this "created an appearance of impropriety 
because the contributions may have played a role in the 
selection of the group's counsel--a practice known as `pay- 
to-play.' " Id. at 148-49. We likewise find no abuse of 
discretion in the District Court's decision to reject this 
argument. 
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Lest we be misunderstood, we observe that actual proof 
of pay-to-play would constitute strong (and, quite probably, 
dispositive) evidence that the presumption had been 
rebutted. A movant that was willing to base its choice of 
class counsel on political contributions instead of 
professional considerations would, it seems to us, have 
quite clearly demonstrated that it would "not fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class." Thus, had 
Aboff and Wilson backed up their claims, the District Court 
would have likely been justified in holding that the 
presumption had been rebutted and disqualifying the 
CalPERS Group from serving as lead plaintiff. 
 
The problem for Aboff and Wilson is that the District 
Court expressly found that they had not provided evidence 
in support of their pay-to-play allegations, see id. at 149, 
and we have no basis upon which to disagree. When 
pressed by the District Court, Aboff and Wilson admitted 
that they had no evidence that the contributions, 
themselves legal, had influenced the CalPERS Group's 
selection process.48 Allegations of impropriety are not proof 
of wrongdoing. If they were, then any class member (or 
lawyer seeking to be appointed lead counsel) could disable 
any presumptive lead plaintiff by making unsupported 
allegations of impropriety. We therefore hold that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Aboff 
and Wilson's pay-to-play arguments.49 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
48. At oral argument before this Court, Aboff argued that it had been 
unable to back up its allegations because the District Court had denied 
it discovery. The Reform Act is quite clear on this score: an objecting 
class member is entitled to discovery "only if the plaintiff first 
demonstrates a reasonable basis for a finding that the presumptively 
most adequate plaintiff is incapable of adequately representing the 
class." 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iv). Under this standard, it is 
doubtful 
that Aboff would have been entitled to discovery (if indeed it asked). 
 
49. Although we have held that the District Court was correct to reject 
Aboff and Wilson's pay-to-play allegations based on a lack of evidence 
and to appoint the CalPERS Group as lead plaintiff, we call attention to 
a situation that Congress may not have contemplated when it enacted 
the PSLRA. Congress clearly anticipated that pension funds would seek 
to serve as lead plaintiffs; indeed, that likelihood was seen as a 
specific 
benefit of the legislation. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995), 
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Aboff and Wilson's last submission was that the court 
"should select lead plaintiff through a process of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733. What is unclear, however, is 
whether Congress considered a particular risk that seems unique to 
publicly-managed pension funds. The concern is that an informal quid 
pro quo could develop in which law firms specializing in securities class 
actions would contribute to the campaign coffers of the elected officials 
who oversee those funds, and that, in exchange (and in the hopes of 
getting more contributions), those officials would use their control over 
the funds to select those firms to serve as lead counsel for cases in 
which the funds are the lead plaintiff. In such a situation, there would 
also be reason to fear that the lead plaintiff would be complacent and 
unwilling to object to an excessive fee request, thus defeating the Reform 
Act's goal of lead plaintiff-controlled, rather than lead counsel-
controlled, 
litigation. Were such a scenario to occur, the elected official's conduct-
- 
besides representing a breach of fiduciary duty to the pensioners--would 
threaten the best interests of the class members. Though we stress that 
there is no evidence of such impropriety in this case, Congress does not 
appear to have considered this risk when it enacted the Reform Act and 
may wish to revise the PSLRA to account for it. 
 
In the absence of any such amendment, district courts should be 
particularly attuned to the risk of pay-to-play. In cases where a court 
determines that a publicly-managed fund is the presumptively most 
adequate plaintiff, the court could properly require that the fund 
disclose 
any campaign contributions by the fund's choice of counsel to any 
elected officials possessing direct oversight and authority over the fund. 
If any such contributions have been made, the court could also require 
that the fund submit a sworn declaration describing the process by 
which it selected counsel and attesting to the degree to which the 
selection process was or was not influenced by any elected officials. 
 
Courts must also, however, take care to prevent the use of discovery 
to harass presumptive lead plaintiffs, something that the Reform Act was 
meant to guard against. The statute is clear that"discovery relating to 
whether a member . . . of the purported plaintiff class is the most 
adequate plaintiff may be conducted by a plaintiff only if the plaintiff 
[seeking discovery] first demonstrates a reasonable basis for finding that 
the presumptively most adequate plaintiff is incapable of adequately 
representing the class." 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iv) (emphasis added). 
We reiterate that evidence of campaign contributions, standing alone, 
does not create "a reasonable basis" sufficient to justify party-conducted 
discovery, though it would certainly (as noted earlier) be enough for the 
court, on its own initiative, to seek further information from the 
presumptive lead plaintiff. 
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competitive bidding." Id. at 149. The District Court refused, 
noting that "the PSLRA permits no such thing." Id. We 
agree. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the procedures 
that the Reform Act establishes for selecting a lead 
plaintiff). We therefore hold that the District Court was 
correct to appoint the CalPERS Group as lead plaintiff. 
 
C. The Auction 
 
We turn now to NYCPF 's objection to the District Court's 
decision to employ an auction to select lead counsel. We 
first address Lead Counsel's argument that NYCPF is not 
entitled to object to the auction. Concluding that it is, we 
then consider whether the PSLRA ever permits a district 
court to select lead counsel via competitive bidding. Finding 
that it does (though only under very specific 
circumstances), we analyze whether the District Court's 
decision to hold an auction here was justified. 
 
1. May NYCPF Validly Object to the Auction?  
 
The only party that objects to the District Court's 
decision to select lead counsel via an auction is NYCPF; the 
other two members of the CalPERS Group, CalPERS and 
NYSCRF, have not appeared before us to argue this issue. 
Lead Counsel offers a litany of related reasons why NYCPF 
may not validly press its arguments before us, but, at 
bottom, its submissions reduce to two claims: (1) NYCPF 
lacks standing; and (2) NYCPF has waived the right to 
object to the auction. 
 
Lead Counsel's first contention appears to be that NYCPF 
lacks standing to object to the auction in its capacity as a 
member of the CalPERS Group. Lead Counsel notes that in 
the Retainer Agreement executed between them and lead 
counsel, the members of the CalPERS Group "agree[d] to 
prosecute this litigation together and on an equal basis." 
Lead Counsel submits that the Retainer Agreement is 
governed by New Jersey law and contends that, under that 
law, the language quoted above establishes the CalPERS 
Group as a joint venture. See Lead Counsel's Opening Br. 
at 47. And, asserts Lead Counsel, because New Jersey's 
default partnership rules provide that decisions of a 
partnership are made by majority vote, NYCPF cannot 
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object on behalf of the CalPERS Group without the 
approval of at least one of its partners. 
 
We disagree. We do not decide whether Lead Counsel is 
correct about the legal effect of the Retainer Agreement, 
though we note that NYCPF vigorously contests Lead 
Counsel's submissions. See NYCPF 's Reply Br.  at 14. 
Instead, we conclude that NYCPF has standing to challenge 
the District Court's decision to hold an auction in its 
capacity as a class member. The Reform Act's lead plaintiff 
provisions are intended to benefit the plaintiff class. It 
follows that a district court's deviation from the PSLRA 
model has the potential to harm every member of the class. 
We therefore hold that, regardless of whether it may object 
as a member of the CalPERS Group (a question that we do 
not decide), NYCPF has standing to object in its capacity as 
a class member. 
 
Lead Counsel's second contention is that NYCPF has 
waived any right to object to the auction. There is no 
question that NYCPF raised these arguments before the 
District Court, see In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. 
Supp. 2d 285, 303-04 (D.N.J. 2000)--the dispute is 
whether it did so too late. The District Court announced 
that it would conduct an auction on August 4, 1998, but 
NYCPF did not object at that time. On August 17, 1998, the 
CalPERS Group sent a letter to the court about the 
upcoming auction, and although the letter stated that the 
CalPERS Group had the right to "select" lead counsel, it 
never expressly contested the District Court's decision to 
hold an auction. The District Court held a hearing on 
August 19, 1998 for the purpose of soliciting input as to 
how the auction should be conducted, but, although a 
representative for NYCPF attended that hearing, it did not 
object to the auction at that time either. In fact, there does 
not appear to be any evidence that NYCPF objected to the 
District Court's decision to hold an auction until after the 
Settlement had been reached and it was clear that the 
court-ordered grid would produce a higher fee award than 
the Retainer Agreement. See id. at 304. 50 Based on this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
50. Under the Retainer Agreement (and absent the express consent of the 
CalPERS Group), the maximum counsel fee would have been 
approximately $187 million--over $76 million dollars less than that 
produced by the court-ordered auction grid. See supra nn.4 & 9. 
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delay, Lead Counsel suggests that we deem NYCPF 's 
objections to have been waived. 
 
This argument has a certain appeal, but we conclude 
that it is foreclosed by In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES 
Litigation, 243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 2001), in which we held 
that certain class members had standing to object to an 
attorneys fees award. At least in theory, the PRIDES 
settlement fund was large enough to provide a 100% 
recovery to all class members, and the attorneys fees award 
was not to come out of that fund. Moreover, the settlement 
was structured so that any unclaimed portions of the 
settlement or reduction in fees would revert to Cendant, 
rather than be distributed to the class members. As a 
result, lead counsel argued that the objecting class 
members lacked standing to object to the fee award 
because they could not show that they were "aggrieved" by 
it. Despite the force of this argument, we held that the 
objectors possessed standing. See id. at 728. 
 
Our reasoning in Cendant PRIDES was twofold. First, we 
observed that the agency problems inherent in the class 
action fee awards context counseled in favor of construing 
standing extremely broadly. See id. at 728-29. And even in 
cases like Cendant PRIDES where the fee award did not 
directly reduce the class's recovery, we suggested that lead 
counsel who seek an "excessive" fee may have breached 
their fiduciary duties to the class, thus entitling the class to 
recover any excess from its lawyers. See id. at 729. 
 
Second, we emphasized the critical importance of 
searching judicial review of fee awards in class actions, 
because of the inherent conflict of interest between lead 
counsel and the class and because judges have an 
independent obligation to avoid "potential public 
misunderstandings" over the size of fee awards. Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). And in so stating, 
we stressed that "[o]ur interest and supervisory role is 
pervasive and extends not only to the final fee award but 
also to the manner by which class counsel is selected and 
the manner by which attorneys fee conditions are 
established." Id. at 731 (emphasis added). "Because of the 
possible injury to [the objector] and other class members 
from the fee award . . . , and, more importantly, because of 
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our overarching interest in class action fee awards," we 
held that the objector had standing to appeal the fee award. 
Id. at 732. 
 
Cendant PRIDES strongly counsels against declining to 
hear NYCPF 's objections to the auction. In that case we 
were willing to employ a quite broad conception of standing 
--a fundamental and non-waivable prerequisite for a federal 
court even to have jurisdiction, see, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)--to ensure that we 
would be able to consider the propriety of a class action fee 
award in view of the public interest and perception issues. 
Here, in contrast, Lead Counsel does not submit that 
NYCPF has failed to allege a constitutionally sufficient 
"injury in fact"; instead, it contends that we should employ 
the equitable doctrine of waiver to decline to consider its 
claim. It would be incongruous indeed if the vital 
importance of searching judicial review of class action fee 
awards were sufficient to warrant an expansive conception 
of standing, but insufficient for a court to decline to invoke 
its equitable power not to consider certain claims. For that 
reason, we reject Lead Counsel's argument that we should 
not consider NYCPF 's objections to the auction, and turn to 
the question whether the District Court's decision to hold 
an auction was consistent with the PSLRA. 
 
2. Does the Reform Act Ever Permit an Auction? 
 
The statutory section most directly on point provides that 
"[t]he most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval 
of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the 
class." 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). This language makes 
two things clear. First, the lead plaintiff 's right to select 
and retain counsel is not absolute--the court retains the 
power and the duty to supervise counsel selection and 
counsel retention. But second, and just as importantly, the 
power to "select and retain" lead counsel belongs, at least 
in the first instance, to the lead plaintiff, and the court's 
role is confined to deciding whether to "approv[e]" that 
choice. Because a court-ordered auction involves the court 
rather than the lead plaintiff choosing lead counsel and 
determining the financial terms of its retention, this latter 
determination strongly implies that an auction is not 
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generally permissible in a Reform Act case, at least as a 
matter of first resort. 
 
This conclusion gains support when we examine the 
overall structure of the PSLRA's lead plaintiff section. The 
Reform Act contains detailed procedures for choosing the 
lead plaintiff, see supra Part IV.B.1, indicating that 
Congress attached great importance to ensuring that the 
right person or group is selected. The only powers expressly 
given to the lead plaintiff, however, are to "select and 
retain" counsel. If those powers are seriously limited, it 
would seem odd for Congress to have established such a 
specific means for choosing the lead plaintiff. But if the 
powers to "select and retain" lead counsel carry a great deal 
of discretion and responsibility, it makes perfect sense that 
Congress attached great significance to the identity of the 
person or group that would be making those choices. 
 
Adding support to our view that auctions are not 
generally permitted is the fact that the Reform Act's lead 
plaintiff provisions were clearly modeled after the Weiss and 
Beckerman proposal. The statutory language is almost 
identical to that suggested in Weiss and Beckerman's 
article, compare 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3), with Weiss & 
Beckerman, 104 Yale L.J. at 2105-09, and this view is 
confirmed by the Senate Report, see S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 
11 n.32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 
n.32. The entire thrust of Weiss and Beckerman's argument 
was that large investors would do a better job at counsel 
selection, retention, and monitoring than judges have 
traditionally done, and their proposal sought to encourage 
such investors to serve as lead plaintiff for that purpose. 
This goal would be significantly undermined were we to 
interpret the Reform Act as permitting courts to take 
decisions involving counsel selection and retention away 
from the lead plaintiff by ordering an auction. 
 
Lastly, our belief that the PSLRA does not allow an 
auction in the ordinary case is well supported in the 
Reform Act's legislative history. Both the Conference 
Committee Report and the Senate Report state that the 
purpose of the legislation was to encourage institutional 
investors to serve as lead plaintiff, predicting that their 
involvement would significantly benefit absent class 
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members. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995), 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733; S. Rep. No. 104- 
98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690. 
Both Reports begin by acknowledging that lead counsel 
have historically chosen the lead plaintiff rather than vice 
versa, and by outlining the significant problems created by 
that phenomenon. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 32- 
33 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731-32; S. 
Rep. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690. Later, both Reports contain a brief 
discussion of the lead plaintiff 's power to choose lead 
counsel: 
 
       [The] lead plaintiff provision solves the dilemma of who 
       will serve as class counsel. Subject to court approval, 
       the most adequate plaintiff retains class counsel. As a 
       result, the Conference Committee expects that the 
       plaintiff will choose counsel rather than, as is true 
       today, counsel choosing the plaintiff. The Conference 
       Committee does not intend to disturb the court's 
       discretion under existing law to approve or disapprove 
       lead plaintiff 's choice of counsel when necessary to 
       protect the interests of the plaintiff class. 
 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 35 (1995), reprinted in 
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 734; S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 11-12 
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690. 
 
The second sentence of the above-quoted language 
emphasizes that the choice belongs to the lead plaintiff, and 
the third is significant for two reasons. First, it confirms 
that the court's role is generally limited to "approv[ing] or 
disapprov[ing] lead plaintiff 's choice of counsel;" and that it 
is not the court's responsibility to make that choice itself. 
Second, it indicates that the court should generally employ 
a deferential standard in reviewing the lead plaintiff 's 
choices. It is not enough that the lead plaintiff selected 
counsel or negotiated a retainer agreement that is different 
than what the court would have done; the question is 
whether judicial intervention is "necessary to protect the 
interests of the plaintiff class." 
 
We respect the arguments advanced by Judge Shadur--a 
jurist of extraordinary distinction, who, as we noted supra 
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n.44, is one of the primary judicial advocates in favor of the 
auction method--as to why auctions are not inconsistent 
with the Reform Act, but we ultimately find them 
unpersuasive. Judge Shadur notes that the PSLRA provides 
that a movant's status as presumptive lead plaintiff may be 
overcome if it can be shown that the movant will not fairly 
and adequately represent the class, and observes that the 
statute makes the lead plaintiff 's right to select and retain 
counsel "subject to the approval of the court." See In re 
Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (quoting 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)(aa) 
& (B)(v)); see also In re Comdisco Sec. Litig. , 141 F. Supp. 
2d 951, 953 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (quoting this discussion from 
Bank One). Based on these two provisions, Judge Shadur 
writes: 
 
        Suppose for instance a plaintiff in such a 
       presumptive status has agreed that its own lawyers, if 
       acting as class counsel, are to receive one-third of any 
       class recovery. Suppose further that another highly 
       reputable law firm that has appeared of record for 
       another putative plaintiff or plaintiffs, having 
       demonstrated excellent credentials in earlier securities 
       class action litigation and being clearly capable of 
       handling the complexities of the current lawsuit, is 
       willing to handle the case for half of that percentage fee 
       --or to provide even a greater contrast, is willing to 
       work for that lesser percentage and also to impose a 
       cap on the firm's total fee payment. In that 
       circumstance the presumptive lead plaintiff could 
       certainly bind itself contractually to pay one-third of its 
       share of the class recovery to its own lawyer, but any 
       court would be remiss if it were to foist that one-third 
       contingency arrangement on all of the other class 
       members who had not themselves chosen that law firm 
       to be their advocate. . . . 
 
        In this Court's view, if the presumptive lead plaintiffs 
       were to insist on their class counsel handling the 
       action on the hypothesized materially less favorable 
       contractual basis, that insistence would effectively 
       rebut the presumption that the putative class 
       representatives, despite the amounts that they have at 
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       stake personally, were indeed the "most adequate 
       plaintiffs"--that is, the class members "most capable of 
       adequately representing the interests of class 
       members" (Subsection (a)(3)(B)(i)). If on the other hand 
       the presumptive class representative were willing to be 
       represented by the most favorable qualified bidder 
       among the lawyers submitting bids, with that bidder 
       either supplanting the presumptive lead plaintiff 's 
       original choice of counsel or working together with that 
       original counsel (but with the total lawyers' fees to be 
       circumscribed by the low bidder's proposal), the 
       presumption would clearly remain unrebutted and the 
       presumptive most adequate plaintiffs would properly be 
       appointed as lead plaintiffs. 
 
Bank One, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 784. 
 
As should be clear from our discussion of the proper 
means of appointing a lead plaintiff, see supra  Part IV.B.1, 
we concur with the first portion of Judge Shadur's analysis. 
In a situation like the one he describes, we think it quite 
clear that the presumptive lead plaintiff 's actions 
(especially if it could offer no persuasive reason for 
preferring the first, more expensive firm, to the second, 
equally-qualified but less expensive one) would demonstrate 
that it would not fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class. This, of course, would require the 
court to disqualify that movant from serving as the lead 
plaintiff and to locate another movant that could serve in 
that capacity. It would not, in our view, require the court to 
appoint the movant whose lawyer had offered to work for 
half as much as the lawyers for the first movant. 
 
As the foregoing makes clear, we part company with 
Judge Shadur insofar as he argues that his hypothetical 
shows that the Reform Act necessarily permits an auction. 
Judge Shadur's view appears to be that any movant who is 
unwilling to be represented by the firm or firms that a court 
determines to be the lowest qualified bidder in a court- 
conducted auction has necessarily shown that it will not 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. 
We disagree for two reasons. First, this approach is in 
considerable tension with the text of the PSLRA. As we 
explained above, the Reform Act makes clear that it is the 
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lead plaintiff 's job to "select and retain" lead counsel and it 
is the court's duty to decide whether to "approve" that 
choice. But under Judge Shadur's approach, a presumptive 
lead plaintiff 's only option is to assent to the counsel and 
the fee terms that were chosen by the court via a court- 
ordered auction (because otherwise the movant will be 
disqualified from serving as lead plaintiff on the grounds 
that it will not fairly and adequately represent the interests 
of the class). Judge Shadur's reading of the statute in effect 
confers upon the court the right to "select and retain" 
counsel and limits the lead plaintiff to deciding whether to 
acquiesce in those choices, thus eliminating any discretion 
on the part of the lead plaintiff. We simply do not think that 
such a result is consistent with the statutory text. 
 
Moreover, we do not agree that the fact that a 
presumptive lead plaintiff refuses to accede to the counsel 
or fee terms set via an auction demonstrates that it will not 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the absent 
class members. As we explained earlier, the Reform Act's 
lead plaintiff provisions (which include the section that 
confers on the lead plaintiff the rights to select and retain 
lead counsel) were based on Weiss and Beckerman's article. 
A central thrust of Weiss and Beckerman's argument was 
that institutional investors would likely do a better job than 
courts at selecting, retaining, and monitoring counsel than 
courts have traditionally done. See 104 Yale L.J. at 2105- 
07. Whether we (or Judge Shadur) would agree with this 
proposition is irrelevant; what is clear is that Congress did. 
And if institutional investors are as good or better than 
courts at balancing quality and cost in selecting class 
counsel, then it follows that the fact that those investors 
may choose different lawyers and negotiate different fee 
arrangements than the court does not demonstrate that 
those investors will not fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class. We therefore respectfully disagree 
with Judge Shadur that the use of court-ordered auctions 
can be squared with the PSLRA in the ordinary case. 
 
Instead, we think that the Reform Act evidences a strong 
presumption in favor of approving a properly-selected lead 
plaintiff 's decisions as to counsel selection and counsel 
retention. When a properly-appointed lead plaintiff asks the 
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court to approve its choice of lead counsel and of a retainer 
agreement, the question is not whether the court believes 
that the lead plaintiff could have made a better choice or 
gotten a better deal. Such a standard would eviscerate the 
Reform Act's underlying assumption that, at least in the 
typical case, a properly-selected lead plaintiff is likely to do 
as good or better job than the court at these tasks. Because 
of this, we think that the court's inquiry is appropriately 
limited to whether the lead plaintiff 's selection and 
agreement with counsel are reasonable on their own terms. 
 
In making this determination, courts should consider: (1) 
the quantum of legal experience and sophistication 
possessed by the lead plaintiff; (2) the manner in which the 
lead plaintiff chose what law firms to consider; (3) the 
process by which the lead plaintiff selected its final choice; 
(4) the qualifications and experience of counsel selected by 
the lead plaintiff; and (5) the evidence that the retainer 
agreement negotiated by the lead plaintiff was (or was not) 
the product of serious negotiations between the lead 
plaintiff and the prospective lead counsel. See, e.g., In re 
Nice Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206, 223 (D.N.J. 1999) 
("Not only should the proposed counsel fees be the result of 
hard-bargaining, but the initial selection of counsel should 
be the result of independent decision-making by the lead 
plaintiff."). 
 
We do not mean for this list to be exhaustive, or to 
intimate that district courts are required to give each of 
these factors equal weight in a particular case; at bottom, 
the ultimate inquiry is always whether the lead plaintiff 's 
choices were the result of a good faith selection and 
negotiation process and were arrived at via meaningful 
arms-length bargaining. Whenever it is shown that they 
were not, it is the court's obligation to disapprove the lead 
plaintiff 's choices. See, e.g., Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v. 
Widmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688, 692-93 & 
n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (rejecting a lead plaintiff 's choice of a 
"consortium of ten law firms" on the grounds that it was 
"not in the best interests of the class members"). 
 
Although we think, for reasons explained above, that an 
auction is impermissible in most Reform Act cases, we do 
not rule out the possibility that it could be validly used. If 
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the court determines that the lead plaintiff 's initial choice 
of counsel or negotiation of a retainer agreement is 
inadequate, it should clearly state why (for both the benefit 
of the lead plaintiff and for the record) and should direct 
the lead plaintiff to undertake an acceptable selection 
process. If the lead plaintiff 's response demonstrates that it 
is unwilling or unable to do so, then the court will, of 
necessity, be required to take a more active role. 
 
At that point, a court will have several options. If a 
litigant were to have repeatedly undertaken a flawed 
process of selecting and retaining lead counsel, that may be 
enough to show that it will not fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class. In such a situation, the court 
would be justified in disqualifying that litigant from serving 
as lead plaintiff, selecting a new lead plaintiff, and directing 
that newly-appointed lead plaintiff to undertake an 
acceptable search. 
 
On the other hand, it is possible that the court could 
conclude that, perhaps due to the nature of the case at 
hand, none of the possible lead plaintiffs is capable of 
fulfilling the model contemplated by the Reform Act, i.e., a 
sophisticated investor who has suffered sizeable losses and 
can be counted on to serve the interests of the class in an 
aggressive manner. In such a situation, it would be 
permissible for a court to conclude that its obligation to 
protect the interests of the plaintiff class makes it 
necessary for the court to assume direct control over 
counsel selection and counsel retention, and, were the 
court to so conclude, an auction would be one permissible 
means by which the court could select and retain counsel 
on behalf of the class.51 We stress, however, that it is not 
sufficient justification for an auction in a case governed by 
the Reform Act that the court prefers a process of counsel 
selection or counsel retention that it, rather than the lead 
plaintiff, controls, nor is it enough that the court thinks 
that an auction is an inherently superior mechanism for 
determining a reasonable fee. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
51. Our position here is in substantial accord with that advanced by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. See Brief for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 20-23. 
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3. Was the Auction in this Case Permissible?  
 
We now analyze whether, under these precepts, the 
District Court's decision to conduct an auction was 
justified. We begin by rejecting the contention that the 
court's willingness to permit counsel chosen by Lead 
Plaintiff to match what the District Court determined to be 
the lowest qualified bid fully protected the CalPERS Group's 
right to "select and retain" lead counsel. First, because the 
court's order gave the matching power to the Group's 
choice of counsel rather than to the Group itself, this 
approach did not, in fact, preserve the Group's ability to 
"select" lead counsel. Moreover, because the court's order 
meant that Lead Plaintiff 's choice would be honored only if 
it was made pursuant to fee terms set by the District Court, 
the court's approach also undermined the CalPERS Group's 
ability to "retain" counsel. 
 
In its written opinion, the District Court gave several 
reasons for holding an auction. First, it noted that the 
PSLRA makes Lead Plaintiff 's decision "subject to the 
approval of the court." The court stressed that"given the 
opportunity, absent class members would try to secure the 
most qualified representation at the lowest cost," and then 
observed that, at the end of the case, it would be required 
to ensure that the "[t]otal attorneys's fees and expenses" 
that it awarded to lead counsel did "not exceed a 
reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and 
prejudgment interest actually paid to the class." In re 
Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 150 (D.N.J. 1998). 
The court concluded that holding an auction would aid it in 
making this determination and in protecting the class's 
interests because it would simulate the market, thus 
providing a "benchmark of reasonableness." Id. at 150-52. 
Second, the District Court stated that holding an auction 
would have the "salutary" effect of "remov[ing] any 
speculative doubt" about Aboff and Wilson's pay-to-play 
allegations. Id. at 152. 
 
These reasons are not sufficient justification for holding 
an auction. The first (i.e., a generalized desire to hold down 
costs by "simulating" the market) would apply in every 
case, and thus cannot be enough to justify a procedure that 
we have concluded may only be used rarely. Further, there 
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is no need to "simulate" the market in cases where a 
properly-selected lead plaintiff conducts a good-faith 
counsel selection process because in such cases--at least 
under the theory supporting the PSLRA--the fee agreed to 
by the lead plaintiff is the market fee. 
 
Nor do we think that the laudable desire to dispel mere 
allegations of impropriety as to one member of the CalPERS 
Group is enough to justify holding an auction. Were it 
sufficient, then any disgruntled class member (or lawyer 
seeking to be appointed lead counsel) could disable the lead 
plaintiff from exercising its statutorily-conferred power by 
making unsupported allegations of impropriety. 
 
It could also be argued that two of the District Court's 
statements during the August 4 and August 19, 1998, 
hearings support its decision to hold an auction. To begin 
with, we doubt that any of these musings could properly be 
seen as "findings" sufficient to justify the court's actions. 
But even if they could, we find these proffered reasons 
simply inadequate. During the August 4 hearing, the 
District Court suggested that institutional investors may 
not do a good job of selecting lead counsel because"at 
times familiarity or a long time association between a client 
and a lawyer . . . may limit arms length bargaining." These 
"concerns" cannot justify the court's decision to hold an 
auction because there was simply no evidence of 
"familiarity or a long time association" between any member 
of the CalPERS Group and either of the firms that the 
Group proposed retaining, nor was there any evidence of or 
finding by the District Court that arms-length bargaining 
had not, in fact, taken place. 
 
We are similarly unable to conclude that the auction was 
justified based on the District Court's statement during the 
August 19 hearing that "one can make the argument. . . 
that because of [their] economic power that at times [large 
investors] get a little complacent economically and therefore 
. . . they are not as cost effective as they should be." First, 
as a generic supposition, this intuition is directly at odds 
with the principles that animated the Reform Act. Second, 
the court never made findings that the CalPERS Group had 
been "complacent economically" or had demonstrated that 
it would not be "as cost effective as [it] should be." 
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At oral argument before this Court, Lead Counsel offered 
two additional arguments in favor of the District Court's 
decision to conduct an auction. Lead Counsel's first 
contention was that at the time of its decision to hold an 
auction on August 4, the court knew nothing about the 
process by which the CalPERS Group had selected and 
retained its choice of counsel. As a consequence, Lead 
Counsel submits that the District Court could not be 
confident at that time that Lead Plaintiff had conducted a 
thorough and good faith counsel search, and argues that 
this uncertainty (combined with Aboff 's and Wilson's pay- 
to-play allegations) justified the court's decision to hold an 
auction. Lead Counsel's second argument was that the 
entire litigation landscape had changed between the time 
Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel entered into the Retainer 
Agreement and the time of the August 4 hearing. This is 
because on July 14, 1998, shortly after the Retainer 
Agreement became effective on June 23, Cendant 
announced that it would be restating three years of CUC's 
financial statements instead of just one. Lead Counsel 
submits that Cendant's July 14 announcement 
fundamentally altered the dynamics of this case, and 
contends that this development justified the Court's August 
4 decision to hold an auction. 
 
We find these arguments unpersuasive. First, we note 
that the District Court never gave them as reasons for 
holding an auction. Second, though Lead Plaintiff does not 
appear to have submitted much information about the 
thoroughness and integrity of the process by which it 
selected and retained counsel prior to the District Court's 
decision to conduct an auction (although Lead Counsel did 
describe it to the court as "the best fee ever negotiated in 
advance" and "the hardest bargain ever driven in a 
securities class action case," 109 F. Supp. 2d at 291-93), it 
is also true that the District Court did not order Lead 
Plaintiff to provide such information or give any indication 
that it was concerned about the process by which Lead 
Plaintiff selected counsel and negotiated the Retainer 
Agreement. Although we have no doubt that a court may 
(and should) require that a lead plaintiff provide 
information about the process it used to select and retain 
counsel before deciding whether to "approv[e]" that choice, 
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see 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v), Lead Plaintiff cannot be 
faulted for not producing the information that the statute 
does not expressly require and that the court did not seek. 
Cf. Laborers Local 1298 Pension Fund v. Campbell Soup Co., 
No. CIV.A. 00-152 (JEI), 2000 WL 486956, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 24, 2000) (giving the lead plaintiff advance notice of 
the questions the court will want answered before deciding 
whether to approve its choice of lead counsel); Proceedings 
of the 2001 Third Circuit Task Force on the Selection of 
Class Counsel, Statement of Vaughn R. Walker, at 22 
(Appendix A), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/ 
classcounsel/Witness%20Statements/vwalker.pdf 
(providing questionnaire that Judge Walker has distributed 
to lead plaintiff candidates regarding their method of 
selecting and retaining their chosen counsel). 
 
Third, although a fundamental and unexpected change in 
the litigation landscape would probably be the sort of thing 
that would justify a district court's decision to decline to 
approve a proposed retainer agreement (or to order that a 
previously approved retainer agreement be renegotiated), 
the proper remedy would be to instruct the lead plaintiff to 
renegotiate an adequate agreement rather than to order an 
auction immediately. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court 
abused its discretion by conducting an auction because its 
decision to do so was founded upon an erroneous 
understanding of the legal standards undergirding the 
propriety of conducting an auction under the PSLRA. With 
regard to counsel selection, however, this error was 
harmless because the counsel selected via the auction 
process were the same as those whom the Lead Plaintiff 
sought to have appointed in the first place. 
 
D. Counsel Fees 
 
Having determined that the District Court should not 
have held an auction, we face the question of what happens 
next. The fact that BRB and BLBG were appointed Lead 
Counsel after exercising their option to meet what the court 
determined to be the lowest reasonable auction bid makes 
our task considerably easier than it would have been had 
the District Court appointed different firms to serve as lead 
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counsel. Cognizant of the unusual situation in which we 
find ourselves, we conclude that the District Court was 
correct to appoint BRB and BLBG as Lead Counsel, but 
hold that it should have done so pursuant to the Retainer 
Agreement negotiated between them and Lead Plaintiff. In 
appointing BRB and BLBG Lead Counsel (albeit for reasons 
that we have found to be erroneous) the District Court 
obviously determined that the firms were qualified to serve 
as counsel for the class. To our knowledge, no one has 
questioned that conclusion, and it is difficult to see how 
anyone could do so. 
 
The matter of the Retainer Agreement is somewhat more 
complicated, but we think it should be deemed to be in 
force. That the District Court would have approved all of its 
provisions except for its fee provisions is evidenced by the 
fact that the court required that all bidders consent to 
those provisions as a condition precedent to participating in 
the auction. And the fact that the court would have found 
the Retainer Agreement's fee provisions to be reasonable 
had it employed the correct legal standard is attested to by 
the fact that the court deemed the bid that BRB and BLBG 
submitted in connection with the auction to have been 
"realistic in the context of likely results." Although this bid 
was not the same as the fee provisions contained in the 
Retainer Agreement, see In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 
F. Supp. 2d 285, 291 n.3 (D.N.J. 2000), Lead Counsel has 
represented to us that it contained only "minor 
modifications," which were made "because the litigation 
`milestones' of the court's fee grid did not precisely match 
the `milestones' of the agreement." Lead Counsel's Br. at 17 
n.7. 
 
Besides Aboff 's and Wilson's pay-to-play allegations 
(which the District Court rejected based on insufficient 
proof--a finding with which we have no quarrel), no party 
has come forward with supportable allegations that Lead 
Plaintiff did not select and retain BRB and BLBG through 
a sufficiently sophisticated and sincere search. We therefore 
hold that the District Court should have appointed BRB 
and BLBG Lead Counsel pursuant to the Retainer 
Agreement, and we also conclude that that Agreement is 
currently in force. 
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In light of this conclusion, we think that the District 
Court erred in considering and ruling upon Lead Counsel's 
fee application. The Retainer Agreement states that Lead 
Counsel "will not submit any fee application to the Court 
without the prior approval of The Funds," but there is 
insufficient evidence that either CalPERS or NYSCRF gave 
their "prior approval."52 Lead Counsel originally relied on 
the fact that neither CalPERS nor NYSCRF objected to its 
fee request, but acquiescence (which is the most that a 
failure to object shows) is not the same thing as"prior 
approval." 
 
Lead Counsel also points to an off-the-record conference 
conducted by the District Court on May 22, 2001, which 
was apparently attended by representatives for Lead 
Counsel, NYCPF, and NYSCRF. NYSCRF was represented 
by its General Counsel, Randall Treece, and Lead Plaintiff 
asserts that Treece had been given CalPERS's proxy by its 
General Counsel, Kayla Gillan. Lead Counsel maintains 
that at the May 22 conference, the court "made clear that 
. . . the result of the auction process had superseded the 
fee provisions of the retainer agreement, and that class 
counsel had a right to rely on the fee grid set by the court 
and was entitled to seek a fee in that amount." At this 
point, according to Lead Counsel, Treece "thanked the 
court for its guidance and stated that [NYS]CRF and 
CalPERS would accept the court's view." 
 
We need not decide whether this version of events, if 
true, would demonstrate that NYSCRF and CalPERS gave 
their "prior approval" to Lead Counsel's fee request. The 
facts remain that NYCPF disputes Lead Counsel's account; 
neither Treece nor anyone else from NYSCRF or CalPERS 
has confirmed it or stated that Lead Counsel has accurately 
stated their views; and the fact that this conference was 
held off the record makes it impossible for us to assess 
what really happened.53 Because Lead Counsel has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
52. As noted earlier, we need not and do not decide whether "prior 
approval of The Funds" means all of the Funds or a majority of the 
Funds. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 
53. Moreover, it is unclear whether a failure to object just after the 
court 
emphatically stated what it was going to do would even qualify as 
acquiescence, much less "approval." 
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submitted insufficient evidence that its fee request was 
submitted with "the prior approval of The Funds" and 
because the fee request was submitted pursuant to the fee 
grid arrived at via the auction rather than that contained in 
the Retainer Agreement, we hold that the request was 
improper under the Retainer Agreement and that the 
District Court should not have considered it. We will 
therefore set aside the District Court's fee award and 
remand this case with instructions to dismiss the fee 
application and to decline to accept any further 
applications that are submitted without the prior approval 
of the Funds.54 
 
Our conclusion that the current fee request is improper 
under the Retainer Agreement makes it unnecessary for us 
to engage in a substantive review of the fee award approved 
by the District Court. But this is the seventh appeal in the 
Cendant proceedings, see supra n.11, and, with others still 
in progress, we think it necessary to say a few words about 
the standards that should guide the District Court's 
discretion in considering fee requests under the PSLRA that 
will be the principal focus on remand so as to help bring 
this now protracted matter to a close. 
 
The Reform Act confers on the lead plaintiff the power to 
"retain" lead counsel, 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v), but it 
also requires that the court ensure that the "[t]otal 
attorneys' fees and expenses awarded . . . to counsel for the 
plaintiff class . . . not exceed a reasonable percentage of the 
amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually 
paid to the class." Id. S 78u-4(a)(6). This latter provision 
makes clear that the court has an independent obligation to 
ensure the reasonableness of any fee request. The issue is 
the scope of this obligation. 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that no 
class action "shall . . . be dismissed or compromised 
without the approval of the court," but the detailed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
54. This disposition makes it technically unnecessary for us to decide 
whether Aboff is correct that the Settlement Notice was defective with 
regard to Lead Counsel's request for attorneys fees or whether Throenle 
is correct that the fee request was improper as matter of law. At all 
events, we conclude that both arguments are meritless. 
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standards set forth for reviewing attorneys fees in this 
Court's earlier cases are not contained in any statute or 
rule. Rather, they were developed because of recognition 
that in the class action context there is no way for"the 
class" to select, retain, or monitor its lawyers in the way 
that an individual client would, and because of doubts that 
a typical lead plaintiff in the non-PSLRA context is a 
terribly good agent for the class. In the ordinary case, the 
court is the only disinterested agent capable of protecting 
the class from its lawyers and its primary means of doing 
so is by scrutinizing the lawyers' proposed fee. In such a 
context, searching judicial review of fee requests is both 
necessary and appropriate to ensure that the interests of 
absent class members are not compromised. See supra Part 
IV.A.1 & 2. 
 
The Reform Act shifts the underpinnings of our class 
action attorneys fees jurisprudence in the securities area. 
As a preliminary matter, the PSLRA sets out a detailed 
procedure for choosing lead plaintiffs, the whole point of 
this process being to locate a lead plaintiff that will be an 
effective agent for the class. The properly-selected lead 
plaintiff is then charged with selecting and retaining lead 
counsel (subject to court approval). This regime is far 
different from the traditional case in which counsel is often 
"selected" and "retained" based on the fact that it filed the 
first suit. Consequently, courts have far more reason at the 
outset to think that counsel selection and retention were 
done in the best interests of the class in a typical Reform 
Act case than they do in other class action contexts, at 
least when the procedures of counsel selection employed by 
the lead plaintiff were adequate. 
 
The same holds true of the monitoring of class counsel. 
In the typical class action, there is little reason to think 
that the lead plaintiff has the incentive or ability to monitor 
lead counsel's performance, but there is good reason to 
think that a lead plaintiff that has been properly selected 
under the PSLRA would possess both. In this context, the 
lead plaintiff is in the best position, under the PSLRA's 
scheme, to determine (at least initially) what its lead 
counsel's fee should be. Our jurisprudence must take 
account of that change. 
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We therefore believe that, under the PSLRA, courts 
should accord a presumption of reasonableness to any fee 
request submitted pursuant to a retainer agreement that 
was entered into between a properly-selected lead plaintiff 
and a properly-selected lead counsel. See Weiss & 
Beckerman, 104 Yale L.J. at 2105 ("[A] court might well feel 
confident in assuming that a fee arrangement an 
institutional investor had negotiated with its lawyers before 
initiating a class action maximized those lawyers' incentives 
to represent diligently the class's interests, reflected the 
deal a fully informed client would negotiate, and thus 
presumptively was reasonable."). This presumption will 
ensure that the lead plaintiff, not the court, functions as 
the class's primary agent vis-a-vis its lawyers. Further, by 
rendering ex ante fee agreements more reliable, it will assist 
those agreements in aligning the interests of the class and 
its lawyers during the pendency of the litigation. 
 
Saying that there is a presumption necessarily assumes 
that it can be overcome in some cases, however. First, the 
presumption of reasonableness would likely be abrogated 
entirely were the court to find that the assumptions 
underlying the original retainer agreement had been 
materially altered by significant and unusual factual 
and/or legal developments that could not reasonably have 
been foreseen at the time of the original agreement. If such 
developments occurred early enough in the litigation, the 
court might wish to inform the lead plaintiff and lead 
counsel of its concerns and direct them to renegotiate the 
fee agreement. If, however, the changes were to come to 
light late in the day, and if the lead plaintiff and the lead 
counsel were unable to agree to a revised fee schedule to 
account for that change, the court could be justified in 
holding that the presumption of reasonableness had been 
abrogated and to review the fee request using the 
traditional standards. 
 
We stress, however, that not just any factual or legal 
development would suffice to justify a court's decision that 
the presumption of reasonableness had been rebutted on 
grounds of changed circumstances. Uncertainties are part 
of any ex ante negotiation and it should be presumed that 
the lead plaintiff and the lead counsel took the possibility 
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of uncertainty into account in negotiating their agreement. 
Thus, only unusual and unforeseeable changes, i.e., those 
that could not have been adequately taken into account in 
the negotiations, could justify a court's decision to find the 
presumption abrogated. 
 
Even if the presumption of reasonableness is not 
undermined by changed circumstances, however, courts 
must still consider whether it has been rebutted. As we 
have noted above, there is an arguable tension between the 
presumption of reasonableness accorded the arrangement 
between the Lead Plaintiff and properly selected counsel 
and the duty imposed on the Court by the Reform Act, 18 
U.S.C. S 78u-4, to insure "[t]hat total attorneys' fees and 
expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff 
class shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of the 
amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually 
paid to the class." We resolve this tension by holding that 
the presumption may be rebutted by a prima facie showing 
that the (properly submitted) retained agreement fee is 
clearly excessive. In terms of the policy of the Reform Act, 
we do not believe that candidates for lead plaintiff 
designation will be deterred by the understanding that their 
retainer fee arrangement with Lead Counsel will be subject 
to judicial review for clear excessiveness. 
 
In making this clear excessiveness inquiry, district courts 
should be primarily guided by the factors set forth in 
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2000), in which we set forth standards for 
evaluating whether the percentage fee, which essentially 
had supplanted the lodestar on our class action counsel fee 
jurisprudence, was excessive. Under Gunter, the Court 
should examine: 
 
       (1) the size of the fund created and the number of 
       persons benefitted; (2) the presence or absence of 
       substantial objections by members of the class to the 
       settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3) 
       the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the 
       complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of 
       nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the 
       case by plaintiffs' counsel; and (7) the awards in 
       similar cases. 
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Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2000). But, as our cases have recognized, factors 
(1), (3), and (7) "should receive less weight" in mega-fund 
cases such as this one. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 339 (3d Cir. 1998).55 
 
Gunter review will, however, need to be modified to take 
into account some of the changed circumstances brought 
about by the PSLRA. First, the aim in this context is not to 
assess whether the fee request is reasonable; instead, the 
goal is to determine whether the presumption of 
reasonableness has been rebutted. As a consequence, the 
discussions of these factors that have appeared in our prior 
cases will not necessarily apply in cases governed by the 
Reform Act. Second, courts should employ a deferential 
standard of review in assessing factor (3) ("the skill and 
efficiency of the attorneys") because the PSLRA assumes 
that properly-selected lead plaintiffs are at least as able to 
answer those questions as courts. Lastly, factor (7) ("the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
55. Following the lead of the 1985 Task Force Report, several of this 
Court's cases have stated that, ordinarily, the percentage of a recovery 
devoted to attorneys fees should decrease as the size of the overall 
settlement or recovery increases. See 1985 Task Force Report, 108 
F.R.D. at 256; Prudential, 148 F.3d at 339; In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES 
Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 736 (3d Cir. 2001). In Prudential, we explained that 
"[t]he basis for this inverse relationship is the belief that in many 
instances the increase in recovery is merely a factor of the size of the 
class and has no direct relationship to the efforts of counsel." 148 F.3d 
at 339 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This position, 
however, has been criticized by respected courts and commentators, who 
contend that such a fee scale often gives counsel an incentive to settle 
cases too early and too cheaply. See, e.g., In re Auction Houses Antitrust 
Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 80-81, 84 n.55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (outlining the 
advantages and problems with the use of decreasing and increasing fee 
scales, and ultimately concluding that an increasing fee scale was more 
appropriate in that particular case); 2001 Task Force Proceedings, 
Statement of Samuel Issacharoff, at 7, available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/Witness%20Statements/ 
samissac.pdf (arguing that a decreasing percentage scale simply gives 
counsel an incentive to settle cheap). We need not decide at this time 
whether the deference that courts owe to fee scales negotiated by a 
properly-selected lead plaintiff would mandate deference to that 
plaintiff 's decision to employ a rising-percentage fee scale in a 
particular 
case. 
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awards in similar cases") may be of limited use, at least in 
the first generation of Reform Act cases. As we have 
explained, the PSLRA shifts the entire backdrop against 
which our fee jurisprudence has developed, and, as a 
consequence, non-PSLRA cases may not be sufficiently 
"similar" to provide a meaningful basis for comparison.56 
 
Gunter acknowledges a possible role for the lodestar in 
this calculus, by noting the possible utility of a lodestar 
cross-check. See 223 F.3d at 200. We note in this regard 
that the Reform Act does not rule out the use of the 
lodestar. The Conference Committee Report states: 
 
       The Conference Committee limits the award of 
       attorney's fees and costs to counsel for a class in new 
       section 27(a)(6) of the 1933 Act and new section 
       21D(a)(6) of the 1934 Act to a reasonable percentage of 
       the amount of recovery awarded to the class. By not 
       fixing the percentage of fees and costs counsel may 
       receive, the Conference Committee intends to give the 
       court flexibility in determining what is reasonable on a 
       case-by-case basis. The Conference Committee does 
       not intend to prohibit use of the lodestar approach as 
       a means of calculating attorney's fees. The provision 
       focuses on the final amount of fees awarded, not the 
       means by which such fees are calculated. H.R. Conf. 
       Rep. 104-369, *36. 
 
Several of our cases have "recommended" that district 
courts compare the results at which they arrive via the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
56. In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 2001), is not 
to the contrary. That case, like this one, was governed by the PSLRA, but 
we nevertheless applied full-strength Gunter review rather than the 
version we have described here. In Cendant PRIDES, as here, the district 
court had employed an auction to select and retain lead counsel, see id. 
at 735 n.18, but that decision was not challenged on appeal in Cendant 
PRIDES. Once the use of an auction was accepted, Cendant PRIDES 
ceased to be a typical PSLRA case because the assumptions underlying 
the Reform Act model that we outlined above had broken down. As we 
have explained, see supra Part IV.A.2, the auction method, like the 
traditional approach, relies on the court to serve as the class's agent 
with regard to selecting and retaining lead counsel. In such a context, 
the full Gunter review that we mandated in Cendant PRIDES makes 
sense. 
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percentage-of-recovery method with an abbreviated 
calculation of the lodestar amount. See, e.g., GM Trucks, 55 
F.3d at 822; Prudential, 148 F.3d at 333; Gunter, 223 F.3d 
at 199; Cendant PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 742. 57 The goal of this 
practice is to ensure that the proposed fee award does not 
result in counsel being paid a rate vastly in excess of what 
any lawyer could reasonably charge per hour, thus avoiding 
a "windfall" to lead counsel. The lodestar cross-check, 
however, is very time consuming. Thus, while the Court 
should in the first instance test the presumption, if 
challenged, by the Gunter factors, it may, if necessary, 
utilize the lodestar cross-check.58 
 
Although the foregoing discussion suggests that, in view 
of a presumption, whatever fee is re-submitted by Lead 
Counsel pursuant to the Retainer Agreement on remand 
has a "leg up" for approval, we cannot blind ourselves to 
the reality that both the fee award of $262 million under 
the auction and (potentially up to) $187 million under the 
Retainer Agreement are staggering in their size, and, on the 
basis of the evidence in the record, may represent 
compensation at an astonishing hourly rate (as well as an 
extraordinarily high lodestar "multiplier," see supra n.57). 
Objectors contend that the lodestar figure is approximately 
$8,000,000, which would mean that the multiplier would 
be 45.75 if lead counsel were to receive the court awarded 
fee, and approximately 24 if it were to receive the 
negotiated fee. Lead counsel counter that the $8,000,000 
figure was preliminary and that the final figure will be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
57. Arguably Cendant PRIDES, which, as noted above, see supra, n. 56, 
was not decided as a Reform Act case, may have, by implication, elevated 
the lodestar cross-check from being a "recommendation" to a 
requirement. There the District Court had not performed a lodestar 
cross-check, and by our calculations the fees that it ultimately awarded 
were between 7 and 10 times the lodestar amount. See 243 F.3d at 742. 
We wrote that "[i]n allowing such a high multiplier . . . without even 
calculating it, much less explaining how it [was] justified, the District 
Court strayed from all responsible discretionary parameters" in granting 
the fee award. Id. 
 
58. We note that even PSLRA sponsored fee agreements between Lead 
Plaintiff and Lead Counsel will typically require an accounting of hours 
spent, as the agreement in the present case does. 
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much higher, from 50% to 100%. Even so, the multiplier 
would still be extremely high. 
 
At all events, this was a simple case in terms of liability 
with respect to Cendant, and the case was settled at a very 
early stage, after little formal discovery. Thus the possibility 
of rebuttal of the presumption of reasonableness must be 
seriously considered by the District Court on remand. If the 
Gunter factors (and possible lodestar cross-check) were to 
confirm that the fee agreed to by a lead plaintiff and lead 
counsel was clearly excessive, the court would need to set 
a reasonable fee according to the standards our previous 
cases have set down for class actions not governed by the 
PSLRA. If the District Court does consider the lodestar, it 
might think of it as a floor and the fee under the retainer 
agreement as a ceiling. In such event, it should explain on 
the record its reasons for selecting a fee award at or 
between these two figures. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, the District Court's orders 
approving the Settlement and the Plan of Allocation will be 
affirmed. We hold that the District Court was correct to 
appoint the CalPERS Group as lead plaintiff but that it 
erred in holding an auction to select and retain lead 
counsel. The latter error was harmless with respect to the 
identity of Lead Counsel, but not with respect to the 
determination of its fee. Because we believe that, absent the 
error, the court would have properly appointed BRB and 
BLBG as lead counsel pursuant to the Retainer Agreement 
entered into between the firms and the CalPERS Group, we 
hold that the Agreement remains in force. Consequently, 
the fee award will be vacated and the case remanded with 
instructions to the District Court to dismiss the fee request 
as improper under the Retainer Agreement and to decline 
to consider any further fee requests that are not submitted 
with the "prior approval of the Funds." In considering any 
such fee requests, the Court will be guided by our 
discussion herein. Parties to bear their own costs. 
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